• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.2724-2731
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• 2014

As the future national defense plan of government focus on advanced weapon system, military maintenance facility becomes more important. However, military maintenance facility has been managed by director's experience and simple mathematical calculation until now. Thus, the optimization for the management of military maintenance facility is suggested by more scientistic and logical methods in this study. The study follows the procedure below. First, simulation is designed according to the analysis of military maintenance facility. Second, independent variable and dependent variable are defined for optimization. Independent Variable includes the number of maintenance machine, transportation machine, worker in the details of military maintenance facility operation, and dependent variable involves total maintenance time affected by independent variable. Third, warmup analysis is performed to get warmup period, based on the simulation model. Fourth, the optimal combination is computed with evolution strategy, meta-heuristic, to enhance military maintenance management. By the optimal combination, the management of military maintenance facility can gain the biggest effect against the limited cost. In the future, the multipurpose study, to analyze the military maintenance facility covering various weapon system equipments, will be performed.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.153-173
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• 2017

On 15 December 2015, China seized an underwater drone belonging to the U.S. in the South China Sea. The underwater drone was then about to be retrieved by the Bowditch, a U.S. naval ship.Although China returned the underwater drone to the U.S. on 20 December 2016, the incident resulted in the considerable controversy involving the use of underwater drones. The reason for this is that the seizure of the underwater drone happened in the exclusive economic zone (hereafter referred to as "EEZ") of the Philippines. Part XIII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to as "UNCLOS") governs the matters of marine scientific research (hereafter referred to as "MSR"). If a State intends to use an underwater drone in the EEZ of another coastal State for the purpose of MSR, the former has to obtain the consent of the latter in accordance with relevant provisions included in Part XIII of the UNCLOS. However, it is not obvious whether the consent of a coastal State should be required to launch an underwater drone in the EEZ of the State for the purpose of hydrographic surveying or military surveying. Maritime powers such as the U.S. regard hydrographic surveying or military surveying as part of "other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines" found in Article 58(1) of the UNCLOS, or part of the freedom of the high seas. This interpretation is not incompatible with the implications that the UNCLOS has. Nevertheless, Korea cannot accept this kind of interpretation that is supported by maritime powers. The freedom of hydrographic surveying or military surveying could imply that the EEZ of Korea would be full of underwater drones launched by China, Japan or even Russia. Hence, Korea should claim that the data collected for the purpose of MSR cannot be distinguished from that collected for the purpose of hydrographic surveying or military surveying. This means that hydrographic surveying or military surveying without the consent of a coastal State in the EEZ of the State should not be permitted.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.220-250
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• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.112-162
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• 2015

This study began to confirm or review the balance of power theory by applying scientific methods through experiential cases. Though there are several kinds of national power, this study supposes military power as a crucial power when it comes to war and peace. This research covered balance and imbalance through comparing relative military power between nations or nations' group. Comparison of relative military power can be achieved by statistically processing the values of which has been converted into the standard variables in same domain, then calculating the values of nation's power which has been synthesized different experiential factors. In addition, the criteria of experiential experiment is highly dedicated to European countries, USA, Japan prior to 1st and 2nd World War, as well as USA, Soviet Union and North East Asia during Cold War era. In addition, the balance of power theory has been redefined to review the action of the state upon the changes of power as mentioned in the theory. To begin with, the redefined theory states that relative level of military power between nations defines the consistency of peace and balance of power. If military power is enough to be on the range of level required to keep the power in equilibrium, peace and balance can be achieved. The opposite would unbalance the military power, causing conflicts. While the relative military level between nations change, nations seek to establish 'nations group' via military cooperation such as alliance, which also shift relative military power between nations group as well. Thus, in order to achieve balance of power, a nation seeks to strengthen its military power(self-help), while pursuing military cooperation(or alliance). This changes relative military power between nations group also. In other words, if there exists balance of power between nations, there is balance of power between nations group as well. In this theory, WWI and II broke out due to the imbalance of military force between nations and nations group, and reviewed that due to the balance of military force during the Cold War, peace was maintained. WWI was resulted from imbalance of military cooperation between two powerful states group and WWII was occurred because of the imbalance among the states. Peace was maintained from cooperation of military power and balance among the states during the Cold War. Imbalance among continental states is more threatening than maritime states and balance of power made by army force and naval force also is feasible. Also the outcomes of two variables are found military power balanced ratio of military power for balance is 67% when variable ratio of balance is 100% and standard value for balance is 0.86. Military power exists in a form of range. The range is what unstabilized the international system causing nations to supplement their military powers. These results made possible the calculation and comparison between state's military power. How balance of power inflicted war and peace has been studied through scientific reviews. Military conflict is highly possible upon already unbalanced military powers of North East Asian countries, if the US draws its power back to America. China and Japan are constantly building up their military force. On the other hand, Korean military force is inferior so in accordance to change of international situation state's survival could be threatened and it is difficult to achieve drastic increase in military force like Germany did. Especially constructing naval force demands lots of time; however but has benefit that naval force can overcome imbalance between continental states and maritime states.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.70-80
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• 2004

