• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.143-159
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• 2017

Due to the rapid development of IT in recent years, not only personal information but also the key technologies and information leakage that companies have are becoming important issues. For the enterprise, the core technology that the company possesses is a very important part for the survival of the enterprise and for the continuous competitive advantage. Recently, there have been many cases of technical infringement. Technology leaks not only cause tremendous financial losses such as falling stock prices for companies, but they also have a negative impact on corporate reputation and delays in corporate development. In the case of SMEs, where core technology is an important part of the enterprise, compared to large corporations, the preparation for technological leakage can be seen as an indispensable factor in the existence of the enterprise. As the necessity and importance of Information Security Management (ISM) is emerging, it is necessary to check and prepare for the threat of technology infringement early in the enterprise. Nevertheless, previous studies have shown that the majority of policy alternatives are represented by about 90%. As a research method, literature analysis accounted for 76% and empirical and statistical analysis accounted for a relatively low rate of 16%. For this reason, it is necessary to study the management model and prediction model to prevent leakage of technology to meet the characteristics of SMEs. In this study, before analyzing the empirical analysis, we divided the technical characteristics from the technology value perspective and the organizational factor from the technology control point based on many previous researches related to the factors affecting the technology leakage. A total of 12 related variables were selected for the two factors, and the analysis was performed with these variables. In this study, we use three - year data of "Small and Medium Enterprise Technical Statistics Survey" conducted by the Small and Medium Business Administration. Analysis data includes 30 industries based on KSIC-based 2-digit classification, and the number of companies affected by technology leakage is 415 over 3 years. Through this data, we conducted a randomized sampling in the same industry based on the KSIC in the same year, and compared with the companies (n = 415) and the unaffected firms (n = 415) 1:1 Corresponding samples were prepared and analyzed. In this research, we will conduct an empirical analysis to search for factors influencing technology leakage, and propose an early warning system through data mining. Specifically, in this study, based on the questionnaire survey of SMEs conducted by the Small and Medium Business Administration (SME), we classified the factors that affect the technology leakage of SMEs into two factors(Technology Characteristics, Organization Characteristics). And we propose a model that informs the possibility of technical infringement by using Support Vector Machine(SVM) which is one of the various techniques of data mining based on the proven factors through statistical analysis. Unlike previous studies, this study focused on the cases of various industries in many years, and it can be pointed out that the artificial intelligence model was developed through this study. In addition, since the factors are derived empirically according to the actual leakage of SME technology leakage, it will be possible to suggest to policy makers which companies should be managed from the viewpoint of technology protection. Finally, it is expected that the early warning model on the possibility of technology leakage proposed in this study will provide an opportunity to prevent technology Leakage from the viewpoint of enterprise and government in advance.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.143-159
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• 2015

