• Title/Summary/Keyword: optimal competition policy

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통신방송융합 시장의 경쟁전망과 최적경쟁정책 : 한국 IPTV사례를 중심으로

  • 최종일;황준석;고대영
    • Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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    • 2006.02a
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    • pp.248-263
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    • 2006
  • The convergence in telecommunication and broadcasting is one of the most popular topics in these days. For example, the characteristic of IPTV -internet protocol television-is controversial in the extreme. In Korea the IPTV operators are mainly the telecommunication service operators. So it is natural that the IPTV services are categorized to the telecommunication services. But the Broadcasting service providers, especially the CATV providers who can serve the TPS-triple play service- like IPTV players insist that the IPTV should be regulated as a broadcasting service. This paper will analyze whether the regulation in which the IPTV is categorized to one of the broadcasting services is better than the case of telecommunication services. To examine this, the social welfare analysis is conduced and the differential oligopoly market model is used. Together with that, this paper suggests that we can improve the social welfare by the asymmetric regulation between IPTV and D-CA TV. This means that in Korea the IPTV has a weak substitution relation with the D-CA TV and the IPTV should be dealed as a new convergence service that differs from traditional broadcasting services.

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An Overview of the Rationale of Monetary and Banking Intervention: The Role of the Central Bank in Money and Banking Revisited (화폐(貨幣)·금융개입(金融介入)의 이론적(理論的) 근거(根據)에 대한 고찰(考察) : 중앙은행(中央銀行)의 존립근거(存立根據)에 대한 개관(槪觀))

  • Jwa, Sung-hee
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.12 no.3
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    • pp.71-94
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    • 1990
  • This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.

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A Study on the Strategies for Stimulating Medical Tourism in Oriental Medicine Blue Ocean of the 21st Century (21세기 블루오션, 한의학의료관광활성화를 위한 탐색적 연구)

  • Kim, Hyoung-Soon;Joo, Jong-Cheon
    • Journal of Sasang Constitutional Medicine
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    • v.21 no.2
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    • pp.137-143
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    • 2009
  • 1. Objective : This study aims to evaluate the medical tourism structures in countries with prosperous medical tourism industry such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and India in order ro propose optimal strategies that can promote the medical tourism in Korea. 2. Methods : All pertinent literature concerning medical tourism directly and indirectly were assessed, and reviews of medical tourism strategies found in various countries were evaluated. 3. Results : Evaluation of related literature reveals that medical tourism is a recent burgeoning industry that has grown In market size considerably in the last five to ten years. Also, it shows that oriental medicine is a highly likely candidate amidst the various medical fields for attraction foreign patients. 4. Conclusion : The Korean government should support and install appropriate legal and administrative bodies in order to attract medical tourists; Korea-specific medical tourism programs (ie. traditional Korean medicine package tours) should be developed in order to attract medical tourists from the western world and the middle-east. In addition, low-price policy of medical tourism is not a proper strategies for the competition against advanced medical tourism destinations such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and India. Differentiated medical tourism package such as oriental medical tourism program rather than provision of low-price policy seems to be more effective strategy for the medical tourism in Korea. Future studies on strategies for promoting medical tourism should focus on how foreigners recognize traditional Korean medicine, what diagnostic approach might be appealing to them and how the legal system concerning the medical procedures may be altered and modified.

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Exploration of Optimal Product Innovation Strategy Using Decision Tree Analysis: A Data-mining Approach

  • Cho, Insu
    • STI Policy Review
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    • v.8 no.2
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    • pp.75-93
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    • 2017
  • Recently, global competition in the manufacturing sector is driving firms in the manufacturing sector to conduct product innovation projects to maintain their competitive edge. The key points of product innovation projects are 1) what the purpose of the project is and 2) what expected results in the target market can be achieved by implementing the innovation. Therefore, this study focuses on the performance of innovation projects with a business viewpoint. In this respect, this study proposes the "achievement rate" of product innovation projects as a measurement of project performance. Then, this study finds the best strategies from various innovation activities to optimize the achievement rate of product innovation projects. There are three major innovation activities for the projects, including three types of R&D activities: Internal, joint and external R&D, and five types of non-R&D activities - acquisition of machines, equipment and software, purchasing external knowledge, job education and training, market research and design. This study applies decision tree modeling, a kind of data-mining methodology, to explore effective innovation activities. This study employs the data from the 'Korean Innovation Survey (KIS) 2014: Manufacturing Sector.' The KIS 2014 gathered information about innovation activities in the manufacturing sector over three years (2011-2013). This study gives some practical implication for managing the activities. First, innovation activities that increased the achievement rate of product diversification projects included a combination of market research, new product design, and job training. Second, our results show that a combination of internal R&D, job training and training, and market research increases the project achievement most for the replacement of outdated products. Third, new market creation or extension of market share indicates that launching replacement products and continuously upgrading products are most important.

