• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.33 no.6
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• pp.136-143
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• 2018

In this study, we conducted a pilot study on the multiple spurious operations (MSO) analysis in the fire probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of domestic nuclear power plant (NPP) to identify the degree of influence of the operator actions used in the MSO mitigation strategies. The MSO scenario of the domestic reference NPP selected for this study is refueling water tank (RWT) drain down event. It could be caused by spurious operations of the containment spray system (CSS) of the reference NPP. The RWT drain down event can be stopped by the main control room (MCR) operator actions for stopping the operation of CSS pump or closing the CSS motor operated valve if the containment spray actuation signal (CSAS) is spuriously actuated. Outside the MCR, it can be stopped by operator actions for closing the CSS manual valves or motor operated valve or stopping the operation of CSS pump. The quantification result of a fire PSA model that takes into account all recovery actions for the RWT drain down event lead to risk reduction by about 95%, compared with quantification result of fire PSA model without considering them. Among the various operator actions, the recovery action for the spurious CSAS operations and the operator action for the manual valve are identified as the most important operator actions. This study quantitatively showed the extent to which the operator actions used as MSO countermeasures have affected the fire PSA quantification results. In addition, we can see the rank of importance among the operator recovery actions in quantitative terms.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.51 no.7
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• pp.1765-1775
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• 2019

Multiple spurious operations (MSOs) mean multiple fire induced circuit faults causing an undesired operation of one or more systems or components. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) of the United States published NEI 00-01 as guidelines for solving MSOs. And this guideline includes MSO scenarios of pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR). Nuclear power plant operators in U.S. analyzed MSOs under MSO scenarios included in NEI 00-01 and operators of PWRs in Korea also analyzed MSOs under the scenarios of NEI 00-01. As there are no pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) in the United States, MSO scenarios of PHWRs are not included in the NEI 00-01 and any feasible scenarios have not been developed. This paper developed MSO scenarios which can be applied to PHWRs by reviewing the 63 MSO scenarios included in NEI 00-01. This study found that seven scenarios out of the 63 MSO scenarios can be applied and three more scenarios need to be developed.

• Fire Science and Engineering
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• v.33 no.6
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• pp.43-52
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• 2019

A walk-down procedure for fire modeling of nuclear power plants, based on deterministic fire protection requirements, was developed. The walk-down procedure includes checking the locations of safety shutdown equipment and cables that are not correctly indicated on drawings and identifying the existence and location of combustibles and ignition sources. In order to verify the performance of the walk-down procedure developed in this study, a sample of important equipment and cables were selected for hypothetical multiple spurious operation (MSO) scenarios. In addition, the hypothetical fire modeling scenarios were derived from the selected safe shutdown equipment and cables and an actual walk-down was conducted. The plant information collected through the walk-down was compared to the information obtained from the drawings, so that the collected information may be used as input values for the fire modeling.

• Fire Science and Engineering
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.57-65
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• 2018

In this study, a post-fire safe shutdown analysis (PFSSA) including multiple spurious operation (MSO) treatments for cables was conducted with an imaginary nuclear power plant for training using a deterministic fire analysis code. The imaginary nuclear power plant for the training consisted of a reactor containment building and an auxiliary building, including a total of 22 fire areas. The equipment including valves, pumps, emergency diesel generators, switch gears, motor control centers, and logic controllers were located in each fire area of the imaginary plant. It was assumed that each equipment is connected with two cables and that each cable passes through the fire areas along the cable trays. A database containing the information on the equipment and cables for the imaginary plant was constructed for the fire area analysis. The fire area analysis was performed for several assumed MSO scenarios, equipment logics, and cable logics. A mitigation measure using a three hour rated wrap was applied to the failed cables and cable trays after the fire area analysis.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.30 no.3
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• pp.114-122
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• 2015

In a fire hazard analysis (FHA) for nuclear power plant, various electrical circuit analyses are performed in the parts of fire loading analysis, fire modeling analysis, separation criteria analysis, associated circuit analysis, and multiple spurious operation analysis. Thus, electrical circuit analyses are very important areas so that reliability of the analysis results should be assured. This study is to establish essential electrical elements for each analysis for verification of the reliability of the electrical circuit analyses in the fire hazard analysis for nuclear power plants. Applying the results derived by the study to domestic nuclear power plants, it is expected to determine the adequacy of the fire hazard analysis report and contribute to the reliability of the fire hazard analysis of those plants.