• Korean Security Journal
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• no.26
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• pp.29-58
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• 2011

Since 11 September 2001, warnings of risk in the nexus of terrorism and nuclear weapons and materials which poses one of the gravest threats to the international community have continued. The purpose of this study is to analyze the aim, principles, characteristics, activities, impediments to progress and developmental recommendation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT). In addition, it suggests implications of the GICNT for the ROK policy. International community will need a comprehensive strategy with four key elements to accomplish the GICNT: (1) securing and reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world, (2) countering terrorist nuclear plots, (3) preventing and deterring state transfers of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists, (4) interdicting nuclear smuggling. Moreover, other steps should be taken to build the needed sense of urgency, including: (1) analysis and assessment through joint threat briefing for real nuclear threat possibility, (2) nuclear terrorism exercises, (3) fast-paced nuclear security reviews, (4) realistic testing of nuclear security performance to defeat insider or outsider threats, (5) preparing shared database of threats and incidents. As for the ROK, main concerns are transfer of North Korea's nuclear weapons, materials and technology to international terror groups and attacks on nuclear facilities and uses of nuclear devices. As the 5th nuclear country, the ROK has strengthened systems of physical protection and nuclear counterterrorism based on the international conventions. In order to comprehensive and effective prevention of nuclear terrorism, the ROK has to strengthen nuclear detection instruments and mobile radiation monitoring system in airports, ports, road networks, and national critical infrastructures. Furthermore, it has to draw up effective crisis management manual and prepare nuclear counterterrorism exercises and operational postures. The fundamental key to the prevention, detection and response to nuclear terrorism which leads to catastrophic impacts is to establish not only domestic law, institution and systems, but also strengthen international cooperation.

• Journal of Plant Biotechnology
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• v.43 no.1
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• pp.91-98
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• 2016

The growth area of living modified (LM) cotton has steadily increased every year, since its first commercialization in 1996. Development of environmental risk assessment tools and techniques for LM cotton is required for ecosystem safety. We therefore developed multiplex PCR assays for simultaneous detection of two (MON15985, MON531) and four (GHB614, LLCOTTON25, MON88913 and MON1445) LM cotton events approved in Korea, with event specific primer pairs. The PCR reactions were optimized by using event specific primers of six LM cottons at various concentrations. The reactions allows amplification of estimated amplicons of MON15985 (214 bp), MON531 (270 bp), GHB614 (119 bp), LLCOTTON25 (164 bp), MON88913 (276 bp), and MON1445 (389 bp) from multiplex PCR reactions. The multiplex PCR assay developed allowed that two annealing steps (15 cycles at $55^{\circ}C$ and 25 cycles at $60^{\circ}C$) were performed for amplification of distinguished two LM cottons, and only one annealing step (50 cycles at $60^{\circ}C$) was necessary for tetraplex PCR. Primer extension step of all PCR reactions was skipped for time-effective amplification. Our methods suggest that two multiplex PCR assays can be cost-effective and a rapid diagnostic tool for environmental LMO monitoring of six LM cottons.

• Journal of Food Hygiene and Safety
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.367-375
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• 2010

The bacteriological and physiochemical analysis of sea water and sediments in Tongyeong harbor was conducted to evaluate sanitary conditions. The samples were collected at 8 stations established once a month from June, 2008 to May, 2009. During the study period, the range of temperature was from 6.7 to $25.2^{\circ}C$, transparency ranged from 1.2 to 2.6 m, chemical oxygen demand ranged from 1.90 to 2.92 mg/L, dissolved oxygen ranged from 6.2 to 10.5 mg/L, dissolved nitrogen ranged from 0.052 to 0.098 mg/L, phosphate ranged from 0.044 to 0.065 mg/L, respectively. Seafood, if eaten raw, carries the risk of food poisoning. Seafood poisoning is often cause by pathogenic microorganism originating from fecal contamination, such as Salmonella sp., Shigella sp. and norovirus. Fecal coliforms are an important indicator of fecal contamination. Therefore, data on fecal coliform are very important for evaluating the safety of fisheries in coastal areas. So, we investigated the sanitary indicate bacteria. The coliform group and fecal coliform MPN's of sea water in Tongyeong harbor were ranged from < 1.8~22,000/100 mL (GM 164.9 MPN/100 mL) and < 1.8~7,900 MPN/100 mL (GM 33.7 MPN/100 mL), respectively. Total coliform were detected 97.0% in 96 of samples and 68.9% of total coliforms were fecal coliforms. These results similar to another seawater detection ratio of total coloforms and fecal coliforms. The Vibrios was isolated and identified with VITEK system. Four hundred eighty strains that were obtained from sea water samples in Tongyeong harbor Detection ratio Vibrio alginolyticus, 34.2%, Vibrio parahaemolyticus, 13.8%, Vibrio vulnificus 10.0%, and V. mimicus 12.5% respectively. Vibrio cholerae O1, was not detected. During the study period, the ranges of water content, ignition loss, COD, and acid volatile sulfates in sediments in Tongyeoung harbor were 41.0~57.4%, 7.8~10.5%, 6.51~9.30 mg/g, 0.04~0.09 mg/g, respectively. Heavy metals in sediment of Tongyeoung harbor were Cd, $0.10{\pm}0.05$; Cu, $4.79{\pm}8.20$; As, $1.95{\pm}0.17$; Hg, $0.10{\pm}0.07$; $Cr^{6+}$, $0.34{\pm}0.12$; Zn, $125.33{\pm}16.40$; Ni, $16.43{\pm}1.93$ mg/kg.

