• Title/Summary/Keyword: territorial airspace

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The Status of North Korean Airspace after Reunification (북한 공역의 통일 후 지위)

  • Kwon, Chang-Young
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.32 no.1
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    • pp.287-325
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    • 2017
  • Considering the development of aerospace, military science and technology since the 20th century, the sky is very important for the nation's existence and prosperity. The proverb "Whosoever commands the space commands the world itself!" emphasizes the need for the command of the air. This essay is the first study on the status of airspace after reunification. First, the territorial airspace is over the territory and territorial sea, and its horizontal extent is determined by the territorial boundary lines. Acceptance of the present order is most reasonable, rather than attempting to reconfigure through historical truths about border issues, and it could be supported by neighboring countries in the reunification period. For peace in Northeast Asia, the reunified Korea needs to respect the existing border agreement between North Korea and China or Russia. However, the North Korean straight baselines established in the East Sea and the Yellow Sea should be discarded because they are not available under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is desirable for the reunified Korea to redefine the straight baselines that comply with international law and determine the territorial waters up to and including the 12-nautical mile outside it. Second, the Flight Information Region (hereinafter "FIR") is a region defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter "ICAO") in order to provide information necessary for the safe and efficient flight of aircraft and the search and rescue of aircraft. At present, Korea is divided into Incheon FIR which is under the jurisdiction of South Korea and Pyongyang FIR which is under the jurisdiction of North Korea. If North Korea can not temporarily exercise control of Pyongyang FIR due to a sudden change of circumstances, it is desirable for South Korea to exercise control of Pyongyang FIR, and if it is unavoidable, ICAO should temporarily exercise it. In reunified Korea, it is desirable to abolish Pyongyang FIR and integrate it into Incheon FIR with the approval of ICAO, considering systematic management and control of FIR, establishment of route, and efficiency of management. Third, the Air Defense Identification Zone (hereinafter "ADIZ") is a zone that requires easy identification, positioning, and control of aircraft for national security purposes, and is set up unilaterally by the country concerned. The US unilaterally established the Korea Air Defense Identification Area (KADIZ) by the Declaration of Commitment on March 22, 1951. The Ministry of Defense proclaimed a new KADIZ which extended to the area including IEODO on December 13, 2013. At present, North Korea's military warning zone is set only at maritime boundaries such as the East Sea and the Yellow Sea. But in view of its lack of function as ADIZ in relations with China and Russia, the reunified Korea has no obligation to succeed it. Since the depth of the Korean peninsula is short, it is necessary to set ADIZ boundary on the outskirts of the territorial airspace to achieve the original purpose of ADIZ. Therefore, KADIZ of the reunified Korea should be newly established by the boundary line that coincides with the Incheon FIR of the reunified Korea. However, if there is no buffer zone overlapping with or adjacent to the ADIZs of neighboring countries, military tensions may rise. Therefore, through bilateral negotiations for peace in Northeast Asia, a buffer zone is established between adjacent ADIZs.

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A Study of Allocation of Military Airspace and Range Using Goal Programming (목표계획법을 활용한 군 공역 및 사격장 할당 모형 연구)

  • Lyu, Hyun-Min;Lee, Moon-Gul
    • Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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    • v.40 no.2
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    • pp.63-77
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    • 2015
  • The territorial air that our sovereignty is being applied to is divided into several zones and areas. In order to use and manage them effectively, these zones and areas have laws, regulations and rules. The number of airspaces (MOA : Military Operation Area) and Ranges that are used in the military are limited and many airbases are being used for training. Currently the central department manages some, and the rest are independent airbases. Therefore, efficient allocation is not performed and the result occurs where airspaces and ranges are allocated unnecessarily. This is increasing the workload of staff leading to unnecessary re-work. To slove problem, this study proposed models for allocating airspaces and ranges using goal programming with multi-objective functions of minimizing the deviations of the target values.

China's recent establishment of its ADIZ and its implications for regional security (중국의 방공식별구역(ADIZ) 선포와 역내 안보적 함의)

  • SHIN, Chang-Hoon
    • Strategy21
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    • s.33
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    • pp.148-177
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    • 2014
  • The regional security and stability in Northeast Asia has become more complicated because of a sudden establishment of China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on 23 November 2013. One dimensional conflicts on the territorial sovereignty over the islands between the regional States has developed into the two dimensional conflicts like maritime delimitations among the States concerned since they have all ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which adopts the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone regime. Moreover, due to the notion of the outer limit of the continental shelf, the conflicts have developed into three dimensional ones in order to acquire more natural resources even in the seabed. To make matters worse, such three dimensional conflicts have expanded to the airspace as well. The paper will analyze what implications the sudden declaration of China's ADIZ have for the regional security in Northeast Asia from the perspectives of public international law. To this end, the paper 1) starts with the debates on the legal nature of the ADIZ, 2) identifies the Chinese government's political motives for the establishment of the ADIZ over the East China Sea, 3) assesses the responses of the regional States and the USA to the China's establishment of the ADIZ, and then 4) discuss what implications the overlapped ADIZ of the three key States in the region have for the regional security and stability.