A Historical Consideration on the Evolution of Competition in Offshore Fisheries (근해저인망류어업에 있어서 업종별 경합관계 형성에 관한 사적고찰)

  • 김병호
    • The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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    • v.35 no.1
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    • pp.23-56
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    • 2004
  • The offshore trawl fishery is seeking its survival way to overcome current management conditions in red, resulted from the bilateral agreement with China and Japan. However, this movement magnifies conflicts between fisheries on the contrary and it is thought to be impossible to get over current situations. For all that, this study is aimed at investigating how this current situations have occurred. The management freedom as response to the change in fishing conditions of a certain fishery, in case of Korea, is affected by institutional regulations. The example of this is controls on fishing gears, fishing vessels, and fishing grounds. The most exposure of this control is a segmentation of institutional fisheries. The initial segmentation of the offshore trawl fishery in Korea was occurred in the period of Japan's colonization when the degree of use of fishing grounds was limited geographically. At that time, fisheries were divided by fishing areas, but it did not divide the fishery itself. The large - sized fishing vessels were developed politically to be more competative to Japanese fishing vessels since 1950s. During this time, the trawl fishery was merged into current Eastern trawl fishery and South - Western trawl fishery. It was also inevitable to divide into the pair trawl and single trawl fishery as a result of the physical mergency between Western trawl and Southern trawl fishery. In order to develop the trawl fishery, new licenses were issued on the shrimp trawl fishery, through which it was expected to boost the trawl fishery. As opposed, the shrimp trawl fishery was changed into the mid - sized trawl fishery, targeting on the eastern fishing areas and the large - sized trawl fishery was developed since the late of 1970s with the development of filefish processing industry. The large trawl fishery that led in development of offshore trawl fishery since the late of 1950s was started to divide into a pair trawl and single trawl according to the fishing method and capital power. It finally became an institutionally independent fishery in 1980s, respectively. Looking into these historical process, the segmentation of the trawl fishery is thought as a result of the lack of long - term perspective and as a production of trial and error resulted by unprepared policy. As a result, these segmentation of fisheries roles as critical obstacles in harmonization of fisheries and in overcoming of current situations. Therefore, the review of this institutional segmentation of the offshore trawl fishery should be taken for an optimal redistribution of fishing grounds suits with business and fishing technology. For this, the fishery must be divided into large capitalized fishery and small - mid fishery with consideration of capital, fishing method, and the condition of use of fishing grounds. In addition to this, by limiting outline of fishing ground that the large fishery can harvest, it must allow for the small - mid fishery to catch with its own boundary. Furthermore, by launching buyback programs on the trawl, eastern trawl, pair trawl, it can provide broader fishing grounds where the fishery can harvest with management freedom.

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The Concentration of Economic Power in Korea (경제력집중(經濟力集中) : 기본시각(基本視角)과 정책방향(政策方向))

  • Lee, Kyu-uck
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.12 no.1
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    • pp.31-68
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    • 1990
  • The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

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The Impact of Market Environments on Optimal Channel Strategy Involving an Internet Channel: A Game Theoretic Approach (시장 환경이 인터넷 경로를 포함한 다중 경로 관리에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구: 게임 이론적 접근방법)

  • Yoo, Weon-Sang
    • Journal of Distribution Research
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    • v.16 no.2
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    • pp.119-138
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    • 2011
  • Internet commerce has been growing at a rapid pace for the last decade. Many firms try to reach wider consumer markets by adding the Internet channel to the existing traditional channels. Despite the various benefits of the Internet channel, a significant number of firms failed in managing the new type of channel. Previous studies could not cleary explain these conflicting results associated with the Internet channel. One of the major reasons is most of the previous studies conducted analyses under a specific market condition and claimed that as the impact of Internet channel introduction. Therefore, their results are strongly influenced by the specific market settings. However, firms face various market conditions in the real worlddensity and disutility of using the Internet. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of various market environments on a firm's optimal channel strategy by employing a flexible game theory model. We capture various market conditions with consumer density and disutility of using the Internet.

