• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.127-132
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• 2016

Recently, China & Japan have expanded their responding ADIZ(Air Defence Identification Zone) to implement each Government's maritime policy and to project their Air Power in preparation for maritime provocation & contingency, especially over the piled area where East Asia countries have claimed to have maritime jurisdiction one another. So this is to guide the Development Option for Korea Air Defence Identification Zone to cope with the maritime intentions of the neighboring countries, considering the international law for ADIZ, the maritime policy and the maritime sovereign & jurisdiction area of the Republic of Korea, etc.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.44 no.5
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• pp.661-674
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• 2009

In recent academic debates within the UN Group of Experts on Geographical Names, two contrasting views evolved as regards to the status of the names of transboundary features or features beyond a single sovereignty. The partial view posits that a name is an endonym only for those portions of a feature where the name corresponds to the language used while the whole view argues that a name in its official language is an endonym for the whole feature. In either of these views, the name East Sea should be given due respect, for the Korean territorial waters at least or as an endonym for the entire sea. This paper supports the partial view that a geographical feature can be separated and each separated portion can have different name forms and status. Regarding the separation of a feature, the limits to which local people perceive as 'their' sea should be used. The name East Sea is proposed as the translated form of an endonym Donghae.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• The Sea:JOURNAL OF THE KOREAN SOCIETY OF OCEANOGRAPHY
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.104-109
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• 2013

The spawning characteristics of Hexagrammos agrammus and Hexagrammos otakii was directly observed in coastal regions of the Yellow Sea and South Sea during the spawning seasons using scuba diving. The territorial male H. agrammus showed different body size, nuptial coloration and nest location compared to those of H. otakii, even though both species caring egg masses were found at the almost same depths. In the West sea, a relatively small guardian H. agrammus male protects 1-2 egg masses laid on a clump of red algae within his territory. The territorial males in red nuptial coloration and their egg masses were well camouflaged in their surroundings. Contrary to H. agammus, a guardian H. otakii male in yellowish nuptial coloration protects 4-8 egg masses in a nest. In addition, their nests were located on the relatively open environments such as discarded fishing nets, rock crevices and a clump of algae. The results of present study shows that even though both of two species belonged to Hexagrammidae, they have different strategies for spawning and protecting their egg masses.

• Proceedings of the KSRS Conference
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• 2002.10a
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• pp.663-663
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• 2002

The National Oceanographic Research Institute of KOREA started to survey for the basic data necessary to territorial sea and EEZ identification and marine development with Multi-Beam Echo Sounder(L3 SeaBeam 2112) since 1996. The Multi-Beam surveys has provided a very new and precise way of describing the morphology and nature of the underwater seabed. Multi-Beam Echo Sounder systems employ sound waves propagating at angles which vary from vertical to nearly horizontal. The locations on the bottom where echoes are generated cover a swath whose port to starboard width may be equal to many times the water depth. Newer Multi-beam bathymetric sonars provide both a beam by beam depth and backscatter amplitude of the bottom. But The backscattered amplitude didn't use for identification of bottom properties because backscatter amplitude effects by the many environmental variables of underwater and seabed. We investigates the utilization of geo-referenced backscatter amplitude and analysis of relationship between The Backscattered Amplitude and Sidescan Sonar imagery from Sea Beam 2112. For the backscattered amplitude imagery mainly represents the properties of sediment, we computed the beam geometry, time-varied amplifier gain, and mainly incidence angle to the topography using bathymetric model at each ping. In this paper, those issues are illustrated, and the angular independent imagery based on swath topographic model is described.