"Legal Study on Boundary between Airspace and Outer Space" (영공(領空)과 우주공간(宇宙空間)의 한계(限界)에 관한 법적(法的) 고찰(考察))

  • Choi, Wan-Sik
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.2
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    • pp.31-67
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    • 1990
  • One of the first issues which arose in the evolution of air law was the determination of the vertical limits of airspace over private property. In 1959 the UN in its Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, started to give attention to the question of the meaning of the term "outer space". Discussions in the United Nations regarding the delimitation issue were often divided between those in favour of a functional approach ("functionalists"), and those seeking the delineation of a boundary ("spatialists"). The functionalists, backed initially by both major space powers, which viewed any boundary as possibly restricting their access to space(Whether for peaceful or military purposes), won the first rounds, starting with the 1959 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which did not consider that the topic called for priority consideration. In 1966, however, the spatialists, were able to place the issue on the agenda of the Outer Sapce Committee pursuant to Resolution 2222 (xxx1). However, the spatialists were not able to present a common position since there existed a variety of propositions for delineation of a boundary. Over the years, the funtionalists have seemed to be losing ground. As the element of location is a decisive factor for the choice of the legal regime to be applied, a purely functional approach to the regulation of activities in the space above the Earth does not offer a solution. It is therefore to be welcomed that there is clear evidence of a growing recognition of the defect inherent to such an approach and that a spatial approach to the problem is gaining support both by a growing number of States as well as by publicists. The search for a solution of the problem of demarcating the two different legal regimes governing the space above the Earth has undoubtedly been facilitated, and a number of countries, among them Argentina, Belgium, France, Italy and Mexico have already advocated the acceptance of the lower boundary of outer space at a height of 100km. The adoption of the principle of sovereignty at that height does not mean that States would not be allowed to take protective measures against space activities above that height which constitute a threat to their security. A parallel can be drawn with the defence of the State's security on the high seas. Measures taken by States in their own protection on the high seas outside the territorial waters-provided that they are proportionate to the danger-are not considered to infringe the principle of international law. The most important issue in this context relates to the problem of a right of passage for space craft through foreign air space in order to reach outer space. In the reports to former ILA Conferences an explanation was given of the reasons why no customary rule of freedom of passage for aircraft through foreign territorial air space could as yet be said to exist. It was suggested, however, that though the essential elements for the creation of a rule of customary international law allowing such passage were still lacking, developments apperaed to point to a steady growth of a feeling of necessity for such a rule. A definite treaty solution of the demarcation problem would require further study which should be carried out by the UN Outer Space Committee in close co-operation with other interested international organizations, including ICAO. If a limit between air space and outer space were established, air space would automatically come under the regime of the Chicago Convention alone. The use of the word "recognize" in Art. I of chicago convention is an acknowledgement of sovereignty over airspace existing as a general principle of law, the binding force of which exists independently of the Convention. Further it is important to note that the Aricle recognizes this sovereignty, as existing for every state, holding it immaterial whether the state is or is not a contracting state. The functional criteria having been created by reference to either the nature of activity or the nature of the space object, the next hurdle would be to provide methods of verification. With regard to the question of international verification the establishment of an International Satelite Monitoring Agency is required. The path towards the successful delimitation of outer space from territorial space is doubtless narrow and stony but the establishment of a precise legal framework, consonant with the basic principles of international law, for the future activities of states in outer space will, it is still believed, remove a source of potentially dangerous conflicts between states, and furthermore afford some safeguard of the rights and interests of non-space powers which otherwise are likely to be eroded by incipient customs based on at present almost complete freedom of action of the space powers.

