• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.135-166
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• 2008

This paper reports the empirical results of comparing the willingness to pay(WTP) for health risk reductions and the willingness to accept(WTA) for risk increases using experimental market methods in the first time in Korea. Health risks were defined as probabilities of premature death from exposure to one of As, Pb, and THM in tap water. A total of six experimental markets with 15 participants in each experiments were held using 20 repetitive Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auctions. To compare the effects of market experiences, trading a marketed good, candy bar, was introduced before the trading the non-marketed good, drinking water risks. Moreover, an objective risk information was provided after the first 10 trials to incorporate learning processes. Regardless of marketed or non-marketed goods, the mean of WTA exceeded the mean of WTP at the first auction trial. As experimental trials proceeded, the disparity between WTA and WTP for marketed goods disappeared. However results for non-marketed goods were rather mixed to the extent that WTA for health risks from As (relatively high risk leves) were significantly larger than WTP, while there were no significant difference between WTA and WTP for health risks fro Pb and THM (relatively low risk levels). On the other hand, participants seemed to respond in a 'rational' manner to the objective risk information provided, with positive learning effects of market-like experience(especially in the WTA experiments).

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.105-116
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• 2017

In recent years, large Korean construction companies have suffered serious losses in their overseas business. Many practitioners and researchers have analyzed causes of cost overrun in these projects. However, these arguments have not been empirically verified based on acutal project cases. This study investigated cost overrun rate, contingency, allowance, predicted risk before bidding, and actual and residual risk after award in the 67 international infrastructure projects conducted by 13 large construction companies. The causes of cost overruns are derived as follows. First, they identified the possibility of cost overrun to some extent before the bidding, but did not reflect the enough risk money to bid price. In particular, this behavior was more severe in badly cost-overrun projects. Second, the causes of cost overrun were more influenced by external environmental risk than internal capability risk. However, the internal risk in badly cost-overrun projects was relatively high compared to cost-underrun projects. Third, badly cost-overrun projects failed to mitigate risk. However, cost underrun projects were affected more by low exterior risk conditions than by well mitigated risk. This study provides more informed knowledge in controlling project costs in international infrastructure projects.