I test the hypothesis that the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets leads to cross-asset return predictability in Korea. Using thirty-six industry portfolios and the broad market index as our test assets, I establish several key results. First, a number of industries such as semiconductor, electronics, metal, and petroleum lead the stock market by up to one month. In contrast, the market, which is widely followed, only leads a few industries. Importantly, an industry's ability to lead the market is correlated with its propensity to forecast various indicators of economic activity such as industrial production growth. Consistent with our hypothesis, these findings indicate that the market reacts with a delay to information in industry returns about its fundamentals because information diffuses only gradually across asset markets. Traditional theories of asset pricing assume that investors have unlimited information-processing capacity. However, this assumption does not hold for many traders, even the most sophisticated ones. Many economists recognize that investors are better characterized as being only boundedly rational(see Shiller(2000), Sims(2201)). Even from casual observation, few traders can pay attention to all sources of information much less understand their impact on the prices of assets that they trade. Indeed, a large literature in psychology documents the extent to which even attention is a precious cognitive resource(see, eg., Kahneman(1973), Nisbett and Ross(1980), Fiske and Taylor(1991)). A number of papers have explored the implications of limited information- processing capacity for asset prices. I will review this literature in Section II. For instance, Merton(1987) develops a static model of multiple stocks in which investors only have information about a limited number of stocks and only trade those that they have information about. Related models of limited market participation include brennan(1975) and Allen and Gale(1994). As a result, stocks that are less recognized by investors have a smaller investor base(neglected stocks) and trade at a greater discount because of limited risk sharing. More recently, Hong and Stein(1999) develop a dynamic model of a single asset in which information gradually diffuses across the investment public and investors are unable to perform the rational expectations trick of extracting information from prices. Hong and Stein(1999). My hypothesis is that the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets leads to cross-asset return predictability. This hypothesis relies on two key assumptions. The first is that valuable information that originates in one asset reaches investors in other markets only with a lag, i.e. news travels slowly across markets. The second assumption is that because of limited information-processing capacity, many (though not necessarily all) investors may not pay attention or be able to extract the information from the asset prices of markets that they do not participate in. These two assumptions taken together leads to cross-asset return predictability. My hypothesis would appear to be a very plausible one for a few reasons. To begin with, as pointed out by Merton(1987) and the subsequent literature on segmented markets and limited market participation, few investors trade all assets. Put another way, limited participation is a pervasive feature of financial markets. Indeed, even among equity money managers, there is specialization along industries such as sector or market timing funds. Some reasons for this limited market participation include tax, regulatory or liquidity constraints. More plausibly, investors have to specialize because they have their hands full trying to understand the markets that they do participate in
This project was a service-cum-research effort with a quasi-experimental study design to examine the health benefits of an integrated Family Planning (FP)/Maternal & Child health (MCH) Service approach that provides crucial factors missing in the present on-going programs. The specific objectives were: 1) To test the effectiveness of trained nurse/midwives (MW) assigned as change agents in the Health Sub-Center (HSC) to bring about the changes in the eight FP/MCH indicators, namely; (i)FP/MCH contacts between field workers and their clients (ii) the use of effective FP methods, (iii) the inter-birth interval and/or open interval, (iv) prenatal care by medically qualified personnel, (v) medically supervised deliveries, (vi) the rate of induced abortion, (vii) maternal and infant morbidity, and (viii) preinatal & infant mortality. 2) To measure the integrative linkage (contacts) between MW & HSC workers and between HSC and clients. 3) To examine the organizational or administrative factors influencing integrative linkage between health workers. Study design; The above objectives called for quasi-experimental design setting up a study and control area with and without a midwife. An active intervention program (FP/MCH minimum 'package' program) was conducted for a 2 year period from June 1982-July 1984 in Seosan County and 'before and after' surveys were conducted to measure the change. Service input; This study was undertaken by the Soonchunhyang University in collaboration with WHO. After a baseline survery in 1981, trained nurses/midwives were introduced into two health sub-centers in a rural setting (Seosan county) for a 2 year period from 1982 to 1984. A major service input was the establishment of midwifery services in the existing health delivery system with emphasis on nurse/midwife's role as the link between health workers (nurse aids) and village health workers, and the referral of risk patients to the private physician (OBGY specialist). An evaluation survey was made in August 1984 to assess the effectiveness of this alternative integrated approach in the study areas in comparison with the control area which had normal government services. Method of evaluation; a. In this study, the primary objective was first to examine to what extent the FP/MCH package program brought about changes in the pre-determined eight indicators (outcome and impact measures) and the following relationship was first analyzed; b. Nevertheless, this project did not automatically accept the