• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.65-71
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• 2017

"National important facilities" refers to facilities that have a great influence on national security and people's live s if enemy occupation, destruction, or functional paralysis is imposed by the Ministry of Defense Directive. In view of the case of nuclear plant hacking and the attack on the government building "National important facilities" could be the target of anti-social crimes. In the meantime, the "National important facilities" check is limited to the facilit y survey. so The purpose of this study is to develop generalized requirements. Therefore, comparing the requiremen ts of ISO 9001:2015 and ISO 27001:2013. There are only 8 differences(operating) out of 1-10. And the rest are used in common. In addition, we confirmed that the results of comparing the cases of domestic and foreign CPTED are within the "Six Principles". In Chapter 8, the principle of application of CPTED was inserted and the certification re quirements of the "National important facilities" management system were derived.

• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.97-106
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• 2015

Currently, South Korea is exposed to various attacks of North Korea such as traditional, nuclear, and ABC weapons. Now it is hard to make an accurate estimate the damage may have been occurred to citizens due to those attacks. It is only possible to assume the rough outline. As a countermeasure to such military threats of North Korea, government-aided evacuation facilities services are going along across the board concerning the object, installation range, budget, and drawing standards. Whereas, in case of public evacuation facilities, there is no special regulation or principle in designation. Since various facilities are regarded as applicable, any protection against military threats can't be anticipated. In this study, military threats provoked by North Korea are figured out, thus the problem of plan and design that public evacuation facilities have are pointed out. This study suggest the result and proposal.

• Progress in Medical Physics
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.53-62
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• 2022

In this study, we have investigated the shielding evaluation methodology for facilities using kV energy generators. We have collected and analysis of safety evaluation criteria and methodology for overseas facilities using radiation generators. And we investigated the current status of shielding evaluation of domestic industrial radiation generators. According to the statistical data from the Radiation Safety Information System, as of 2022, a total of 7,679 organizations are using radiation generating devices. Among them, 6,299 facilities use these devices for industrial purposes, which accounts for a considerable portion of radiation. The organizations that use these devices evaluate whether the exposure dose for workers and frequent visitors is suitable as per the limit regulated by the Nuclear Safety Act. Moreover, during this process, the safety shields are evaluated at the facilities that use the radiation generating devices. However, the facilities that use radiating devices having energy less than or equal to 6 MV for industrial purposes are still mostly evaluated and analyzed according to the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 49 (NCRP 49) report published in 1976. We have investigated the technical standards of safety management, including the maximum permissible dose and parameters assessment criteria for facilities using radiation generating devices, based on the NCRP 49 and the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society N.43.3 reports, which are the representative reports related to radiation shielding management cases overseas.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
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• v.56 no.5
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• pp.557-564
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• 2023

Nuclear materials such as uranium are used as fuel for nuclear power generation, but there is a high possibility that they will be used for non-peaceful purposes, so international inspections and regulations are being conducted. Isotope analysis data of fine particulate obtained from nuclear facilities can provide important information on the origin and concentration method of nuclear material, so it is widely used in the field of nuclear safety and nuclear forensics. In this study we describe the analytical method that can directly identify nuclear particles and measure their isotopic ratios for fine samples using a large-geometry secondary ion mass spectrometer and introduce its preliminary results. Using the U-200 standard material, the location of fine particles was identified and the results consistent with the standard value were obtained through microbeam analysis.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.1-8
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• 2020

Maintenance of power distribution facilities is a significant subject in the power supplies. Fault caused by deterioration in power distribution facilities may damage the entire power distribution system. However, current methods of diagnosing power distribution facilities have been manually diagnosed by the human inspector, resulting in continuous pole accidents. In order to improve the existing diagnostic methods, a thermal image analysis model is proposed in this work. Using a thermal image technique in diagnosis field is emerging in the various engineering field due to its non-contact, safe, and highly reliable energy detection technology. Deep learning object detection algorithms are trained with thermal images of a power distribution facility in order to automatically analyze its irregular energy status, hereby efficiently preventing fault of the system. The detected object is diagnosed through a thermal intensity area analysis. The proposed model in this work resulted 82% of accuracy of detecting an actual distribution system by analyzing more than 16,000 images of its thermal images.

