• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.20 no.3
• /
• pp.335-366
• /
• 2017

Sorensen proved that 'vague' is vague through a sorites paradox that he presented. I will show that his sorites paradox satisfies the conditions for a sorites paradox and does not satisfy those conditions. So we will face a new paradox which exemplifies inconsistency of conditions for a sorites paradox. But those conditions include a principle which says when two cases are close enough, there will be no change in truth value. It represents an essential feature of vagueness. Therefore the paradox I will present in this article is not only shows inconsistency of conditions for a sorites paradox but also shows inconsistency of vagueness itself.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
• /
• 2006.05a
• /
• pp.65-66
• /
• 2006

본 논문은 퍼지논리의 유용성이 모호함을 다루는데 있다는 것과 이에 대한 예로서 퍼지논리로써 sorites paradox를 해결하는 방식을 소개하려는데 그 목적이 있다.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.16 no.2
• /
• pp.189-231
• /
• 2013

The purpose of this paper is to show that Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox do not conclusively refute supervaluationism. I will achieve this purpose on the basis of local validity. In general, people regard supervaluational validity as global validity. And D-introduction, which is premise of Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox, is justified only if we assume global validity. But it cannot correctly grasp supervaluational semantics, especially semantic character of D-operator. So I will show that validity of supervaluationism is local and define global validity by local validity. Strategy of this paper is to protect supervaluationism against Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox by minimal modification of supervaluationism and to prove that supervaluational logic is not revisionary and weak for solving the sorites paradox.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.22 no.1
• /
• pp.87-124
• /
• 2019

A dialetheic approach to the sorites paradox is to understand a borderline case as a true contradiction. In order to accommodate this approach, the possibility of an alternative that does not involve a contradiction should be considered first. Beall presents an alternative that has all virtues of dialetheic solution without contradiction. I do not think his alternative has no contradiction. Using the inclosure schema I will show it. Furthermore, I will show that all alternatives which do not accept the existence of cut-off point imply a contradiction. This means that we have to accept a true contradiction as long as we accept the intuition of vagueness, especially, what is called 'tolerance'.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society for History of Mathematics Conference
• /
• 2001.11a
• /
• pp.9-9
• /
• 2001

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.13 no.2
• /
• pp.117-134
• /
• 2010

In this paper, I attempted to show that 'Sorensen's Sorites' is not a successful argument for the vagueness of 'vague'. There are a lot of debates about it, but the central issue is whether Sorensen's Sorites is just small sorites; whether the vagueness certified by Sorensen's Sorites is just the vagueness of 'small'. Deas and Hull thought it was and rejected Sorensen's proof based on his sorites. But their rejection was rebutted by Varzi. The basis of his argument is that the subject of Sorensen's sentences - 'n-small' is vague - is not used but mentioned. I tried to reply on behalf of Deas and Hull and to show that the predicate 'vague' has not any effect on determining the truth value of "'n-small' is vague." Then it can be removed from the sentence. Of course I approve 'vague' is a homological term. What I do not agree with is only Sorensen's argument.