• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.127-150
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• 2020

A Basic Plan for the Promotion of Space Development (hereinafter referred to as "basic plan"), which prescribes mid- and long-term policy objectives and basic direction-setting on space development every five years, is one of the matters to be deliberated by the National Space Committee. Confirmed February 2018 by the Committee, the 3rd Basic Plan has a unique matter, compared to the 2nd Basic Plan. It is to construct "Korean Positioning System(KPS)". Almost every country in the world including Korea has been relying on GPS. On the occasion of the shooting down of a Korean Air flight 007 by Soviet Russia, GPS Standard Positioning Service has been open to the world. Due to technical errors of GPS or conflict of interests between countries in international relations, however, the above Service can be interrupted at any time. Such cessation might bring extensive damage to the social, economic and security domains of every country. This is why some countries has been constructing an independent global or regional satellite navigation system: EU(Galileo), Russia(Glonass), India(NaVic), Japan(QZSS), and China(Beidou). So does South Korea. Once KPS is built, it is expected to make use of the system in various areas such as transportation, aviation, disaster, construction, defense, ocean, distribution, telecommunication, etc. For this, a pan-governmental governance is needed to be established. And this governance must be based on the law. Korea is richly experienced in developing and operating individually satellite itself, but it has little experience in the simultaneous development and operation of the satellites, ground, and users systems, such as KPS. Therefore we need to review overseas cases, in order to minimize trial and error. U.S. GPS is a classic example.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.39
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• pp.319-353
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• 2014

Cyber-based technologies are now ubiquitous around the glob and are emerging as an "instrument of power" in societies, and are becoming more available to a country's opponents, who may use it to attack, degrade, and disrupt communications and the flow of information. The globe-spanning range of cyberspace and no national borders will challenge legal systems and complicate a nation's ability to deter threats and respond to contingencies. Through cyberspace, competitive powers will target industry, academia, government, as well as the military in the air, land, maritime, and space domains of our nations. Enemies in cyberspace will include both states and non-states and will range from the unsophisticated amateur to highly trained professional hackers. In much the same way that airpower transformed the battlefield of World War II, cyberspace has fractured the physical barriers that shield a nation from attacks on its commerce and communication. Cyberthreats to the infrastructure and other assets are a growing concern to policymakers. In 2013 Cyberwarfare was, for the first time, considered a larger threat than Al Qaeda or terrorism, by many U.S. intelligence officials. The new United States military strategy makes explicit that a cyberattack is casus belli just as a traditional act of war. The Economist describes cyberspace as "the fifth domain of warfare and writes that China, Russia, Israel and North Korea. Iran are boasting of having the world's second-largest cyber-army. Entities posing a significant threat to the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure assets include cyberterrorists, cyberspies, cyberthieves, cyberwarriors, and cyberhacktivists. These malefactors may access cyber-based technologies in order to deny service, steal or manipulate data, or use a device to launch an attack against itself or another piece of equipment. However because the Internet offers near-total anonymity, it is difficult to discern the identity, the motives, and the location of an intruder. The scope and enormity of the threats are not just focused to private industry but also to the country's heavily networked critical infrastructure. There are many ongoing efforts in government and industry that focus on making computers, the Internet, and related technologies more secure. As the national intelligence institution's effort, cyber counter-intelligence is measures to identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreign operations that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology, as well as foreign intelligence service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and intentions. However one of the hardest issues in cyber counterintelligence is the problem of "Attribution". Unlike conventional warfare, figuring out who is behind an attack can be very difficult, even though the Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has claimed that the United States has the capability to trace attacks back to their sources and hold the attackers "accountable". Considering all these cyber security problems, this paper examines closely cyber security issues through the lessons from that of U.S experience. For that purpose I review the arising cyber security issues considering changing global security environments in the 21st century and their implications to the reshaping the government system. For that purpose this study mainly deals with and emphasis the cyber security issues as one of the growing national security threats. This article also reviews what our intelligence and security Agencies should do among the transforming cyber space. At any rate, despite of all hot debates about the various legality and human rights issues derived from the cyber space and intelligence service activity, the national security should be secured. Therefore, this paper suggests that one of the most important and immediate step is to understanding the legal ideology of national security and national intelligence.

