• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.351-395
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• 2019

Hempel's original intuitions about the raven's paradox are summed up in three ways. The first is known as the paradoxical conclusion: If one observes that an object a - about which nothing is antecedently known - is a non-black non-raven, then this observation confirms that all ravens are black. The second is an intuitive verdict of the misled conclusion of the paradox: If one observes that an object a - which is known to be a non-raven - is non-black (hence, is a non-black non-raven), then this observation does not confirmationally affect that all ravens are black. The third is a comparative claim between the two intuitions: the degree of confirmation appearing in the first intuition is greater than the degree of confirmation in the second intuition. The Standard Bayesian Solution of the paradox is evaluated to fleshed Hempel's intuitions out by establishing the first intuition. However, such an evaluation of this solution should be further analyzed because Hempel's intuition is not the only one. The solution of paradox does not establish the second intuition in a strict sense. However, I think the Bayesian solution will establish the second intuition based on its typical strategy of quantitative vindication. If only quantitative vindication is accepted, this evaluation of the solution remains valid. Nevertheless, the solution fails to establish the third intuition. In this article, I propose a new way to apply the Bayesian method to establish Hempel's intuitions, including the third intuition. If my analysis is correct, the Standard Bayesian Solution of the raven's paradox could indeed flesh Hempel's intuitions out by denying one of the assumptions considered essential.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.367-390
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• 2017

Much of literature on the paradoxes of confirmation has been focused on the problems raised by the fact that a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis that every raven is black. In this paper I would like to emphasize that more interesting problems are still waiting to be explained, if we notice that a black nonraven confirms the raven hypothesis as well. For this I examine what Hempel exactly means by the paradoxes of confirmation, and show that the previous discussions on the paradoxes were at most partial solutions. Then I argue that Hempel presupposes the so-called 'converse consequence condition' regarding confirmational evidence. Finally I discuss what impact is made on the Bayesian solution to the paradoxes, if we accept a more faithful interpretation to Hempel.