• Korean Journal of Remote Sensing
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.95-100
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• 2012

Big swell is often generated offshore and damages the coasts after travelling long distance. In order to prevent coastal damages, wave measurements should be performed offshore as well as coastal waters around Korea. However, in-situ wave measurements are difficult because of high expense of instruments and high risk of operation. Satellite wave measurements using altimeter make it possible to get wave information from the sea difficult to execute field measurements such as the center of the East Sea or exclusive territorial waters. In order to use wave information from the satellite altimeter, it is important to verify altimeter wave data with in-situ data. This paper examines significant wave height data observed by ENVISAT altimeter by comparing wave data observed at Ieodo station.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.44-51
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• 2014

This thesis analyzes the latest operating concept and status for Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) researching overseas ADIZ CONOPS, international legal basis for ADIZ, the intention & background of proclamation for China Air Defense Identification Zone(CADIZ). Firstly, ADIZ is lawful concerning international connivance for ADIZ where around 20 countries have operated, Article 56 "Rights, jurisdiction & duties of the coastal State" and Article 301 "Peaceful uses of the seas" on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLS). Secondly, ADIZ has been regarded as a support means for national interest & policy as well as military air defense one. Thirdly, Based on legal re-interpretation for UNCLS relating to ADIZ, China proclaimed CADIZ where can ensure national maritime policy and strategy including A2/AD(Anti-Access & Area Defence), inroad into the ocean, claim for Senkaku Islands possession, etc..

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.125-149
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• 2021

Even 10 years after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan has yet to solve the problems emerging from generating contaminated water every day. Japan has unilaterally decided to release nuclear wastewater in the sea despite Korea's concerns about safety as their radioactive water storage tanks reach the limits. Despite Korea's response, Japan is still preparing to discharge nuclear wastewater without fulfilling its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. There are concerns about marine pollution caused by the radioactive materials from nuclear wastewater and invading Korea's maritime sovereignty. In particular, it is impossible to reverse the effects of environmental pollution, so plans to discharge radioactive water must be prevented unless immediate safety is guaranteed. This study proposes Korea's response strategy to resolve the conflict between the two countries due to plans to release contaminated water. Korea should respond to Japan's release of nuclear wastewater in the sea in various ways through cooperation with Japan, provisional measures, and cooperation with neighboring countries.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.29-55
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• 2018

Arctic sea ice has been retreating as a result of the global warming. Arctic sea ice extent for April 2018 averaged 13.71 million square kilometers. This figure shows far less sea ice compared to the average extent from 1981 to 2010. Meanwhile, 287 times of maritime transits through the Northwest Passage have been made during the 2017 and the first ship traversed the Northern Sea Route without the assistant of ice-breaker in August 2017. Commercialization of the Arctic Passage means significant economic and strategic advantages by shortening the distance. In this article, 'Arctic Passage' means Northern Sea Route along the Arctic coast of Russia and Northwest Passage crossing Canadian Arctic Ocean. As climate changes, the potential feasibility of the Arctic Passage has been drawing international attention. Since navigation in this area remains hazardous in some aspects, IMO adopted Polar Code to promote safe, secure and sustainable shipping through the Arctic Passage. Futhermore, Russia and Canada regulate foreign vessels over the maritime zones with the authority to unilaterally exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the Article 234 of UNCLOS. The dispute over the navigation regime of the arctic passage materialized with Russia proclaimed Dmitrii Laptev and Sannikov Straits as historically belong to U.S.S.R. in the mid 1960s and Canada declared that the waters of the passage are historic internal waters in 1973 for the first time. So as to support their claims, In 1985, Russia and Canada established straight baseline including Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage. The United States has consistently protested that the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage are straits used for international navigation which are subject to the regime of transit passage. Firstly, it seems that Russia and Canada do not meet the basic requirements for acquiring a historic title. Secondly, since the Law of the Sea had adopted before the establishment of straight baseline over the Russian Arctic Archipelago and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, Ships can exercise at least the right of innocent passage. Lastly, Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage have fulfilled the both geographical and functional criteria pertaining to the strait used for international navigation under the international law. Especially, should the arctic passage become commercially viable, it can be expected to accumulate the functional criterion. Russia and Canada regulate the ships navigate in their maritime zones by adopting the higher degree of an environmental standard than generally accepted international rules and standard mainly under the Article 234 of UNCLOS. However, the Article 234 must be interpreted restrictively as this contains constraint on the freedom of navigation. Thus, it is reasonable to consider that the Article 234 is limited only to the EEZ of coastal states. Therefore, ships navigating in the Arctic Passage with the legal status of the territorial sea and the international straits under the law of the sea have the right of innocent passage and transit passage as usual.