• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.163-197
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• 2016

The completion of Jeju Naval Base on February 2016 made the Republic of Korea Navy(ROKN) review the size and role of the Maritime Task Flotilla(MTF). The new strategic environment for the 12st century and the new challenges require the Navy to counter North Korea's provocations and prevent potential enemy's threat. The Navy is also required to take part in the variety of international roles and missions commensurated with Korea's global status to maximize the national interest. Despite these changes, Korea's military construction concept is still unable to break away from the old paradigm of the North Korean threat largely centered. In order to develop the current MTF into the Task Group with the construction of Jeju Naval Base, the Navy must newly not only establish new force development plan and fleet management concepts but also go to persuade and convince policy decision makers. To this end, the following efforts should be promoted. First, the ROK Navy steps up efforts in order to share with the Task Group's vision and strategy. The Navy should also provide the size and structure as well as the missions and roles of the Task Group to react to new maritime security environment. Second, the Navy analyse the MTF's ability and what is required and necessary to perform its duty. After that, it must set out the direction of the Task Group's force development. Third, the current missions and roles of the MTF should be re-established to respond various threats. Finally, accommodating of new technology to the MTF should intensify its strengths. The ROK Navy has a mixed force structure consisting of three fixed- base fleets and a MTF. The fixed base fleet has a passive force to defend and protect its own sea areas, but the MTF should actively not only counter North Korea's threats, including ballistic missiles, but also fight potential threats and takes international missions as a primary task force. However, the MTF has a limited capability to accomplish given missions and long-range operations, and thus, the ROK Navy is strongly required to construct the Task Group.

• Strategy21
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• 통권43호
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• pp.175-199
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• 2018

Recent marine territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have come to us as a great threat. China, which has recently established the China Coast Guard and has rapidly developed maritime security forces, is trying to overcome the various conflict countries with its power. Japan is also strengthening intensively its maritime security forces. Since Korea, China, and Japan are geographically neighboring and sharing maritime space in Northeast Asia, there is no conflict between maritime jurisdiction and territorial rights among the countries. The struggle for initiative in the ocean is fierce among the three coastal nations in Northeast Asia. therefore, Korea needs more thorough preparation and response to protect the marine sovereignty. As the superpowers of China and Japan are confronted and the United States is involved in the balance of power in strategic purposes, the East Asian sea area is a place where tension and conflict environment exist. China's illegal fishing boats are constantly invading our waters, and they even threaten the lives of our police officers. The issue of delimiting maritime boundaries between Korea and China has yet to be solved, and is underway in both countries, and there is a possibility that the exploration activities of the continental shelf resources may collide as the agreement on the continental shelf will expire between Korea and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts in the maritime jurisdictions of the three countries in Korea, China and Japan are leading to the enhancement of maritime security forces to secure deterrence rather than military confrontation. In the situation where the unresolved sovereignty and jurisdiction conflicts of Korea, China and Japan continue, and the competition for the strengthening of the maritime powers of China and Japan becomes fierce, there is a urgent need for stabilization and enhancement of the maritime forces in our country. It is necessary to establish a new long-term strategy for enhancing the maritime security force and to carry out it. It is expected that the Korean Coast Guard, which once said that it was a model for the establishment of China's Coast Guard as a powerful force for the enforcement of the maritime law, firmly establishes itself as a key force to protect our oceans with the Navy and keeps our maritime sovereignty firmly.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제7권2호
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• pp.275-280
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• 2021

본 연구는 특전부사관 우수자원 홍보를 통해 인력을 획득하는 연구의 문제에서 출발하여 다음 4가지 홍보 전략을 연구하였다. 첫째, 페이스북의 홍보 전략 매개체이다. 둘째, 유튜브의 홍보 전략 매개체이다. 셋째, 블로그의 홍보 전략 매개체이다. 넷째, Web site의 홍보 전략 매개체이다. 따라서 특전부사관 우수자원 획득을 위한 전략적인 매개체를 활용하여 홍보 활동을 통한 우수자원을 획득하는 데 있다. 더 나아가 특전 부사관 우수인력을 획득하는데 4가지 홍보 전략과 외국군 우수인력 획득사례를 통해 본 연구를 고찰하고자 한다. 결국, 본 연구는 전략적 매개체를 활용하여 특전부사관 우수자원 획득을 위해 모병 활동을 하는 데 기초적인 시사점을 제공할 수 있다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.5-36
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• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

• Strategy21
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• 통권46호
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• pp.123-157
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• 2020

이번 연구는 국제해사국의 연례 보고서를 바탕으로 2009~2014년 동안 아프리카 인근 해역에서 발생한 771건의 해적사건을 음이항 회귀분석(Negative binomial regression)을 이용하여 분석했다. 이번 연구를 통해 소말리아 인근에서 작전하는 다국적 해군함정의 숫자가 증가할수록 소말리아 인근에서 발생하는 해적사건이 감소하는 사실을 정량적으로 확인했다. 이를 통해 청해부대를 비롯하여 소말리아 인근에서 실시되고 있는 다국적 해군의 대(對)해적 작전이 실제로 해적사건 감소에 효과가 있음을 증명했다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.352-376
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• 2018

