• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.34 no.6
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• pp.17-27
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• 2019

This paper introduces the 5G spectrum auction in Germany that occurred last summer and ended overheatedly after an extraordinarily long period. We describe the context of the latest German spectrum auction and trace the participants' bidding behavior. This case details the trend of the 5G spectrum auction and the factors that affect the spectrum auction as follows: First, it is determined that investment obligations that force network installations can be a financial burden to mobile network operators (MNOs) and require a careful approach. Second, excess demands can cause auction overheating and the spectrum supply volume needs to be determined by a proper demand forecast and investment incentive. Third, 'Set-Aside' for local usage aids in developing the vertical industry; however it limits the spectrum supply for mobiles and leads to higher bidding prices. Fourth, a modified adoption of a typical spectrum auction can alleviate MNO's financial burdens to secure the broadband spectrum. Finally, competition to secure the necessary bandwidth in the situation of limited spectrum supply may delay the process of the spectrum auction, causing it overheated.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.35 no.6
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• pp.1126-1133
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• 2013

The first spectrum auction in the Republic of Korea is attention-worthy owing to the fierce competition for the only 1.8-GHz spectrum license, the winning bidder of which was suspected of overpaying for its acquisition. This study empirically investigates the existence of a "winner's curse" in the first Korean spectrum auction by using a standard event study methodology. The results show that both the winner and loser experienced significant positive returns on the completion day of the auction. The results imply that there was no winner's curse in the auction and that the losing firm might increase its competitive advantage by acquiring other spectrum licenses despite failing to achieve its initial target spectrum. Therefore, these results suggest that regulators may need to consider bringing about positive short-term wealth benefits to all bidders by appropriately designing a spectrum auction, such as by performing multiband auctions.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.39C no.12
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• pp.1352-1361
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• 2014

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which regulates interstate and international communications in the United States, has established a plan to allocate high demand spectrum to the usage of mobile communication by inducing voluntary relinquishment from broadcasters. This plan was introduced by the National Broadband Plan as an incentive auction in 2010. The FCC suggested the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in 2012 and issued Report and Order (R&O) on May 2014 regarding the overall rules of incentive auctions expected to be implemented in mid-2015. The incentive auction attracts the attention of many countries because this policy suggests a novel approach regarding the alteration of use from an inefficient usage to an efficient usage in limited spectrum resources. In this paper, we define the key issues in order for implementation of incentive auction. Since the incentive auction is a highly complicated process compared to previous allocation procedures, a careful review of the incentive auction regarding whether this spectrum policy can be introduced is required. In this paper, we describe the detailed procedure of the incentive auction and present policy considerations for the introduction of the incentive auction.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.38A no.11
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• pp.944-954
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• 2013

Cognitive radio technology gives secondary users chances that they can use specific spectrum of the primary user when the primary user doesn't use it. This paper proposes the algorithm that maximizes the benefit of the primary user considering spectrum price and auction period by using the auction game theory. According to the ratio of spectrum that secondary users bid, primary user allocates spectrum to secondary users. In the process of repeated auction, the primary user gets to find the optimal price of spectrum. Using the price and the proposed utility function of primary user, we derive the optimal auction period. At the same time, the primary user finally determines the price of spectrum appropriate for the optimal period.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.3 no.3
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• pp.485-499
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• 1999

Auctions are appealing market-type mechanisms because they can be deployed to solve the twin problems of resources pricing and allocation. Nonetheless the effectiveness of an auction mechanism in radio spectrum property rights should not be taken for granted. Policymakers need to be aware of the complexity of introducing market discipline in an area where none existed before. Auction design is critical to the success of the allocation process. However, a poorly designed auction mechanism can have detrimental effects on the spectrum rights allocation process. This study discusses some of the key elements and issues of auction design of radio spectrum rights for its efficient allocation. Particularly this study discusses, based on the existing auction theory and other countries' experiences, such issues as bidding rule, value interdependency and sequence of auction, information structure and asymmetric bidder, and wealth constraints and imperfect capital market.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.9
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• pp.3312-3334
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• 2015

In this paper, a mechanism for spectrum allocation in overlay cognitive radio networks is proposed. In overlay cognitive radio networks, the secondary users (SUs) must first sense the activity of primary users (PUs) to identify unoccupied spectrum bands. Based on their different contributions for the spectrum sensing, the SUs get payoffs that are computed by the fusion center (FC). The unoccupied bands will be auctioned and SUs are asked to bid using payoffs they earned or saved. Coalitions are allowed to form among SUs because each SU may only need a portion of the bands. We formulate the coalition forming process as a coalition forming game and analyze it by game theory. In the coalition formation game, debtor-creditor relationship may occur among the SUs because of their limited payoff storage. A debtor asks a creditor for payoff help, and in return provides the creditor with a portion of transmission time to relay data for the creditor. The negotiations between debtors and creditors can be modeled as a Bayesian game because they lack complete information of each other, and the equilibria of the game is investigated. Theoretical analysis and numerical results show that the proposed auction yields data rate improvement and certain fairness among all SUs.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.37 no.5
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• pp.70-81
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• 2022

This study derived implications regarding competition policy to establish a reasonable spectrum allocation draft of a 3.7 GHz spectrum band by indepth analysis of 5G spectrum auctions. The following general features were identified by examining auctions of three countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark, were completed in 2021. First, securing the minimum bandwidth that is essential for service competition was guaranteed by applying the spectrum cap. Second, a continuous spectrum band was allocated to all mobile network operators. Third, certain requirements were implemented to encourage the expansion of 5G service coverage. The spectrum cap that was implemented in Korea during the most recent spectrum auction was ineffective regarding competition policy. Additionally, it is anticipated that the allocation of 3.7-4.0 GHz spectrum will considerably impact market competition because the continuity of spectrum band is different among mobile service operators. Therefore, it is time to discuss promoting the 5G service competition in Korea by revising related laws.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.1-32
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• 2014

Auction is widely used in allocation and procurement of resources due to its desirable properties: efficiency and revenue maximization. It is well-known, however, that auction may fail to achieve efficiency when allocative externalities exist. Such a result may happen in the auction of the resources that are very scarce, for example, radio spectrum. This is because allocation of the resources has effects on competition of the firms in the aftermarket, and thus a firm that utilizes the resources less efficiently may make a higher bid to lessen competition. This paper shows first that efficient allocation may not be achieved by auction even when the number of bidders is 2, while it is shown in the literature that auction may result in inefficient allocation when the number of bidders is greater than or equal to 3. There exist 2 firms, who make a bid to win the scarce resources that increase the value or decrease the production cost of their own product. After the auction ends, the firms engage in Bertrand competition on the Hotelling line. Inefficient allocation may happen even under the second-price auction rule, and it happens only when the firms are different in the initial value or the initial cost of their products as well as in the value of the auctioned resources. The firm who has been the leader loses a large portion of the market if it fails to win the auction, and thus makes a high bid even when the other firm can use the resources more efficiently. Allocative efficiency Pareto improves when the smaller firm's bid counts more than the leader's bid. This paper suggests a modified rule that the smaller firm wins the auction when its bid multiplied by some constant is greater than the leader's bid. The multiplier can be calculated from the market shares. It is equal to 1 when the two firms are the same, and is increasing in the leader's market share. Allocation is efficient in a strictly larger set of parameters under the modified rule than under the standard second-price auction rule.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.38 no.1
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• pp.78-79
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• 2023