• 전자통신동향분석
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• 제34권6호
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• pp.17-27
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• 2019

This paper introduces the 5G spectrum auction in Germany that occurred last summer and ended overheatedly after an extraordinarily long period. We describe the context of the latest German spectrum auction and trace the participants' bidding behavior. This case details the trend of the 5G spectrum auction and the factors that affect the spectrum auction as follows: First, it is determined that investment obligations that force network installations can be a financial burden to mobile network operators (MNOs) and require a careful approach. Second, excess demands can cause auction overheating and the spectrum supply volume needs to be determined by a proper demand forecast and investment incentive. Third, 'Set-Aside' for local usage aids in developing the vertical industry; however it limits the spectrum supply for mobiles and leads to higher bidding prices. Fourth, a modified adoption of a typical spectrum auction can alleviate MNO's financial burdens to secure the broadband spectrum. Finally, competition to secure the necessary bandwidth in the situation of limited spectrum supply may delay the process of the spectrum auction, causing it overheated.

• ETRI Journal
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• 제35권6호
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• pp.1126-1133
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• 2013

The first spectrum auction in the Republic of Korea is attention-worthy owing to the fierce competition for the only 1.8-GHz spectrum license, the winning bidder of which was suspected of overpaying for its acquisition. This study empirically investigates the existence of a "winner's curse" in the first Korean spectrum auction by using a standard event study methodology. The results show that both the winner and loser experienced significant positive returns on the completion day of the auction. The results imply that there was no winner's curse in the auction and that the losing firm might increase its competitive advantage by acquiring other spectrum licenses despite failing to achieve its initial target spectrum. Therefore, these results suggest that regulators may need to consider bringing about positive short-term wealth benefits to all bidders by appropriately designing a spectrum auction, such as by performing multiband auctions.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제18권4호
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• 한국통신학회논문지
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• 제39C권12호
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• pp.1352-1361
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• 2014

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which regulates interstate and international communications in the United States, has established a plan to allocate high demand spectrum to the usage of mobile communication by inducing voluntary relinquishment from broadcasters. This plan was introduced by the National Broadband Plan as an incentive auction in 2010. The FCC suggested the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in 2012 and issued Report and Order (R&O) on May 2014 regarding the overall rules of incentive auctions expected to be implemented in mid-2015. The incentive auction attracts the attention of many countries because this policy suggests a novel approach regarding the alteration of use from an inefficient usage to an efficient usage in limited spectrum resources. In this paper, we define the key issues in order for implementation of incentive auction. Since the incentive auction is a highly complicated process compared to previous allocation procedures, a careful review of the incentive auction regarding whether this spectrum policy can be introduced is required. In this paper, we describe the detailed procedure of the incentive auction and present policy considerations for the introduction of the incentive auction.

• 한국통신학회논문지
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• 제38A권11호
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• pp.944-954
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• 2013

인지무선(cognitive radio)기술은 특정 주파수에 대해 권한을 가진 주 사용자가 자신의 주파수를 사용하지 않을 때 생기는 유휴 대역을 특정 주파수에 대해 권한이 없는 부 사용자가 사용할 수 있도록 하는 기술이다. 본 논문에서는 인지무선 네트워크에 옥션 게임 이론을 적용시켜, 주파수 가격과 옥션 주기를 동시에 고려한 주 사용자의 이득을 최대화 할 수 있도록 하는 알고리즘을 제안한다. 부 사용자들이 제시한 주파수양의 비율에 따라 주 사용자의 주파수를 분배하는 옥션이 반복적으로 진행되면서 주 사용자는 최적의 주파수 가격을 찾게 되며, 찾아진 주파수 가격 정보와 본 논문에서 새로 제시한 주 사용자의 효용함수를 이용해 최적의 옥션 주기를 찾게 된다. 동시에 주 사용자는 찾아진 최적의 옥션 주기에 맞는 주파수 가격을 최종적으로 결정하게 된다.