assumption that if two or more activities were integrated, the results would automatically be better than a non-integrated or categorical program. There is a need to assess the 'integration process' itself within the package program. The process of integration was measured in terms of interactive linkages, or the quantity & quality of contacts between workers & clients and among workers. Intergrative linkages were hypothesized to be influenced by organizational factors at the HSC clinic level including HSC goals, sltrurture, authority, leadership style, resources, and personal characteristics of HSC staff. The extent or degree of integration, as measured by the intensity of integrative linkages, was in turn presumed to influence programme performance. Thus as indicated diagrammatically below, organizational factors constituted the independent variables, integration as the intervening variable and programme performance with respect to family planning and health services as the dependent variable: Concerning organizational factors, however, due to the limited number of HSCs (2 in the study area and 3 in the control area), they were studied by participatory observation of an anthropologist who was independent of the project. In this observation, we examined whether the assumed integration process actually occurred or not. If not, what were the constraints in producing an effective integration process. Summary of Findings; A) Program effects and impact 1. Effects on FP use: During this 2 year action period, FP acceptance increased from 58% in 1981 to 78% in 1984 in both the study and control areas. This increase in both areas was mainly due to the new family planning campaign driven by the Government for the same study period. Therefore, there was no increment of FP acceptance rate due to additional input of MW to the on-going FP program. But in the study area, quality aspects of FP were somewhat improved, having a better continuation rate of IUDs & pills and more use of effective Contraceptive methods in comparison with the control area. 2. Effects of use of MCH services: Between the study and control areas, however, there was a significant difference in maternal and child health care. For example, the coverage of prenatal care was increased from 53% for 1981 birth cohort to 75% for 1984 birth cohort in the study area. In the control area, the same increased from 41% (1981) to 65% (1984). It is noteworthy that almost two thirds of the recent birth cohort received prenatal care even in the control area, indicating that there is a growing demand of MCH care as the size of family norm becomes smaller 3. There has been a substantive increase in delivery care by medical professions in the study area, with an annual increase rate of 10% due to midwives input in the study areas. The project had about two times greater effect on postnatal care (68% vs. 33%) at delivery care(45.2% vs. 26.1%). 4. The study area had better reproductive efficiency (wanted pregancies with FP practice & healthy live births survived by one year old) than the control area, especially among women under 30 (14.1% vs. 9.6%). The proportion of women who preferred the 1st trimester for their first prenatal care rose significantly in the study area as compared to the control area (24% vs 13%). B) Effects on Interactive Linkage 1. This project made a contribution in making several useful steps in the direction of service integration, namely; i) The health workers have become familiar with procedures on how to work together with each other (especially with a midwife) in carrying out their work in FP/MCH and, ii) The health workers have gotten a feeling of the usefulness of family health records (statistical integration) in identifying targets in their own work and their usefulness in caring for family health. 2. On the other hand, because of a lack of required organizational factors, complete linkage was not obtained as the project intended. i) In regards to the government health worker's activities in terms of home visiting there was not much difference between the study & control areas though the MW did more home visiting than Government health workers. ii) In assessing the service performance of MW & health workers, the midwives balanced their workload between 40% FP, 40% MCH & 20% other activities (mainly immunization). However,
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities have been shown to be potential factors that can improve corporate image and increase the ability of corporations to compete. However, most previous studies related to CSR activities investigated how these activities influence product and corporate evaluation, as well as corporate image. In addition, some researchers treated consumers' perceptions of corporate motives as moderator variables in evaluating the relationship between corporate social responsibilities and consumer response. However, motive-based theories have some weaknesses. Corporate social responsibility activities cause two motives(egoistic vs. altruistic) for consumers, but recently, Vlachos et al. (2008) argued that these motives should be segmented. Thus, it is possible to transform the original theory into a modified theory model (persuasion knowledge model, PKM). Vlachos et al. (2008) segmented corporate social responsibility motives into four types and compared the effects of these motives on customer loyalty. Prior studies have proved that CSR activities with positive motives have positive influences on customer loyalty. However, the psychological reasons underlying this finding have not been determined empirically. Thus, the objectives of this research are twofold. First, we attempt to determine why most customers favor companies that they feel have positive motives for their corporate social responsibility activities. Second, we attempt to measure the effects of consumers' reciprocity when society benefits from corporate social responsibility activities. The following research hypotheses are constructed. H1: Values-driven motives for corporate social responsibility activities have a positive influence on the perceived reciprocity. H2: Stakeholder-driven motives for corporate social responsibility activities have a negative influence on the perceived reciprocity. H3: Egoistic-driven