Through this research, the current state of naval coordination and guidance of shipping is reviewed whereupon which a suggestion is made for a novel role which satisfies the needs of the people and the country asked of the Navy. Taking into consideration the dynamic security environment, the developing relationship between the two nations on the Korean peninsula, and the influence that the Republic of Korea has on maritime security, it is made more urgent that the Navy takes a proactive course of action in terms of naval coordination and guidance of shipping. The current form of Korean naval coordination and guidance of shipping is adapted from the logical and flexible concepts of NCAPS and NCAGS and is one of many tasks that the Republic of Korea Navy must perform. However, when the Republic of Korea Navy develops blue-water capabilities with the ambitions of protecting its people and their way of life, naval coordination and guidance of shipping could potentially become one of the primary functions of the Republic of Korea Navy that the it must champion. Already, there are indications that foreign navies are, through many developments and commitment towards naval coordination and guidance of shipping, protecting its people and states' interests wherever is necessary. In the case of Chile, its Navy has taken the helm of naval coordination and guidance of shipping and has integrated various maritime organizations including the coast guard and the National Customs Service for the sake of maintaining regional maritime security, showing immediate force if necessary. Presently, as the Republic of Korea Navy looks to be a global naval power, it is important that a reprioritization of the Navy's mission is undertaken, all the while sustaining military readiness posture on the Northern Limit Line. It cannot be any more emphasized how crucial thorough military readiness posture is as a natural stance against the enemy. That being said, contributing towards international maritime security is consistent with the nation's standing. It is a fact that maritime security has been conceptualized and developed merely as a study within the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Republic of Korea Navy, and other governmental organizations, forces, and academia. Naval cooperation and guidance of shipping suggested by this research as a practical operational field is a concrete solution to what once was an abstract concept. To stand firm on its status as a maritime nation, the Republic of Korea must establish a Maritime Security Organization within its Navy and develop the appropriate doctrines. Attaining experts, developing doctrines, and cultivating the capability to deploy maritime forces will allow for the Republic of Korea to execute a primary role in keeping international maritime security and naval coordination and guidance of shipping. To fully achieve its latent potential necessitates the Republic of Korea Navy to expedite the introduction of naval coordination and guidance of shipping concepts and to establish the appropriate doctrines, operation plans, and organizations.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.128-148
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• 2014

In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제20권2호
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• pp.210-236
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• 2021

China's Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure connectivity and other projects are presented in much of the discourse as a grand strategy to trap developing nations in debt, to exert asymmetric power and construct a new world economic order. The asymmetric relationship between China and Myanmar might therefore be expected to generate a range of political risks for stakeholders. Myanmar itself presents a "perfect storm" of problems, with dysfunctional governance, civil conflict, under-development and growing economic dependence on China. The Kyaukphyu port project and associated Special Economic Zone in Myanmar's troubled Rakhine state is investigated as a case study of risks on the Belt and Road. While worst case fears China might seize military control of the port appear unlikely, at least in current conditions, empirical observation indicates the complexity on the ground generates an array of other risks - as well as opportunities, should conditions allow. Further, despite challenges and constrained capacity, Myanmar governments have demonstrated agency, including by re-negotiating control and costs of the Kyaukphyu project. The case underlines that conditions are more complicated than simply China's asymmetric power. A sceptical approach is taken to normative discourses in order to build inductive understanding of how stakeholders and local experts perceive dynamics underway. A political risk approach is deployed to develop a framework to identify, analyse and assess risks for actors in relation to the Kyaukphyu project. The research findings are presented on an interim basis, given current constraints on field interviews due to the current crisis.

• 한류연구
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.25-29
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• 2022

Economic growth is one of the significant benchmarks determining a country's sustainable growth. Before WWII, most countries perceived their priority in terms of military strength as they dedicated most of their efforts and resources to creating weapons of mass destruction. The current research aims to establish some of the significant factors that may have contributed to the sustainable and progressive economic growth of South Korea within the 60-year timeframe. Multiple prior studies have attributed the economic growth in South Korea to policy reforms that opened the country to foreign markets. The outstanding increase in the percentage of exports stands out as an indication of the improvement in the quality of goods produced in the country. Finally, in recent years, China has dedicated more resources to research and developments as a strategy to improve innovation within the country and its overall economic growth. Other issues of concern likely to undermine the prospects of the country's economic growth include the limited geographical size, aging population, and limited natural resources. As such, South Korea needs to emphasize innovation and improve the business environment as its main strategy for sustainable economic growth in the future to maintain its continuous economic miracle.