• The Journal of Korean Obstetrics and Gynecology
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.95-118
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• 2020

Objectives: The objective of this in vivo study is to observe the analgesic effects or improvements of Gyejibokryeong-hwan aqueous extracts (GJBRHe) on the Primary dysmenorrhea (PD) in rats as compared to those of Indomethacin (IND). Methods: The rats were administered with estradiol benzoate for 10 days and oxytocin 1 hour after the last 10th administration of estradiol benzoate to make the primary dysmenorrhea rat model. Gyejibokryeong-hwan aqueous extracts 500, 250 and 125 mg/kg were orally administrated, for 10 days once a day. Then the changes on the body weights and gains during experimental periods, uterine weights and gross inspections, abdominal writhing response for analgesic activities, uterus lipid peroxidation (malondialdehyde (MDA) levels), antioxidant defense system - glutathione (GSH) contents, activities of superoxide dismutase (SOD) and catalase (CAT), Nuclear factor-κB (NF-κB) and Cyclooxygenase (COX)-2 mRNA expressions, were monitored with uterus histopathology and immunohistochemistry for tumor necrosis factor (TNF)-α and inducible nitric oxide synthase (iNOS). The results of Gyejibokryeong-hwan aqueous extracts were compared to those of Indomethacin adminstered rats. Results: As results of estradiol benzoate and oxytocin treatment, noticeable decreases of body weights and gains, uterus GSH contents, SOD and CAT activities, increases of abdominal writhing responses, uterus lipid peroxidation (MDA level), uterus weights, NF-κB and COX-2 mRNA expressions were observed with increases of TNF-α and iNOS immunolabeled cells, inflammatory cell infiltrations, congestion and enlargement of the uterus at gross and histopathological inspections. These means classic inflammatory and oxidative stress mediated primary dysmenorrhea are relatively well induced. However, these signs were favorably and dose-dependently inhibited by administration of three different dosages of Gyejibokryeong-hwan aqueous extracts, but lesser than those of Indomethacin. Conclusions: The results obtained in this study suggest that Gyejibokryeong-hwan aqueous extracts has favorable analgesic and refinement activities dose-dependently on the estradiol benzoate and oxytocin treatment-induced primary dysmenorrhea signs.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.349-384
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• 2013

The Sputnik 1 launching in 1957 made the world recognize the necessity of international regulations on space development and activities in outer space. The United Nations established COPUOS the very next year, and adopted the mandate to examine legal issues concerning the peaceful uses of outer space. At the time, the military sector of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union were in charge of the space development and they were not welcomed to discuss the prohibition of the military uses of outer space at the legal section in the COPUOS. Although both countries had common interests in securing the freedom of military uses in outer space. As the social and economic benefits derived from space activities have become more apparent, civil expenditures on space activities have continued to increase in several countries. Virtually all new spacefaring states explicitly place a priority on space-based applications to support social and economic development. Such space applications as satellite navigation and Earth imaging are core elements of almost every existing civil space program. Likewise, Moon exploration continues to be a priority for such established spacefaring states as China, Russia, India, and Japan. Recently, Companies that manufacture satellites and ground equipment have also seen significant growth. On 25 February 2012 China successfully launched the eleventh satellite for its indigenous global navigation and positioning satellite system, Beidou. Civil space activities began to grow in China when they were allocated to the China Great Wall Industry Corporation in 1986. China Aerospace Corporation was established in 1993, followed by the development of the China National Space Administration. In Japan civil space was initially coordinated by the National Space Activities Council formed in 1960. Most of the work was performed by the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of the University of Tokyo, the National Aerospace Laboratory, and, most importantly, the National Space Development Agency. In 2003 all this work was assumed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency(JAXA). Japan eases restrictions on military space development. On 20 June 2012 Japan passed the Partial Revision of the Cabinet Establishment Act, which restructured the authority to regulate Japanese space policy and budget, including the governance of the JAXA. Under this legislation, the Space Activities Commission of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, which was responsible for the development of Japanese space program, will be abolished. Regulation of space policy and budget will be handed over to the Space Strategy Headquarter formed under the Prime Minister's Cabinet. Space Strategy will be supported by a Consultative Policy Commission as an academics and independent observers. By revoking Article 4 (Objectives of the Agency) of a law that previously governed JAXA and mandated the development of space programs for "peaceful purposes only," the new legislation demonstrates consistency with Article 2 of the 2008 Basic Space Law. In conformity with the principles laid down in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty JAXA is now free to pursue the non-aggressive military use of space. New legislation is the culmination of a decade-long process that sought ways to "leverage Japan's space development programs and technologies for security purposes, to bolster the nation's defenses in the face of increased tensions in East Asia." In this connection it would also be very important and necessary to create an Asian Space Agency(ASA) for strengthening cooperation within the Asian space community towards joint undertakings.