In discrete red and black, you can stake any amount s in your possession, but the value of s takes positive integer value. Suppose your goal is N and your current fortune is f, with 0＜f＜N. You win back your stake and as much more with probability p and lose your stake with probability, q = 1-p. In this study, we consider optimum strategies for this game with the value of p greater than $\frac{1}{2}$ where the player has the advantage over the house. The optimum strategy at any f when p>$\frac{1}{2}$ is to play timidly, which is to bet 1 all the time. This is called as Timid1 strategy. In this paper, we perform the simulation study to show that the Timid1 strategy is optimum in discrete red and black when p＞\frac{1}{2}.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.122-129
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• 2005

In discrete red and black, you can stake any amount s in your possession, but the value of s takes positive integer value. Suppose your goal is N and your current fortune is ${\Large\;f},\;with\;O<{\Large\;f}. You win back your stake and as much more with probability p and lose your stake with probability, q=1-p. In this study, we consider optimum strategies for this game with the value of p less than ${\frac{1}{2}}$ where the house has the advantage over the player. It is shown that the optimum strategy at any ${\Large\;f}$ is the DBold strategy which is to play boldly in discrete red and black when $p<{\frac{1}{2}}$. And then, we perform the simulation study to show that this strategy, which is to bet as much as you can, is optimal in discrete case.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.3_1
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• pp.27-35
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• 2016

This thesis analyzes the backgrounds of the third offset strategy of the US Department of Defense. The key technology areas to be developed and the implications of the 3rd strategy are also examined. The potential great powers, China and Russia have catched up with US in the certain areas of military technologies. The technological superiority of US military is found to have been eroded. The US DOD needs a new defense policy called the 3rd offset strategy to meet this new challenge. The 5 basic technology areas were identified; learning machines, human-machine collaboration, machine-assisted human operations, human-machine combat teaming, and autonomous weapons. The 3rd offset strategy should be managed not to move to the new arms race with rivalries. The defense acquisition system also needs to be improved for the smooth flow of the advanced commercial technologies to the defense sector. Korea needs to figure out the possible technologies of co-research and development with US.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.76-87
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• 2003

This paper proposes that we need a simpler method for developing the Website strategy for public institutions. The research objectives are threefold: (1) A model that relates to the monitoring of Website strategy in the public sector is proposed. The model includes basic dimensions and a $2{\times}3$ matrix that is a simplified version of the Mohammed et dl.s Marketspace Matrix. (2) The model is tested empirically with a sample of 56 Websites selected from govemment agencies, military organizations and police stations in Korea. (3) The effect of dimension/factors on the innovation level is tested. A special attention is paid to online attracting that is important for public institutions which usually do not use offline advertising aggressively. Results from regression analyses show that main dimensions (Marketing Drivers and relationship Stages) and three factors (Basic Information, Support Information, and Participation) in the matrix are all significantly influential on the innovation level, but the Attracting is not. Colorful designs and attracting features of a homepage have not necessarily anything to do with innovation. This message can offer a good piece of advice for managers of Websites.