• Journal of Genetic Medicine
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-16
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• 2011

Owing to the risk of fetal loss associated with prenatal diagnostic procedures (amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling), noninvasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) is ultimate goal of prenatal diagnosis. The discovery of circulating cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) in maternal plasma in 1997 has opened up new probabilities for NIPD by Dr. Lo et al. The last decade has seen great development in NIPD. Fetal sex and fetal RhD status determination by cffDNA analysis is already in clinical use in certain countries. For routine use, this test is limited by the amount of cell-free maternal DNA in blood sample, the lack of universal fetal markers, and appropriate reference materials. To improve the accuracy of detection of fetal specific sequences in maternal plasma, internal positive controls to confirm to presence of fetal DNA should be analyzed. We have developed strategies for noninvasive determination of fetal gender, and fetal RhD genotyping using cffDNA in maternal plasma, using real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) including RASSF1A epigenetic fetal DNA marker (gender-independent) as internal positive controls, which is to be first successful study of this kind in Korea. In our study, accurate detection of fetal gender through gestational age, and fetal RhD genotyping in RhD-negative pregnant women was achieved. In this assay, we show that the assay is sensitive, easy, fast, and reliable. These developments improve the reliability of the applications of circulating fetal DNA when used in clinical practice to manage sex-linked disorders (e.g., hemophilia, Duchenne muscular dystrophy), congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), RhD incompatibility, and the other noninvasive pregnant diagnostic tests on the coming soon. The study was the first successful case in Korea using cffDNA in maternal plasma, which has created a new avenue for clinical applications of NIPD.

• The Korean Journal of Pesticide Science
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.95-105
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• 2007

The aim of this study was to determine the residual amounts of PAHs in environmental samples such as crop, soil and water collected from paddy, upland fields and forestlands near industrial zone and/or a thermal power plant in South Korea. All of the samples were analyzed by GC-mass spectrometer. The average contents of total PAHs in soil samples were 140.2 ${\mu}g\;kg^{-1}$ and the range was from 4.3 to $662.9{\mu}g\;kg^{-1}$. The detection of benzo(a)anthracene, chrysene, benzo(b)fluoranthene, benzo(k)fluoranthene, benzo(a)pyrene and dibenzo(a,h) anthracene which have strong carcinogenecity was ranged from 14.2 to 167.8 ${\mu}g\;kg^{-1}$. The residual amounts and detection frequency of PAHs in soil samples from the iron and heavy industrial areas near Pohang and Busan were 3-folds more than those of the other areas. Amounts of PAHs in upland soil samples was 1.5 folds higher than those of paddy soil samples, suggesting that it may be related to the content of organic matter in soil. The average contents of total PAHs in crop samples were 9.7 ${\mu}g\;kg^{-1}$ which ranged from 4.5 to 52.2 ${\mu}g\;kg^{-1}$. However, the residual amounts of PAHs in water samples were not detected. These results showed that soils and crops were slightly contaminated with PAHs. Therefore, the investigation should be continued for evaluating a safety or risk assessment through expansion of regions and crops.

• Korean Journal of Remote Sensing
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• v.38 no.6_3
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• pp.1827-1836
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• 2022

Disasters that occur unexpectedly are difficult to predict. In addition, the scale and damage are increasing compared to the past. Sometimes one disaster can develop into another disaster. Among the four stages of disaster management, search and rescue are carried out in the response stage when an emergency occurs. Therefore, personnel such as firefighters who are put into the scene are put in at a lot of risk. In this respect, in the initial response process at the disaster site, robots are a technology with high potential to reduce damage to human life and property. In addition, Light Detection And Ranging (LiDAR) can acquire a relatively wide range of 3D information using a laser. Due to its high accuracy and precision, it is a very useful sensor when considering the characteristics of a disaster site. Therefore, in this study, development and experiments were conducted so that the robot could perform real-time monitoring at the disaster site. Multi-sensor module was developed by combining LiDAR, Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) sensor, and computing board. Then, this module was mounted on the robot, and a customized Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) algorithm was developed. A method for stably mounting a multi-sensor module to a robot to maintain optimal accuracy at disaster sites was studied. And to check the performance of the module, SLAM was tested inside the disaster building, and various SLAM algorithms and distance comparisons were performed. As a result, PackSLAM developed in this study showed lower error compared to other algorithms, showing the possibility of application in disaster sites. In the future, in order to further enhance usability at disaster sites, various experiments will be conducted by establishing a rough terrain environment with many obstacles.

• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
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• v.24 no.3 s.35
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• pp.428-440
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• 1991

This study was conducted to estimate the prevalence rate of cervical cancer and to investigate its risk factors. 5,417 asymptomatic married women were screened from March, 1984 to December, 1990 in Taegu city. Of 5,417 examinees, 3,817 (70.46%) were normal, 1,542 (28.7%) showed inflammatory change, 51 (0.94%) were dysplasia and 7 (0.13%) were carcinoma in situ or invasive carcinomas. The prevalence of abnormal finding (dysplasia, carcinoma in situ or invasive carcinoma) was 1,070 per 100,000 population. The prevalence of dysplasia was 940 per 100,000 and that of carcinoma in situ or invasive carcinoma was 130 per 100,000. Age-adjusted prevalence rate for abnormal finding adjusted with standard population of Taegu city was estimated to be 850 per 100,000. The prevalence of cervical cancer was significantly increased with age (P<0.05). The prevalence of cervical cancer was significantly decreased with age at marriage and educational level (P<0.05). The history of induced abortion and the number of pregnancies were significantly associated with the prevalence of cervical cancer (p<0.05), whereas, the number of parity was not. Age at marriage was significantly associated with the prevalence of cervical cancer after stratification by age (p<0.05). However, the level of education, parity, induced abortion, number of pregnancies were not significant. Inflammation and human papiloma virus infection were associated with cervical cancer with odds ratio of 13.48 (95% confidence interval $7.80{\sim}23.40$) and 474.29 (95% confidence interval $196.80{\sim}1143.10$), respectively. In conclusion, for early detection of cervical cancer it should be recommended to perform mass cytological screening. In particular, regular and periodic cytologic screening, starting at age 25, for cervical cancer should be recommended for those women who have frequent cervical inflammation and for those women married before age of 20.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Korean Journal of Food Science and Technology
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.263-268
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• 2010

This research was conducted to evaluate the occurrence of ochratoxin A (OTA) in coffee and fruit products in Korea. A total of 388 coffee and fruit product samples were collected from retail or outlet markets; 177 samples were coffee and 211 were fruits or their products. Analytical methods including AOAC and Comit$\acute{e}$ Europ$\acute{e}$en de Normalisation (CEN) were selected and modified by method validation to detect and quantify the OTA in samples. All samples were analyzed by liquid chromatography with fluorescence detection. OTA was detected in 3.9% of 177 kinds of coffee and 0% of 211 kinds of fruit products. The levels of OTA were $0.7-4.6\;{\mu}g/kg$ in green coffee, $0.3-4.8\;{\mu}g/kg$ in roasted coffee, $1.4\;{\mu}g/kg$ in mixed coffee, and $0.4-0.6\;{\mu}g/kg$ in instant coffee. However, OTA was not detected in liquid coffee, dried fruits, or grape juice. OTA levels of all samples detected were less than the European Union legislation of $5.0\;{\mu}g/kg$ in coffee, $10.0\;{\mu}g/kg$ in raisins and $2.0\;{\mu}g/kg$ in grape juice. Therefore, the risk of OTA in coffee and fruit products in Korea is relatively low at safe levels.

• Analytical Science and Technology
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.172-180
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• 2014

Fenpyrazamine which is a pyrazole fungicide class for controlling gray mold, sclerotinia rot, and Monilinia in grapevines, stone fruit trees, and vegetables has been registered in republic of Korea in 2013 and the maximum residue limits of fenpyrazamine is set to grape, peach, and mandarin as 5.0, 2.0, and 2.0 mg/kg, respectively. Very reliable and sensitive analytical method for determination of fenpyrazamine residues is required for ensuring the food safety in agricultural products. Fenpyrazamine residues in samples were extracted with acetonitrile, partitioned with dichloromethane, and then purified with silica-SPE cartridge and eluted with hexane and acetone mixture. The purified samples were determined by HPLC-UVD and confirmed with LC-MS and quantified using external standard method. Linear range of fenpyrazamine was between $0.1{\sim}5.0{\mu}g/mL$ with the correlation coefficient (r) 0.999. The average recovery ranged from 71.8 to 102.7% at the spiked level of 0.05, 0.5, and 5.0 mg/kg, while the relative standard deviation was between 0.1 and 7.3%. In addition, limit of detection and limit of quantitation were 0.01 and 0.05 mg/L, respectively. The results revealed that the developed and validated analytical method is possible for fenpyrazamine determination in agricultural product samples and will be used as an official analytical method.