• Journal of Korean society of Dental Hygiene
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.49-64
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• 2004

This study is designed to conduct a questionnaire research into the safety control and the actual condition of radiography by working with dentistry belonging to university hospitals, dental hospitals and dental clinics for three months ranging from August, 2003 to October, 2003. The researcher came to the following conclusions. 1. The research on the current condition of possessed radiational equipment shows that 61.2 percent of the subjects had one intraoral radiation medicine and that 70.1 percent of the subjects had more than one extraoral radiation medicine and that 37.3 percent of the subjects had more than one digital radiation medicine. 2. Most of intraoral radiography (82.1%) was conducted by dental hygienists, and 7.5 percent of intraoral radiography was conducted by nurse aids. On the other hand, most of extraoral radiography (76.6%) was conducted by dental hygienists and digital radiography was conducted by dental hygienists(60.6%), dentists(32.0%) and radiographer(80.0%). 3. The less-than 1-meter-long distance between cone and the radiographer accounted for 44.8 percent. And the more-than 1.6-meter-long distance accounted for no more than 13.4 percent. The exposure time per standard film which was adjusted to each part accounted for 71.6 percent. Fixing the film on the part of healthy patients accounted for 76.1 percent. Fixing the film of elderly patients and children patients by the radiographer accounted for 43.3 percent. 4. The average daily photographing frequency of standard films stood at six to ten pieces(31.3%), and the average weekly photographing frequency of bitewing films stood at less than one piece(47.8%), and the dentistries where bitewing films were not employed accounted for 25.4%. The subjects whose average weekly photographing freqeuncy of occlusal films stood at less than a piece accounted for 59.7 percent. The dentistries whose average weekly photographing frequency of pediatric films stood at one to five pieces accounted for 41.8 percent. In case of panorama & cephalo, one to five pieces on a weekly average accounted for 36.2 percent. The dentistries whose average daily photographing frequency of digital radiation medicine stood at less than 1 piece accounted for 40.0 percent. 5. The research on the use of protective clothes shows that pregnant ·women only accounted for 31.3 percent. In regard to the use of protective clothes in case of the radiographers fixing films, the cases where no protective clothes were employed accounted for 88.1 percent. The reason was said to he attributable to the trouble related to wearing the clothes(54.2%). 6. The survey on the measurement of exposure dose shows that the cases where no measurement was made accounted for 76.1 percent. As far as the measurement methods of exposure dose was concerned, the employment of film badge accounted for 68.8 percent. The subjects turned out to conduct measurement of exposure dose every third month, which accounted for 43.8 percent. The barriers to the measurement of measurement of exposure dose were attributable to the recognition that a little amount of exposure dose need not be measured(29.9%). 7. The survey on the distinction of radiation rooms and clinic rooms reveals that the cases where radiation rooms exclusively existed accounted for 67.2 percent. 43.3 percent of the subjects turned out to have only one protective garment, and 49.3 percent of the subjects proved to conduct a periodical checkup of radiational equipment. The survey on the examination certificates of radiational generators and protective facilities indicates that 80.6 percent of the subjects had the certificates. The research also shows that the subjects with the marks indicating the radiational areas accounted for 70.1 percent. And trustees turned out to handle developing solutions and fixing solutions.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.