• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제23권3호
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• pp.105-117
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• 2019

Purpose - Underdog positioning is often used to evoke a positive attitude when interacting with consumers. However, little research has been conducted on the market competition structure and innovation contexts in which underdog positioning produces the most impact. This research aims to investigate unexplored boundary conditions of underdog positioning and addresses two issues: market structures (oligopoly vs monopolistic competition) and perceived firm innovativeness (PFI). Design/methodology - Two one-way ANOVA designs (market structures: monopolistic competitions vs. oligopoly; perceived frim innovativeness: strong vs. weak) were randomly assigned to 297 graduate and undergraduate students (52 % female) majoring in business. Study 1 examined the effect of underdog positioning on consumer attitudes in the different market structures. Study 2 investigated the relationship between underdog effect and consumer attitudes through viewing conditions that varied in PFI. Findings - Drawing on the results of the study, the authors conclude that underdog positioning is effective to generate more positive consumer attitudes when employed in the market structure of monopolistic competition rather than oligopoly. Moreover, both underdog and top dog positioning are likely to generate more positive consumer attitudes when accompanied with strong PFI than weak PFI. Originality/value -This is the first study to distinguish between monopolistic competition and oligopoly market structures with underdog positioning as well as to demonstrate a positive effect of PFI, regardless of the type of brand narratives.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권5호
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• pp.214-219
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• 2006

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권4호
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• pp.403-411
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• 2005

At present, the Cournot model is one of the most commonly used theories to analyze the gaming situation in an oligopoly type market. However, several problems exist in the successful application of this model to the electricity market. The representative one is obtaining the inverse demand curve able to be induced from the relationship between market price and demand response. In the Cournot model, each player offers their generation quantity to obtain maximum profit, which is accomplished by reducing their quantity compared with available total capacity. As stated above, to obtain the probable Cournot equilibrium to reflect the real market situation, we have to induce the correct demand function first of all. Usually the correlation between price and demand appears over the long-term through statistical data analysis (for example, regression analysis) or by investigating consumer utility functions of several consumer groups classified as residential, industrial, and commercial. However, the elasticity has a tendency to change continuously according to the total market demand size or the level of market price. Therefore it should be updated as the trading period passes by. In this paper we propose a method for inducing and updating this price elasticity of demand function for more realistic market equilibrium.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• 제어로봇시스템학회논문지
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.304-312
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• 2011

In an oligopolistic market, only a few firms account for most or all of total production, e.g., automobile, steel, and computer industries. For a dynamic oligopolistic market with two firms competing in quantities, we show that supervisory control theory of discrete event systems provides a novel approach to solve the dynamic oligopoly problem with the aim of maximizing the profits of both firms. Specifically, we show that the controllability, observability, and nonblocking property (which are the core concepts in supervisory control theory) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for two oligopolistic firms in disequilibrium to eventually reach equilibrium states of maximizing the profits of both firms.

• 국제지역연구
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.35-60
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• 2010

이 논문은 동태게임이론에 바탕을 둔 구조모형을 개발하여 미국 Dallas-Forth Worth 지역의 우유시장의 시장지배력을 측정하였다. 특히, 정태모형에서 도출된 담합추정 파라미터와 동태모형에서 도출된 파라미터를 비교하였으며 정태모형을 이용한 시장지배력 측정의 편기를 분석하였고 기업들의 담합행동의 순환적인 행동도 분석하였다. 분석 결과에 따르면 기업들의 행위가 동태적인 과점이론을 따를 경우 정태모형은 시장지배력을 과소평가하는 경향을 나타내고 있으며 Dallas-Forth Worth 우유시장에서 기업들의 담합 행위는 수요충격과 미래에 예상되는 비용충격에 반순환적인(countercyclical) 모습을 보여주고 있다. Dallas-Forth Worth 시장의 결과는 이론적인 동태과점모형의 예측과 일치하고 있다. 이는 기업들이 가격책정이 다른 기업들의 현재 시장에서의 반응뿐만 아니라 미래의 시장경쟁상황도 고려하여 이루어지고 있음을 나타낸다. 따라서 시장지배력의 검정은 이런 동태적 경쟁을 고려하도록 가격책정관계식을 설정하는 것이 필요하다고 할 수 있다. 그리고 정태 계량모형을 데이터에 무원칙하게 적용하는 것은 시장의 경쟁상황에 대한 잘못된 해석을 유발할 수 있다.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제16권5호
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• pp.3-25
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• 2014

