• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.29-40
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• 2021

North Korea's science and technology policies are being pursued under strong leadership and control by the central government. In particular, a large part of the research and development of science and technology related to the Fourth Industrial Revolution in North Korea is controlled and absorbed by the defense organizations under the national defense-oriented policy framework, among which North Korea is making national efforts to develop advanced technologies in artificial intelligence and actively utilize them in the military affairs. The future weapon system based on AI will have superior performance and destructive power that is different from modern weapons systems, which is likely to change the paradigm of the future battlefield, so a thorough analysis and prediction of the level of AI militarization technology, the direction of development, and AI-based weapons system in North Korea is needed. In addition, research and development of South Korea's corresponding weapon systems and military science and technology are strongly required as soon as possible. Therefore, in this paper, we will analyze the level of AI technology, the direction of AI militarization, and the AI-based weapons system in North Korea, and discuss the AI military technology and corresponding weapon systems that South Korea military must research and develop to counter the North Korea's. The next study will discuss the analysis of AI militarization technologies not only in North Korea but also in neighboring countries in Northeast Asia such as China and Russia, as well as AI weapon systems by battlefield function, detailed core technologies, and research and development measures.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
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• v.23 no.6
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• pp.740-747
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• 2012

An Active Electronically Scanned Array(AESA) radar required necessarily as the Fire Control Radar(FCR) of recent fighters has ununiform detection range with regard to scan angle due to scan loss. Although the compensation method of scan loss in an AESA radar with variable dwell time is investigated, the effectiveness of the method in a fighter FCR with multi-function such as search, track, and missile guidance within limited resources should be considered systematically. In this paper, uniform search performance of an AESA radar using variable dwell time with regard to scan angle is derived. We assumed the search load of 50 % for case without changing dwell time in fixed frame time and showed the fighter FCR requirement for multi-function is not satisfied because the search load for the uniform search performance should be increased by about 100 %. On the other hand, in case of increasing the frame time for the uniform search performance and search load of 50 %, degradation of the search performance is shown by 86.7 % compared with the former. Based on these analyses, the effective beam operation strategy on an airborne AESA radar with uniform search performance in whole scan area is described with consideration of frame time, search load and performance as a whole.

• Journal of KIISE
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• v.44 no.5
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• pp.476-485
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• 2017

The tactical operation centers of future anti-aircraft missile systems provide the environment for the research on future air threats, tactical information, integrated battlefield environment creation and management, engagement control and command and control algorithms. To develop the key functional elements of integrated battlefield situation creation and processing and tactical operation automation processing operations, battery/battalion tactical operation control and reconfiguration design software are required. Therefore, the algorithm software of each function and the tactical operation display software and link software for interworking between equipment were developed as reconfigurable through a data-centric design. In this paper, a tactical operation display framework that can be reconfigured on the operation display of the tactical operations according to the battery/battalion is introduced. This tactical operation display framework was used to develop a common data model design for the reconfigurable structure of multi-role tactical operations with battery / battalion and mission views, and a display configuration tool that provides a tactical operation display framework for view development was also developed using the MVC pattern. If the tactical operation display framework is used, it will be possible to reuse the view design through the common base structure, and a view that can be reconfigured easily and quickly will also be developed.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
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• v.29 no.3
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• pp.233-240
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• 2018

Radar cross section (RCS) analysis of chaff clouds is essential for the accurate detection and tracking of missile targets using radar. For this purpose, we compare the performance of two existing methods of predicting RCS of chaff clouds. One method involves summing up the RCS values of individual chaffs in a cloud, while the other method predicts the RCS values using aerodynamic models based on the probability density function. In order to compare and analyze the two techniques more precisely, the RCS of a single chaff computer-aided design model consisting of a half wavelength dipole was calculated using the commercial electromagnetic numerical analysis software, FEKO 7.0, to estimate the RCS values of chaff clouds via simulation. Thus, we verified that our method using the probability density distribution model is capable of analyzing the RCS of chaff clouds more efficiently.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.29-50
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• 2013

With the recent global threats of terrorism as well as religious conflicts, Northeast Asian countries including South Korea, China, and Japan are experiencing particularly serious security crises as demonstrated by North Korea's threats of nuclear weapons testings and long-range missile launching as well as military provocation toward South Korea such as sinking of ROKS Cheonan and bombardment of Yeonpyeong island and the territorial dispute between China and Japan over Senkaku Islands(Diaoyu Islands). As a result, Park Geun Hye Administration of South Korea and the 2nd Abe Shinzo Cabinet of Japan, both recently established, are making efforts to improve their national security and crisis management policies. One of the key elements of such efforts is the strengthening of National Security Council(NSC) or its equivalent organization as the control tower of national security policy, modeled after the NSC of the United States. This paper compares NSC organization of Korea, the U.S., and Japan and draws policy insights focusing on the current political and national security situation South Korea is facing. Although organizational structure, function, and history of NSC of each country differs, it can be inferred from this comparison that NSC-type of organizations can play an important role as a control tower of security and emergency management policies.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.325-354
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• 2013

The concept of national security and the fundamental system for crisis management have departed from traditional methods and the importance of a national critical infrastructure crisis management has been emphasized. A national critical infrastructure crisis means a situation where human resource, material and functional system that may have a material effect on the critical functions of the government, the vitality and integrity of society, national economy and the safety of the public becomes disabled due to causes such as terrorism or major disasters. Although North Korea had been subject to numerous rounds of negotiations and sanctions as it continually developed nuclear weapons since the 1960s, it has also showed off its nuclear armaments through successful nuclear testings and missile launches. As the development and threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction becomes more noticeable and the range of its risk expands, this study focuses on the potential for an absence of leadership for national crisis management where the country's leadership, which should serve the critical role and function of handling national crises, becomes completely destroyed by the unexpected initial attacks by North Korea. As a result, the purpose of this study is to propose safety measures for the country's leadership in preparation for North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons by examining the concept and degree of risk of weapons of mass destruction with a focus on nuclear weapons, analyzing the substance of the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and evaluating such threat. In conclusion, first, to ensure the normal functioning of a national crisis management system in the event of a national crisis, we must seek safety measures that conform to the scope and succession order of the leadership of the national crisis management for an Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and the Continuity Of Operations (COOP). Second, in the event of a national ceremony, the gathering of the country's leadership all together in an open place should be avoided. In unavoidable circumstances, the next in rank that will act on behalf of the current leader should be designated and relevant safety measures should be taken. Third, during time of peace, in preparation for national crises, the scope of protection for the country's leadership should be prescribed and specific security and safety measures should be implemented. Fourth, the succession order for acting president in the case of the death of the president pursuant to Articles 71 and 26(1) of the National Government Organization Act should reconsidered to see whether it is a reasonable provision that takes into consideration a national crisis management that corresponds to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Pursuant to the Basic Guidelines for National Crisis Management set out under Presidential Directive No. 229, the Korean government is currently operating a case-by-case "crisis management standard manual" and its sub-manuals and has also prepared the Presidential Security Service's security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president. Therefore, the Korean government should actualize the above points in the case-by-case crisis management standard manual and security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president to implement and legislate them.