Predicting IT trends has been a long and important subject for information systems research. IT trend prediction makes it possible to acknowledge emerging eras of innovation and allocate budgets to prepare against rapidly changing technological trends. Towards the end of each year, various domestic and global organizations predict and announce IT trends for the following year. For example, Gartner Predicts 10 top IT trend during the next year, and these predictions affect IT and industry leaders and organization's basic assumptions about technology and the future of IT, but the accuracy of these reports are difficult to verify. Social media data can be useful tool to verify the accuracy. As social media services have gained in popularity, it is used in a variety of ways, from posting about personal daily life to keeping up to date with news and trends. In the recent years, rates of social media activity in Korea have reached unprecedented levels. Hundreds of millions of users now participate in online social networks and communicate with colleague and friends their opinions and thoughts. In particular, Twitter is currently the major micro blog service, it has an important function named 'tweets' which is to report their current thoughts and actions, comments on news and engage in discussions. For an analysis on IT trends, we chose Tweet data because not only it produces massive unstructured textual data in real time but also it serves as an influential channel for opinion leading on technology. Previous studies found that the tweet data provides useful information and detects the trend of society effectively, these studies also identifies that Twitter can track the issue faster than the other media, newspapers. Therefore, this study investigates how frequently the predicted IT trends for the following year announced by public organizations are mentioned on social network services like Twitter. IT trend predictions for 2013, announced near the end of 2012 from two domestic organizations, the National IT Industry Promotion Agency (NIPA) and the National Information Society Agency (NIA), were used as a basis for this research. The present study analyzes the Twitter data generated from Seoul (Korea) compared with the predictions of the two organizations to analyze the differences. Thus, Twitter data analysis requires various natural language processing techniques, including the removal of stop words, and noun extraction for processing various unrefined forms of unstructured data. To overcome these challenges, we used SAS IRS (Information Retrieval Studio) developed by SAS to capture the trend in real-time processing big stream datasets of Twitter. The system offers a framework for crawling, normalizing, analyzing, indexing and searching tweet data. As a result, we have crawled the entire Twitter sphere in Seoul area and obtained 21,589 tweets in 2013 to review how frequently the IT trend topics announced by the two organizations were mentioned by the people in Seoul. The results shows that most IT trend predicted by NIPA and NIA were all frequently mentioned in Twitter except some topics such as 'new types of security threat', 'green IT', 'next generation semiconductor' since these topics non generalized compound words so they can be mentioned in Twitter with other words. To answer whether the IT trend tweets from Korea is related to the following year's IT trends in real world, we compared Twitter's trending topics with those in Nara Market, Korea's online e-Procurement system which is a nationwide web-based procurement system, dealing with whole procurement process of all public organizations in Korea. The correlation analysis show that Tweet frequencies on IT trending topics predicted by NIPA and NIA are significantly correlated with frequencies on IT topics mentioned in project announcements by Nara market in 2012 and 2013. The main contribution of our research can be found in the following aspects: i) the IT topic predictions announced by NIPA and NIA can provide an effective guideline to IT professionals and researchers in Korea who are looking for verified IT topic trends in the following topic, ii) researchers can use Twitter to get some useful ideas to detect and predict dynamic trends of technological and social issues.

• Journal of Appropriate Technology
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.21-27
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• 2020

The ASF, which originated in Africa and threatens the world, landed in Asia in 2018 in China, and became a stern threat to the security of the Korean Peninsula when North Korea officially reported the ASF to the OIE in May 2019. In 1921, Montgomery, a British veterinary pathologist, made headlines by naming the African swine fever "African Swine Fever," or ASF, a disease caused by a high fatality virus that existed in East Africa. The ASF, which was a pandemic of endemic diseases in Africa, landed in Portgal around 1957 and swept through farms in Lisbon, Portugal. The ASF continued to settle in Spain and Portugal, causing 40 years of damage until the end of the 1990s, and is now in progress after landing on the Italian island of Sardinia in 1978. The virus, which landed in Portiport of Georgia on the Black Sea coast of the Black Sea in 2007, spread to Russia and caused massive damage to China in 2018, then rapidly spread to Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar in May 2019 and spread across the country, causing massive damage to the pork industry and is now in progress. Just three months after confirming the outbreak in North Korea, the outbreak at farms in Paju and Yeoncheon was confirmed on Sept. 16, 2019, leaving South Korea with the stigma of ASF-causing countries, and although the ASF's nationwide expansion has been blocked, it is currently underway in wild boars. If the ongoing ASF in the two Koreas becomes indigenous, it would be a major disaster not only for the pork industry but also for the Korean Peninsula economy. Under the current circumstances, it is impossible to focus only on veterinary areas limited to South Korea, ruling out risk factors from the ASF outbreak. Currently, it is difficult to prevent damage to the pork industry due to the ASF outbreak due to the poor water defense reality in North Korea, and as it is adjacent to China, which has a high risk of developing various epidemic diseases, there is a need for the two Koreas to jointly conduct quarantine and quarantine on the border areas. First of all, I think rapid exchange of information and education on ASF and other diseases is necessary before establishing a joint defense system on the Korean Peninsula. It is important to conduct thorough quarantine and disinfection of ASF-generated areas in North Korea, and areas bordering China and Russia, and jointly conduct thorough quarantine and control of livestock and livestock products in circulation. Cooperation by the South and North Korean water defense industries to prevent the protracted ASF on the Korean Peninsula by all means and methods is essential.