• Title/Summary/Keyword: official method of analysis

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Plant Hardiness Zone Mapping Based on a Combined Risk Analysis Using Dormancy Depth Index and Low Temperature Extremes - A Case Study with "Campbell Early" Grapevine - (최저기온과 휴면심도 기반의 동해위험도를 활용한 'Campbell Early' 포도의 내동성 지도 제작)

  • Chung, U-Ran;Kim, Soo-Ock;Yun, Jin-I.
    • Korean Journal of Agricultural and Forest Meteorology
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    • v.10 no.4
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    • pp.121-131
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    • 2008
  • This study was conducted to delineate temporal and spatial patterns of potential risk of cold injury by combining the short-term cold hardiness of Campbell Early grapevine and the IPCC projected climate winter season minimum temperature at a landscape scale. Gridded data sets of daily maximum and minimum temperature with a 270m cell spacing ("High Definition Digital Temperature Map", HD-DTM) were prepared for the current climatological normal year (1971-2000) based on observations at the 56 Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA) stations using a geospatial interpolation scheme for correcting land surface effects (e.g., land use, topography, and elevation). The same procedure was applied to the official temperature projection dataset covering South Korea (under the auspices of the IPCC-SRES A2 and A1B scenarios) for 2071-2100. The dormancy depth model was run with the gridded datasets to estimate the geographical pattern of any changes in the short-term cold hardiness of Campbell Early across South Korea for the current and future normal years (1971-2000 and 2071-2100). We combined this result with the projected mean annual minimum temperature for each period to obtain the potential risk of cold injury. Results showed that both the land areas with the normal cold-hardiness (-150 and below for dormancy depth) and those with the sub-threshold temperature for freezing damage ($-15^{\circ}C$ and below) will decrease in 2071-2100, reducing the freezing risk. Although more land area will encounter less risk in the future, the land area with higher risk (>70%) will expand from 14% at the current normal year to 23 (A1B) ${\sim}5%$ (A2) in the future. Our method can be applied to other deciduous fruit trees for delineating geographical shift of cold-hardiness zone under the projected climate change in the future, thereby providing valuable information for adaptation strategy in fruit industry.

Economic Sanction and DPRK Trade - Estimating the Impact of Japan's Sanction in the 2000s - (대북 경제제재와 북한무역 - 2000년대 일본 대북제재의 영향력 추정 -)

  • Lee, Suk
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.32 no.2
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    • pp.93-143
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    • 2010
  • This paper estimates the impact of Japan's economic sanction on DPRK trade in the 2000s. It conceptualizes the effects of sanction on DPRK trade, econometrically tests whether such effects exist in case of Japan's sanction using currently available DPRK trade statistics, and measures the size of the effects by correcting and reconfiguring the deficiencies of the currently available DPRK trade statistics. The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, Japan's sanction can have two different effects on DPRK trade: 'Sanction Country Effect' and "Third Country Effect.' The former means that the sanction diminishes DPRK trade with Japan while the latter refers to the effects on DPRK trade with other countries as well. The third country effect can arise not simply because the DPRK changes its trade routes to circumvent the sanction, but because the sanction forces the DPRK to readjust its major trade items and patterns. Second, currently no official DPRK trade statistics are available. Thus, the so-called mirror data referring to DPRK trading partners' statistics should be employed for the analysis of the sanction effects. However, all currently available mirror data suffer from three fundamental problems: 1) they may omit the real trade partners of the DPRK; 2) they may confuse ROK trade with DPRK trade; 3) they cannot distinguish non-commercial trade from commercial trade, whereas only the latter concerns Japan's sanction. Considering those problems, we have to adopt the following method in order to reach a reasonable conclusion about the sanction effect. That is, we should repeat the same analysis using all different mirror data currently available, which include KOTRA, IMF and UN Commodity Trade Statistics, and then discuss only the common results from them. Third, currently available mirror data make the following points. 1) DPRK trade is well explained by the gravity model. 2) Japan's sanction has not only the sanction country effect but also the third country effect on DPRK trade. 3) The third country effect occurs differently on DPRK export and import. In case of export, the mirror statistics reveal positive (+) third country effects on all of the major trade partners of the DPRK, including South Korea, China and Thailand. However, on DPRK import, such third country effects are not statistically significant even for South Korea and China. 4) This suggests that Japan's sanction has greater effects on DPRK import rather than its export. Fourth, as far as DPRK export is concerned, it is possible to resolve the abovementioned fundamental problems of mirror data and thus reconstruct more accurate statistics on DPRK trade. Those reconstructed statistics lead us to following conclusions. 1) Japan's economic sanction diminished DPRK's export to Japan from 2004 to 2006 by 103 million dollars on annual average (Sanction Country Effect). It comprises around 60 percent of DPRK's export to Japan in 2003. 2) However, for the same period, the DPRK diverted its exports to other countries to cope up with Japan's sanction, and as a result its export to other countries increased by 85 million dollars on annual average (Third Country Effect). 3) This means that more than 80 per cent of the sanction country effect was made up for by the third country effect. And the actual size of impact that Japan's sanction made on DPRK export in total was merely 30 million dollars on annual average. 4) The third country effect occurred mostly in inter-Korean trade. In fact, Japan's sanction increased DPRK export to the ROK by 72 million dollars on annual average. In contrast, there was no statistically significant increase in DPRK export to China caused by Japan's sanction. 5) It means that the DPRK confronted Japan's sanction and mitigated its impact primarily by using inter-Korean trade and thus the ROK. Fifth, two things should be noted concerning the fourth results above. 1) The results capture the third country effect caused only by trade transfer. Facing Japan's sanction, the DPRK could transfer its existing trade with Japan to other countries. Also it could change its main export items and increase the export of those new items to other countries as mentioned in the first result. However, the fourth results above reflect only the former, not the latter. 2) Although Japan's sanction did not make a huge impact on DPRK export, it might not be necessarily true for DPRK import. Indeed the currently available mirror statistics suggest that Japan's sanction has greater effects on DPRK import. Hence it would not be wise to argue that Japan's sanction did not have much impact on DPRK trade in general, simply using the fourth result above.

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