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A study on Operation Rules of Korean Air Defence Identification Zone (한국 방공식별구역 운영규칙에 관한 고찰)

  • Kwon, Jong-Pil;Lee, Yeong H.
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.32 no.2
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    • pp.189-217
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    • 2017
  • Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

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The Legal Status of Military Aircraft in the High Seas

  • Kim, Han Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.32 no.1
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    • pp.201-224
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    • 2017
  • The main subject of this article focused on the legal status of the military aircraft in the high seas. For this the legal status of the military aircraft, the freedom of overflight, the right of hot pursuit, the right of visit and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) were dealt. The 1944 Chicago Convention neither explicitly nor implicitly negated the customary norms affecting the legal status of military aircraft as initially codified within the 1919 Paris Convention. So the status of military aircraft was not redefined with the Chicago Convention and remains, as stated in the 1919 Paris Convention, as a norm of customary international law. The analyses on the legal status of the military aircraft in the high seas are found as follows; According to the Article 95 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. We can suppose that the military aircraft in the high seas have also complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. According to the Article 111 (5) of the UNCLOS the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. We can conclude that the right of hot pursuit may be exercised by military aircraft. According to the Article 110 of the UNCLOS a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy, (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade, (c) the ship is engaged in an unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109, (d) the ship is without nationality, or (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. As for Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) it is established and declared unilaterally by the air force of a state for the national security. However, there are no articles dealing with it in the 1944 Chicago Convention and there are no international standards to recognize or prohibit the establishment of ADIZs. ADIZ is not interpreted as the expansion of territorial airspace.

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Legal Review on the Regulatory Measures of the European Union on Aircraft Emission (구주연합의 항공기 배출 규제 조치의 국제법적 고찰)

  • Park, Won-Hwa
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.25 no.1
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    • pp.3-26
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    • 2010
  • The European Union(EU) has recently introduced its Directive 2008/101/EC to include aviation in the EU ETS(emissions trading system). As an amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC that regulates reduction of the green house gas(GHG) emissions in Europe in preparation for the Kyoto Protocol, 1997, it obliges both EU and non-EU airline operators to reduce the emission of the carbon dioxide(CO2) significantly in the year 2012 and thereafter from the level they made in 2004 to 2006. Emission allowances allowed free of charge for each airline operator is 97% in the first year 2012 and 95% from 2013 and thereafter from the average annual emissions during historical years 2004 to 2006. Taking into account the rapid growth of air traffic, i.e. 5% in recent years, airlines operating to EU have to reduce their emissions by about 30% in order to meet the requirements of the EU Directive, if not buy the emissions right in the emissions trading market. However, buying quantity is limited to 15% in the year 2012 subject to possible increase from the year 2013. Apart from the hard burden of the airline operators, in particular of those from non-European countries, which is not concern of this paper, the EU Directive has certain legal problems. First, while the Kyoto Protocol of universal application is binding on the Annex I countries of the Climate Change Convention, i.e. developed countries including all Member States of the European Union to reduce GHG at least by 5% in the implementation period from 2008 to 2012 over the 1990 level, non-Annex I countries which are not bound by the Kyoto Protocol see their airlines subjected to aircraft emissions reductions scheme of EU when operating to EU. This is against the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol dealing with the emissions of GHG including CO2, target of the EU Directive. While the Kyoto Protocol mandates ICAO to set up a worldwide scheme for aircraft emissions to contribute to stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, the EU ETS was drawn up outside the framework of the international Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO). Second, EU Directive 2008/101 defines 'aviation activities' as covering 'flights which depart from or arrive in the territory of a Member State to which the [EU] Treaty applies'. While the EU airlines are certainly subject to the EU regulations, obliging non-EU airlines to reduce their emissions even if the emissions are produced during the flight over the high seas and the airspace of the third countries is problematic. The point is whether the EU Directive can be legally applied to extra-territorial behavior of non-EU entities. Third, the EU Directive prescribes 2012 as the first year for implementation. However, the year 2012 is the last year of implementation of the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I countries including members of EU to reduce GHG including the emissions of CO2 coming out from domestic airlines operation. Consequently, EU airlines were already on the reduction scheme of CO2 emissions as long as their domestic operations are concerned from 2008 until the year 2012. But with the implementation of Directive 2008/101 from 2012 for all the airlines, regardless of the status of the country Annex I or not where they are registered, the EU airlines are no longer at the disadvantage compared with the airlines of non-Annex I countries. This unexpected premium for the EU airlines may result in a derogation of the Kyoto Protocol at least for the year 2012. Lastly, as a conclusion, the author shed light briefly on how the Korean aviation authorities are dealing with the EU restrictive measures.

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A Study on Jurisdiction under the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions (국제항공테러협약의 관할권 연구)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.59-89
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    • 2009
  • The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

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