• 한국정보통신학회논문지
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• 제3권3호
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• pp.485-499
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• 1999

1989년 뉴질랜드에서 전파관리에 시장메커니즘이 도입된 이후 전세계적으로 동 방식에 대한 관심이 증대되고 있으며, 그 도입도 점차 확산되고 있다. 이러한 추세에 따라 한국에서도 전파관리에 시장메커니즘 도입에 관한 논의가 최근 들어 활발하게 이루어지고 있다. 이와 같은 배경 하에서 최근 정보통신부가 입법예고한 전파법 개정(안)에는 주파수에 재산권을 도입하고, 도입된 주파수 재산권을 경매방식을 통하여 배분하는 내용이 포함되어 있다. 경매는 자원의 가격결정과 배분이라는 두 가지 문제를 풀기 위해 적용될 수 있기 때문에 매력적인 시장방식의 메커니즘으로 인식되고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 경매방식의 유효성은 주파수 재산권 배분에서 당연한 것으로 받아들여져서는 안될 것이다. 경매가 잘 못 설계될 경우 당초에 의도하였던 것과는 달리 비효율적인 주파수 배분이 이루어 질 수도 있게 될 뿐만 아니라, 전파관리에 부정적인 영향을 줄 수 있기 때문이다. 본 논문에서는 주파수 재산권 경매방식 설계시 고려해야 할 핵심요소와 논점들을 기존의 경매이론과 주요국의 경험을 토대로 논의하였다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권9호
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• pp.3312-3334
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• 2015

In this paper, a mechanism for spectrum allocation in overlay cognitive radio networks is proposed. In overlay cognitive radio networks, the secondary users (SUs) must first sense the activity of primary users (PUs) to identify unoccupied spectrum bands. Based on their different contributions for the spectrum sensing, the SUs get payoffs that are computed by the fusion center (FC). The unoccupied bands will be auctioned and SUs are asked to bid using payoffs they earned or saved. Coalitions are allowed to form among SUs because each SU may only need a portion of the bands. We formulate the coalition forming process as a coalition forming game and analyze it by game theory. In the coalition formation game, debtor-creditor relationship may occur among the SUs because of their limited payoff storage. A debtor asks a creditor for payoff help, and in return provides the creditor with a portion of transmission time to relay data for the creditor. The negotiations between debtors and creditors can be modeled as a Bayesian game because they lack complete information of each other, and the equilibria of the game is investigated. Theoretical analysis and numerical results show that the proposed auction yields data rate improvement and certain fairness among all SUs.

• 전자통신동향분석
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• 제37권5호
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• pp.70-81
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• 2022

This study derived implications regarding competition policy to establish a reasonable spectrum allocation draft of a 3.7 GHz spectrum band by indepth analysis of 5G spectrum auctions. The following general features were identified by examining auctions of three countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark, were completed in 2021. First, securing the minimum bandwidth that is essential for service competition was guaranteed by applying the spectrum cap. Second, a continuous spectrum band was allocated to all mobile network operators. Third, certain requirements were implemented to encourage the expansion of 5G service coverage. The spectrum cap that was implemented in Korea during the most recent spectrum auction was ineffective regarding competition policy. Additionally, it is anticipated that the allocation of 3.7-4.0 GHz spectrum will considerably impact market competition because the continuity of spectrum band is different among mobile service operators. Therefore, it is time to discuss promoting the 5G service competition in Korea by revising related laws.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• 제36권4호
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• pp.1-32
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• 2014

주파수와 같이 매우 희소한 경제적 자원을 배분하는 경우 경매는 배분적 외부성으로 인하여 비효율적 결과를 낳을 수 있다. 경매수입이 아닌 사회후생을 기준으로 하면, 경매를 통한 배분은 경매참여자가 2인일 때에도 비효율적일 수 있다. 이는 2위 기업이 주파수를 더 효율적으로 활용할 수 있다 하더라도 이를 통해 얻는 이익은 크지 않은 반면에 선도기업이 시장을 잠식당함으로써 입는 손실이 클 때 발생한다. 2-경기자 호텔링 모형을 사용하여 분석한 결과, 2위 기업의 입찰가에 어떠한 승수를 곱함으로써 2위 기업을 경매에서 유리하게 만들 경우 경매를 통한 배분 결과가 파레토 개선된다. 승수는 시장점유율을 바탕으로 구할 수 있으며 시장점유율 격차가 클수록 높다.

• 전자통신동향분석
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• 제38권1호
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• pp.78-79
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• 2023