• 융합보안논문지
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• 제14권3_1호
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• pp.79-89
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• 2014

북한의 도발은 지상 해상 공중으로 다양하게 침투 및 국지도발을 일삼아 왔다. 최근 제1 연평해전과 연평도 포격 사건까지 국지전시 합동작전을 보면 북한의 선제 사격 및 도발에 따라 우리 군은 대응 사격위주의 방어만 해왔으며, 항공력의 무력투입은 없었다. 북한의 대남도발 의지와 강도는 김일성, 김정일, 김정은 체제로 전환되면서도 변화가 없다고 판단된다. 지금까지 한반도에서 전쟁위험을 안겨줄 만한 강도 높은 위기사건만을 중심으로 북한 군대의 의도를 파악해 본다면 그러한 사실이 더 명확해진다. 이제까지의 북한의 도발행태를 요약하면 다음과 같은 특징이 부각된다. 첫째, 시기적으로 도발형태가 변하고 있다. 둘째, 위기사건의 목표를 분석하면 군사적 목적에 의한 도발이 가장 많다. 셋째, 북한은 화전양면전략을 구사한다. 넷째, 도발행위를 은폐하.려고 한다. 한반도 위기사건이 발생하였을 때마다 북한측은 자신의 의도를 숨기고 한국에 의한 조작행위로 비난하는 행태를 보여 왔다. 북한의 도발은 미국요인과 한국 및 북한 내부요인이 의사결정체에 복합적으로 작용하여 군사적, 비군사적 수단에 의해 자행되었고 대남도발은 한반도의 공산화 통일이라는 북한의 국가전략체계의 영향을 받기 때문에 공세적으로 지속될 수밖에 없음을 알 수 있다.

• 시스템엔지니어링학술지
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.29-38
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• 2016

The threats around Korea Peninsula have been dramatically increased because North Korea is developing the Nuclear ballistic missile, Submarine launched ballistic missile(SLBM), and many kinds of weapons for sudden provocations. Therefore, ROK navy needs the cutting-edge warship combat systems in order to defeat the enemy threats effectively in the sea. The paper analyzes current warship combat system acquisition process and studies US navy and other advanced countries acquisition process and their contraction trends. After that, the paper proposes the optimal acquisition process of warship combat system for the ROK navy based on our current situation and other advanced countries acquisition trends. The paper will dedicate the next generation warship combat system acquisition process.

• 아동학회지
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• 제21권4호
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• pp.143-158
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• 2000

This study examined whether children's peer representations are associated with peer acceptance and whether attributions and goals are related to representations about behavioral responses in ambiguous provocation and conflict situations. The subjects were 119 5th-grade children responded to 4 hypothetical situations. Results indicated that children's positive representations about peer conduct in ambiguous provocations were related to their higher level of peer acceptance, and positive representations about a friend in conflict situations were associated with their perceived positive qualities of friendship. Children's positive attribution and relational goal orientation were associated with relational behavioral responses. Gender differences were found for some goals and behavioral responses, with girls displaying a more relational goal and behavioral response orientation than boys.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제7권3호
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• pp.115-144
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• 2023

特朗普政府时期美国已表明了 "中国是美国的战略竞争者, 也是修正主义势力, 更是对美国繁荣和安全的主要挑战" 这种立场, 拜登政府也基本上继承了这种对中国的认识。中国也对此积极应对。因此, 美中战略竞争已成为当今国际体系中最重要的背景因素, 也对东北亚安全局势产生了巨大的影响。尽管如此, 观察最近韩美日三边安全合作的形成过程时我们可以发现, 尹锡悦总统上台之后韩国的对外战略调整对韩美日三边安全合作的形成起到了关键性作用。这是因为美国一如既往希望构建的韩美日三边安全合作的成败取决于韩日关系的改善, 而尹锡悦政府不顾韩国国内政治的制约因素, 果断推动了韩日关系的快速改善。随后, 在戴维营召开的韩美日三国峰会为未来三国在安全及其他更广泛领域的合作奠定了基础。中国对韩美日三边安全合作的形成提出了强烈的不满和抗议。但本文认为, 韩国虽然同意与美国和日本形成韩美日三边安全合作, 但韩国的战略目标与美国和日本的战略目标都不完全一致。比如, 回顾冷战结束之后的美日同盟发展历程, 美国与日本都对中国的崛起持有类似的看法和认识。最近几年美日同盟加强的实际目标也主要是如何应对中国的崛起。与此相反, 韩国历届政府都对韩美日三边安全合作持消极的态度。这是因为韩国想要追求的最主要的战略目标是如何减少或消除来自北韩的威胁, 而不是应对中国。面对北韩不断增强的挑衅与威胁, 过半数的韩国人支持通过加强韩美日三边安全合作来遏制或缓解来自北韩的威胁。因此, 只要北韩的核威胁与导弹挑衅持续存在, 那韩国的对外战略方向就很可能是加强韩美日三边安全合作, 以确保自身的安全与生存。所以, 如果中国想要减少韩美日三边安全合作给中国带来的战略上的压力, 最好的方案是降低北韩对韩国的挑衅和威胁, 在让北韩放弃核武器的问题上扮演更加实质性的角色。

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제10권2호
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• pp.167-172
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• 2024

21세기의 주요 전쟁에서 드론은 감시정찰을 넘어 정밀타격 또는 자폭공격, 인지전 등의 목적으로 지상 및 공중은 물론 해상 및 수중으로 그 영역이 확장되고 있다. 이러한 드론은 다영역작전을 수행할 것이며 이를 위해 자율화 수준을 향상하고 High-Low Mix 개념에 기반한 확장성을 강화하는 등의 발전을 이어 나갈 것이다. 최근 드론은 세계의 주요 전쟁에서 주요한 수단으로 활용되고 있으며 향후 게임체인저(Game-Changer)로 진화할 개연성이 충분해 보인다. 북한 또한 오래전부터 정찰 및 공격드론을 운용하기 위해 상당한 노력을 기울여 왔다. 북한은 근래에 들어 드론을 활용한 도발을 지속하고 있고, 그 능력도 점차 고도화되고 있다. 또한, 최근 새로운 전략 드론의 등장으로 이를 활용한 북한의 대남 감시정찰 및 조기경보 능력 확보와 새로운 유형의 도발 등 전·평시 위협이 강화될 것으로 보인다. 이에 이번 연구에서는 북한 전략 드론의 능력을 분석하고 운용 양상을 예측하여 시사점을 제공하고, 이후 우리 군의 드론 전력화 및 대드론체계 솔루션 등 종합적인 전략 수립에 대한 활발한 후속 연구가 이루어지길 바란다.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.43-81
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• 2016

Security environment we face in the Korean Peninsula is unexpectable. Tensions between Seoul and Pyeongyang and its threats are continuously evolving. Kim Jung Un will keep on conducting provocations and DPRK's isolation will result uncertainty to their objective and intention. KPA is centered on ground forces with conventional weapons but they possess modernized missiles and nuclear capabilities. What's more concerning is that North Korea continuously pursue and develop nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Pursuing defense reform is inevitable for the ROK to deal adequately against the security threats posed by the North and to prepare for the environment of future warfare. If we are satisfied with the current capabilities then our military capabilities and security status will retrogress. We have to reorganize our units to make a small but FMC, smart military organization. Organization analysis is an urgent issue for reorganizing units. However, it isn't an easy task to reform an organization. There are vague parts for analysis and strong resistance from the people within the organization. Therefore should not focus on the reduction of people and the organization. Organization reform should be done with the acknowledgement of most of the personnel and should focus on the task and its method. These should be reflected to the organization analysis.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권5호
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.