• Journal of Sasang Constitutional Medicine
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.39-55
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• 1997

Purpose : Dong-Mu(東武) Lee Je-Ma(李濟馬) was designated as a member of fifty persons 'The Wise Ancestors of Korean Culture and Art' in 1984 and the december of 1996 was appointed as 'The Month of Lee Je-Ma'. Though his achivements was valued like this, some historian criticized that he suppressed the righteous army. So this study was for clarifing the background, the motive, and the course of 'The Rising of Choi Moon-Hwan' occurred in Hamhung on february in 1896, and for the correct appraisement about this event. And also through this, author tried to make clear the origin of Lee Je-Ma's thought. Method : After studing the background of the end of Chosun dynasty and the righteous army in 1895(乙未義兵). Author made a comparative study through the historical materials of the goverment side, the Choi Moon-Hwan side, and the Lee Je-Ma side about 'The Rising of Choi Moon-Hwan' occurred in Hamhung on februrary in 1896. Results & Conclusion : The event occurred in Hamhung on february in 1896 was a part of rebellion of the righteous army in 1895 which had risen against The startling Occurrence of 1895'(乙未義兵) and 'The Royal Commands To Cut Off People's Hair'(斷髮令). Lee Je-Ma suppressed the Rising and put Choi Moon-Hwan in the prison, and which was criticized that he suppressed the righteous army later day. That time was a conflict period between conservatism and civilization, and the Lee Je-Ma's act was the best way to protect the security of residents from the attack which maybe occurred by Japanese army in Wonsan. Judging from this events, author could find Lee Je-Ma's thought was quite different from righteous army's neo-confucianism and conservatism. In the aspect of the history of 'Korean National Movement', further study about Choi Moon-Hwan, the chief of righteous army will be need.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• Maritime Security
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.31-60
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• 2023

This study proposes a new convergence weapon system that combines the covert placement and detection abilities of a self-propelled mobile mine with the rapid tracking and attack abilities of supercavitating rocket torpedoes. This innovative system has been designed to counter North Korea's new underwater weapon, 'Haeil'. The concept behind this convergence weapon system is to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each weapon type. Self-propelled mobile mines, typically placed discreetly on the seabed or in the water, are designed to explode when a vessel or submarine passes near them. They are generally used to defend or control specific areas, like traditional sea mines, and can effectively limit enemy movement and guide them in a desired direction. The advantage that self-propelled mines have over traditional sea mines is their ability to move independently, ensuring the survivability of the platform responsible for placing the sea mines. This allows the mines to be discreetly placed even deeper into enemy lines, significantly reducing the time and cost of mine placement while ensuring the safety of the deployed platforms. However, to cause substantial damage to a target, the mine needs to detonate when the target is very close - typically within a few yards. This makes the timing of the explosion crucial. On the other hand, supercavitating rocket torpedoes are capable of traveling at groundbreaking speeds, many times faster than conventional torpedoes. This rapid movement leaves little room for the target to evade, a significant advantage. However, this comes with notable drawbacks - short range, high noise levels, and guidance issues. The high noise levels and short range is a serious disadvantage that can expose the platform that launched the torpedo. This research proposes the use of a convergence weapon system that leverages the strengths of both weapons while compensating for their weaknesses. This strategy can overcome the limitations of traditional underwater kill-chains, offering swift and precise responses. By adapting the weapon acquisition criteria from the Defense force development Service Order, the effectiveness of the proposed system was independently analyzed and proven in terms of underwater defense sustainability, survivability, and cost-efficiency. Furthermore, the utility of this system was demonstrated through simulated scenarios, revealing its potential to play a critical role in future underwater kill-chain scenarios. However, realizing this system presents significant technical challenges and requires further research.