This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.
Since North Korea has used terror crime as a means of unification under communism against South Korea, South Korea has been much damaged until now. And the occurrence possibility of terror crime by North Korean authority is now higher than any other time. The North Korean terror crimes of Kim Il Sung era had been committed by the dictator's instruction with the object of securing governing fund. However, looking at the terror crimes committed for decades during Kim Jung Il authority, it is revealed that these terror crimes are expressed as a criminal behavior because of the conflict to accomplish the power and economic advantage non powerful groups target. This study focused on the power conflict in various causes of terror crimes by applying George B. Vold(1958)'s theory which explained power conflict between groups became a factor of crime, and found the aspect by ages of terror crime behavior by North Korean authority and responding plan to future North Korean terror crime. North Korean authority high-ranking officials were the Labor Party focusing on Juche Idea for decades in Kim Il Sung time. Afterwards, high-ranking officials were formed focusing on military authorities following Military First Policy at the beginning of Kim Jung Il authority, rapid power change has been done for recent 10 years. To arrange the aspect by times of terror crime following this power change, alienated party executives following the support of positive military first authority by Kim Jung Il after 1995 could not object to forcible terror crime behavior of military authority, and 1st, 2nd Yeongpyeong maritime war which happened this time was propelled by military first authority to show the power of military authority. After 2006, conservative party union enforced censorship and inspection on the trade business and foreign currency-earning of military authority while executing drastic purge. The shooting on Keumkangsan tourists that happened this time was a forcible terror crime by military authority following the pressure of conservative party. After October, 2008, first military reign union executed the launch of Gwanmyungsung No.2 long-range missile, second nuclear test, Daechung marine war, and Cheonanham attacking terror in order to highlight the importance and role of military authority. After September 2010, new reign union went through severe competition between new military authority and new mainstream and new military authority at this time executed highly professionalized terror crime such as cyber/electronic terror unlike past military authority. After July 2012, ICBM test launch, third nuclear test, cyber terror on Cheongwadae homepage of new mainstream association was the intention of Km Jung Eun to display his ability and check and adjust the power of party/military/cabinet/ public security organ, and he can attempt the unexpected terror crime in the future. North Korean terror crime has continued since 1980s when Kim Jung Il's power succession was carried out, and the power aspect by times has rapidly changed since 1994 when Kim Il Sung died and the terror crime became intense following the power combat between high-ranking officials and power conflict for right robbery. Now South Korea should install the specialized department which synthesizes and analyzes the information on North Korean high-ranking officials and reinforce the comprehensive information-collecting system through the protection and management of North Korean defectors and secret agents in order to determine the cause of North Korean terror crime and respond to it. And South Korea should participate positively in the international collaboration related to North Korean terror and make direct efforts to attract the international agreement to build the international cooperation for the response to North Korean terror crime. Also, we should try more to arrange the realistic countermeasure against North Korean cyber/electronic terror which was more diversified with the expertise terror escaping from existing forcible terror through enactment/revision of law related to cyber terror crime, organizing relevant institute and budget, training professional manpower, and technical development.
Some Contracting States of the Chicago Convention issue FAOC(Foreign Air Operator Certificate) and conduct various safety assessments for the safety of the foreign operators which operate to their state. These FAOC and safety audits on the foreign operators are being expanded to other parts of the world. While this trend is the strengthening measure of aviation safety resulting in the reduction of aircraft accident. FAOC also burdens the other contracting States to the Chicago Convention due to additional requirements and late permission. EASA(European Aviation Safety Agency) is a body governed by European Basic Regulation. EASA was set up in 2003 and conduct specific regulatory and executive tasks in the field of civil aviation safety and environmental protection. EASA's mission is to promote the highest common standards of safety and environmental protection in civil aviation. The task of the EASA has been expanded from airworthiness to air operations and currently includes the rulemaking and standardization of airworthiness, air crew, air operations, TCO, ATM/ANS safety oversight, aerodromes, etc. According to Implementing Rule, Commission Regulation(EU) No 452/2014, EASA has the mandate to issue safety authorizations to commercial air carriers from outside the EU as from 26 May 2014. Third country operators (TCO) flying to any of the 28 EU Member States and/or to 4 EFTA States (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) must apply to EASA for a so called TCO authorization. EASA will only take over the safety-related part of foreign operator assessment. Operating permits will continue to be issued by the national authorities. A 30-month transition period ensures smooth implementation without interrupting international air operations of foreign air carriers to the EU/EASA. Operators who are currently flying to Europe can continue to do so, but must submit an application for a TCO authorization before 26 November 2014. After the transition period, which lasts until 26 November 2016, a valid TCO authorization will be a mandatory prerequisite, in the absence of which an operating permit cannot be issued by a Member State. The European TCO authorization regime does not differentiate between scheduled and non-scheduled commercial air transport operations in principle. All TCO with commercial air transport need to apply for a TCO authorization. Operators with a potential need of operating to the EU at some time in the near future are advised to apply for a TCO authorization in due course, even when the date of operations is unknown. For all the issue mentioned above, I have studied the function of EASA and EU Regulation including TCO Implementing Rule newly introduced, and suggested some proposals. I hope that this paper is 1) to help preparation of TCO authorization, 2) to help understanding about the international issue, 3) to help the improvement of korean aviation regulations and government organizations, 4) to help compliance with international standards and to contribute to the promotion of aviation safety, in addition.
Needless to say, the management of national forest in all countries is very important in view of the national mission and management purposes. Korean national forest is also in particular significant in promoting national economy for the continuous increasing of the demand for wood, conservation of the land and social welfare. But there's no denying the fact that the leading aim of the Korean forest policy has been based upon the conservation of forest resources and recovery of land conservation function instead of improvement of the forest productive capacity. Therefore, the management of national forest should be aimed as an industry in the chain of the Korean national economy. And the increment of the forest productive capacity based on rationalized forest management is also urgently needed. Not only the increment of the timber production but also the establishment of the good forest in quality and quantity are to bring naturally many functions of conservation and other public benefits. In 1908 Korean national forest was historically established for the first time as a result of the notification for ownership, and was divided into two kinds in 1911-1924, such as indisposable national forest for land conservation, forest management, scientific research and public welfare, and the other national forest to be disposed. Indisposable forest is mostly under the jurisdiction of national forest stations (Chungbu, Tongbu, Nambu), and the tother national forests are under custody of respective cities and provinces, and under custody of the other government authorities. As of the end of 1971, national forest land is 19.5% (1,297,708 ha) of the total forest land area, but growing stock is 50.1% (
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.