    shows the channel structures analyzed in this study. Before the Internet channel is introduced, a monopoly manufacturer sells its products through an independent physical store. From this structure, the manufacturer could introduce its own Internet channel (MI). The independent physical store could also introduce its own Internet channel and coordinate it with the existing physical store (RI). An independent Internet retailer such as Amazon could enter this market (II). In this case, two types of independent retailers compete with each other. In this model, consumers are uniformly distributed on the two dimensional space. Consumer heterogeneity is captured by a consumer's geographical location (ci) and his disutility of using the Internet channel (${\delta}_{N_i}$).
    shows various market conditions captured by the two consumer heterogeneities.
    (a) illustrates a market with symmetric consumer distributions. The model captures explicitly the asymmetric distributions of consumer disutility in a market as well. In a market like that is represented in
    (c), the average consumer disutility of using an Internet store is relatively smaller than that of using a physical store. For example, this case represents the market in which 1) the product is suitable for Internet transactions (e.g., books) or 2) the level of E-Commerce readiness is high such as in Denmark or Finland. On the other hand, the average consumer disutility when using an Internet store is relatively greater than that of using a physical store in a market like (b). Countries like Ukraine and Bulgaria, or the market for "experience goods" such as shoes, could be examples of this market condition. summarizes the various scenarios of consumer distributions analyzed in this study. The range for disutility of using the Internet (${\delta}_{N_i}$) is held constant, while the range of consumer distribution (${\chi}_i$) varies from -25 to 25, from -50 to 50, from -100 to 100, from -150 to 150, and from -200 to 200.
    summarizes the analysis results. As the average travel cost in a market decreases while the average disutility of Internet use remains the same, average retail price, total quantity sold, physical store profit, monopoly manufacturer profit, and thus, total channel profit increase. On the other hand, the quantity sold through the Internet and the profit of the Internet store decrease with a decreasing average travel cost relative to the average disutility of Internet use. We find that a channel that has an advantage over the other kind of channel serves a larger portion of the market. In a market with a high average travel cost, in which the Internet store has a relative advantage over the physical store, for example, the Internet store becomes a mass-retailer serving a larger portion of the market. This result implies that the Internet becomes a more significant distribution channel in those markets characterized by greater geographical dispersion of buyers, or as consumers become more proficient in Internet usage. The results indicate that the degree of price discrimination also varies depending on the distribution of consumer disutility in a market. The manufacturer in a market in which the average travel cost is higher than the average disutility of using the Internet has a stronger incentive for price discrimination than the manufacturer in a market where the average travel cost is relatively lower. We also find that the manufacturer has a stronger incentive to maintain a high price level when the average travel cost in a market is relatively low. Additionally, the retail competition effect due to Internet channel introduction strengthens as average travel cost in a market decreases. This result indicates that a manufacturer's channel power relative to that of the independent physical retailer becomes stronger with a decreasing average travel cost. This implication is counter-intuitive, because it is widely believed that the negative impact of Internet channel introduction on a competing physical retailer is more significant in a market like Russia, where consumers are more geographically dispersed, than in a market like Hong Kong, that has a condensed geographic distribution of consumers.
    illustrates how this happens. When mangers consider the overall impact of the Internet channel, however, they should consider not only channel power, but also sales volume. When both are considered, the introduction of the Internet channel is revealed as more harmful to a physical retailer in Russia than one in Hong Kong, because the sales volume decrease for a physical store due to Internet channel competition is much greater in Russia than in Hong Kong. The results show that manufacturer is always better off with any type of Internet store introduction. The independent physical store benefits from opening its own Internet store when the average travel cost is higher relative to the disutility of using the Internet. Under an opposite market condition, however, the independent physical retailer could be worse off when it opens its own Internet outlet and coordinates both outlets (RI). This is because the low average travel cost significantly reduces the channel power of the independent physical retailer, further aggravating the already weak channel power caused by myopic inter-channel price coordination. The results implies that channel members and policy makers should explicitly consider the factors determining the relative distributions of both kinds of consumer disutility, when they make a channel decision involving an Internet channel. These factors include the suitability of a product for Internet shopping, the level of E-Commerce readiness of a market, and the degree of geographic dispersion of consumers in a market. Despite the academic contributions and managerial implications, this study is limited in the following ways. First, a series of numerical analyses were conducted to derive equilibrium solutions due to the complex forms of demand functions. In the process, we set up V=100, ${\lambda}$=1, and ${\beta}$=0.01. Future research may change this parameter value set to check the generalizability of this study. Second, the five different scenarios for market conditions were analyzed. Future research could try different sets of parameter ranges. Finally, the model setting allows only one monopoly manufacturer in the market. Accommodating competing multiple manufacturers (brands) would generate more realistic results.

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