motives for corporate social responsibility activities have a negative influence on perceived reciprocity. H4: Strategic-driven motives for corporate social responsibility activities have a negative influence on perceived reciprocity. H5: Perceived reciprocity for corporate social responsibility activities has a positive influence on consumer loyalty. A single company is selected as a research subject to understand how the motives behind corporate social responsibility influence consumers' perceived reciprocity and customer loyalty. A total sample of 200 respondents was selected for a pilot test. In addition, to ensure a consistent response, we ensured that the respondents were older than 20 years of age. The surveys of 172 respondents (males-82, females-90) were analyzed after 28 invalid questionnaires were excluded. Based on our cutoff criteria, the model fit the data reasonably well. Values-driven motives for corporate social responsibility activities had a positive effect on perceived reciprocity (t = 6.75, p < .001), supporting H1. Morales (2005) also found that consumers appreciate a company's social responsibility efforts and the benefits provided by these efforts to society. Stakeholder-driven motives for corporate social responsibility activities did not affect perceived reciprocity (t = -.049, p > .05). Thus, H2 was rejected. Egoistic-driven motives (t = .3.11, p < .05) and strategic-driven (t = -4.65, p < .05) motives had a negative influence on perceived reciprocity, supporting H3 and H4, respectively. Furthermore, perceived reciprocity had a positive influence on consumer loyalty (t = 4.24, p < .05), supporting H5. Thus, compared with the general public, undergraduate students appear to be more influenced by egoistic-driven motives. We draw the following conclusions from our research findings. First, value-driven attributions have a positive influence on perceived reciprocity. However, stakeholder-driven attributions have no significant effects on perceived reciprocity. Moreover, both egoistic-driven attributions and strategic-driven attributions have a negative influence on perceived reciprocity. Second, when corporate social responsibility activities align with consumers' reciprocity, the efforts directed towards social responsibility activities have a positive influence on customer loyalty. In this study, we examine whether the type of motivation affects consumer responses to CSR, and in particular, we evaluate how CSR motives can influence a key internal factor (perceived reciprocity) and behavioral consumer outcome (customer loyalty). We demonstrate that perceived reciprocity plays a mediating role in the relationship between CSR motivation and customer loyalty. Our study extends the research on consumer CSR-inferred motivations, positing them as a direct indicator of consumer responses. Furthermore, we convincingly identify perceived reciprocity as a sub-process mediating the effect of CSR attributions on customer loyalty. Future research investigating the ultimate behavior and financial impact of CSR should consider that the impacts of CSR also stem from perceived reciprocity. The results of this study also have important managerial implications. First, the central role that reciprocity plays indicates that managers should routinely measure how much their socially responsible actions create perceived reciprocity. Second, understanding how consumers' perceptions of CSR corporate motives relate to perceived reciprocity and customer loyalty can help managers to monitor and enhance these consumer outcomes through marketing initiatives and management of CSR-induced attribution processes. The results of this study will help corporations to understand the relative importance of the four different motivations types in influencing perceived reciprocity.
This writer have thus far reviewed the civil and criminal obligations of the directors of a parent company that sponsored financially troubled affiliates. What was discussed here applies to logistics companies in the same manner. Hanjin Shipping cannot expect its parent company, Korean Air to prop it up financially. If such financial aid is offered without any collateral, under Korean criminal law, the directors of the parent company bears the burden of civil and criminal responsibility. One way to get around this is to secure fairness in terms of the process and the content of aid. Fairness in terms of process refers to the board of directors making public all information and approving such aid. Fairness in terms of content refers to impartial transactions that block out any possibilities of the chairman of the corporate group acting in his private interest. In the case of Korean Air bailing out Hanjin, the meeting of board of directors were held five times and a thorough review was conducted on the risks involved in the loans being repaid or not. After the review, measures to guard against undesirable scenarios were established before finally deciding on bailing out Hanjin. As such, there are no issues. In terms of the fairness of content, too, there were practically no room for the majority shareholder or controlling shareholder to pocket profits at the expense of the company. This is because the continued aid offered to a financially troubled company (i.e. Hanjin Shipping) was a posing a burden to even the controlling shareholder. This writer argues that the concept of the interest of the entire corporate group needs to be recognized. That is, it must be recognized that the relationship of control and being controlled between parent company and affiliate company, or between affiliate companies serves a practical benefit to the ongoing concern and growth of the group and is therefore just. Moreover, the corporate group and its affiliates, as well as their directors and management must recognize that they have an obligation to prioritize the interests of the corporate group ahead of the interests of the company that they are directly associated with. As such, even if Korean Air offered a loan to Hanjin Shipping without collateral, the act cannot be treated as an offense to law, nor can the directors be accused of damages that they bear the responsibility of compensating under civil law.
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.