• Journal of the Korean Regional Science Association
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.89-104
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• 1994

Recently, environmental issues have remained high on the agendas of public discussion and economic research. In the case of Korea, democratic movement in the late 80's centered people's concerns on the environmental dispute according to landfill, correctional institution, crematory, and nuclear powerplant, etc., Moreover, the failure to provide these kinds of facilities in time have caused serious social problems associated with environmental protection and economic development. The purposes of this paper are threefolds. First, they organize foreign and domestic NIMBYS case studies which have been settled in a desirable way. The second concern is to analyze the consciousness of NIMBYS resident by making up a questionnaire. Third, they estimate the market values of urban unwanted facilities by employing CVM(Contingent Valuation Method) procedure. The results of the study have a double implication : that NIMBYS resident are reluctant to accept government mechanical compensation based on simple published land values, and that unique concensus to preserve the viability and healthfulness of our environment among three main bodies: residents, people, government is necessary in solving NIMBYS subjects in Korea. In addition, this first implication develops to emphasize the intrduction of releveant measures taken to reconcile NIMBYS disagreement, which are complete openness of government policies, full support of local economic development, and perfect management of pollution protection systems for NIMBYS facilities.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.24 no.5
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• pp.63-68
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• 2009

The urgent VAI method development is required since "The Act of Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency that is established in 2003" requires an evaluation of physical threats in nuclear facilities and an establishment of physical protection in Korea. The VAI methodology is developed to (1) make a sabotage model by reusing existing fire/flooding/pipe break PSA models, (2) calculate MCSs and TEPSs, (3) select the most cost-effective TEPS among many TEPSs, (4) determine the compartments in a selected TEPS as vital areas, and (5) provide protection measures to the vital areas. The developed VAI methodology contains four steps, (1) collecting the internal level 1 PSA model and information, (2) developing the fire/flood/pipe rupture model based on level 1 PSA model, (3) integrating the fire/flood/pipe rupture model into the sabotage model by JSTAR, and (4) calculating MCSs and TEPS. The VAT process is performed through the VIPEX that was developed in KAERI. This methodology serves as a guide to develop a sabotage model by using existing internal and external PSA models. When this methodology is used to identify the vital areas, it provides the most cost-effective method to save the VAI and physical protection costs.

• The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.121-126
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• 2010

Regarding HEMP has been studied as few thousand of paper by major nuclear bomb holding countries with USA for the self protection against nuclear bomb attract. Major HEMP protection facilities are consist of the shielding, filtering, grounding and high voltage protection circuits. Shielding room construction required a highest cost among the key protective facilities. Most of a theoretical formulas listed on the paper and related books has a little correlations in the certain frequency band between the theoretical formulas and field measuring results. For the reasons we proposed the advanced new theoretical formulas and developed the computer simulation S/W as enough as apply to the cost effective shielding room design for HEMP considering the various structural constants.

• Journal of Power System Engineering
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.5-13
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• 2005

Acoustic emission(AE) is defined as the transient elastic waves thar are generated by the rapid release of energy. The advantage of AE is that very early crack growth can be detected well before a highly stressed component may fail. At present, an exact diagnosis is the most reliable means for determining the soundness of structures during power plant operations. AE monitoring has been applied successfully in power plants to determine mechanical problems, pressure vessel integrity and external valves leaks, vacuum leaks, the onset of cavitation in pumps and valves, the presence of flow(or no flow) in piping and heat exchange equipment, etc. Acoustic emission(AE) technology has recently strengthened its application base, and practitioners' understanding of the technique's fundamentals. This paper introduces the methods of a survey and assessment on AE monitoring applications in nuclear, fossil and hydraulic power plant. The main objective of this paper was to obtain information on various applications of AE technology in power plant.