최근 관세청이 15개 수입소비재 품목 가격을 분석한 결과, 수입가격 대비 국내 판매가격은 2.1-4.8배 수준인 것으로 나타났다. 이는 아직도 독점 수입업체들이 폭리를 취하고 있다는 것을 보여주는 결과이다. 독점 수입업체가 아닌 제3자가 제품을 수입할 수 있는 병행수입은 1995년 이미 허용되었으나, 위조품 논란, A/S문제 등 때문에 실제 소비자 후생으로 이어지지 못했다. 정부가 최근 병행수입 활성화 정책을 펴면서 지난해 규모가 3조원으로 늘었으나, 아직 전체 소비재 수입의 5%에 불과하다. 관세청이 정식통관 제품이라는 것을 보증해주는 통관인증제 대상 업체와 품목 확대로 통관 인증업체가 344개로 늘어난 것은 매우 다행스런 결과이다. 이에 본 연구는 현재 국내 병행수입 시장의 실태와 문제점을 분석하고, 정부의 "독과점적 소비재 수입 개선방안"의 검토를 통해 향후 병행수입 제도가 국내 경제 활성화와 수입시장의 경쟁 제고를 위해 나아가야 할 방향을 제시하고자 한다.

• 정보처리학회논문지:컴퓨터 및 통신 시스템
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• 제1권3호
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• pp.133-142
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• 2012

쿠르노 모델은 경쟁적 전력시장을 게임이론 기반으로 모델링하기 위한 대표적인 모델이다. 이전 연구에서도 쿠르노 모델을 이용하여 전력시장을 모델링 하기 위한 다양한 시도가 이루어져 왔다. 쿠르노 모델은 몇 개의 주요 발전사업자들이 경쟁하고 그로 인해 시장지배력이 존재하는 과점 시장모델에 적합하다. 쿠르노 모델로 시장을 모델링함에 있어서는 우하향 하는 수요함수의 존재가 선결되어야 한다. 과점에서 시장참여자들은 시장지배력을 활용하여 그들의 이익을 극대화하려고 노력하지만, 우하향하는 시장수요함수에 의해 매출 역시 하락하기 때문에 적당한 지점에서 이러한 시장지배력의 행사를 제한하여야 한다. 스마트그리드에서는 실시간으로 변동하는 요금제와 다양한 전산기반 툴의 활용으로 인해 이러한 수요반응이 더욱 활성화될 것이고, 이 경우 쿠르노 모델은 수요반응 솔루션의 주요 모델로 활용될 것이다. 이에 본 논문은 실제 시장에서 계량경제학적인 접근으로 전력시장의 수요곡선을 추정하는 방법에 대해 제안한다.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.778-780
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• 2005

Electric power industry throughout the world is restructured. The electric power industry has a characteristics of an oligopoly with an imperfect competition. In Korea rules, all information is not available. So the strategy under such incomplete information market differ firm those under complete information system in game theory. This paper presents a analysis technique if Korea ma rket model with incomplete information.

• 한국항해항만학회지
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• 제44권2호
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• pp.128-135
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• 2020

Long-term shipping contracts represent the cooperative and coexisting relationships between the shipping and steel industries. Yet, differences between the contract forms for iron ore and steel products have emerged. Specifically, the large proportion of consecutive voyage charters (CVC) is being applied in the iron ore trade, whereas the contract of affreightment (COA) is proportionally higher for shipping steel products. The literature review and in-depth interviews in this study identified through the research model, the characteristics of the shipping and market structure in both markets have significantly contributed to the preference of different long-term contracts. It has been determined that the mutual oligopoly market structure and the characteristics of shipping such as, the small number of suitable vessels in the market, the single fixed load/discharge ports, the long-distance voyages, and the potential risks for fatal accidents because of cargo liquefaction, for the iron ore trade, provide higher contribution to the preference of CVC contracts. In contrast, the consignor oligopoly market structure and the shipping characteristics, such as the greater number of suitable vessels available in the market, the variation in ports, the cargo quantity per shipment, the various load/discharge ports, and the need for experienced carriers for steel product loading in the steel product trade has shown higher preference on the COA contracts as the consignors with superiority over the shipowners, resulting in favorable contract types and conditions for the consignors.