The Jurchens, the ancestors of the Qing Manchus, had lived scattered in Manchuria and had made their living mostly on ginseng gathering and animal hunting. Their residential areas, rich with deep forest and numerous rivers, provided great habitation for all kinds of flora and fauna, but not so proper for agriculture. Based on their activities of foraging and hunting, the Jurchens developed a unique social organization that was later transformed into the Banner System, the most distinctive Qing military institution. By the sixteenth century, that the external trade brought considerable changes to Jurchen society. A huge amount of foreign silver, imported from Japan and South America to China, first invigorated commercial economy in China proper, and later caused a huge influence on Ming frontier regions, including Manchuria. In the late sixteenth century when the tradition of foraging and hunting encountered with silver economy, the Jurchen tribes became unified after years of competition and transformed themselves into the Manchus to build the Qing empire in 1636. In 1644 the Manchus succeeded in conquering the China Proper and moved into Beijing. Even after that, the Manchu imperial court never forgot the value of Manchurii ginseng; instead, they paid great efforts to monopolize this profitable root. Until the late seventeenth century, the Qing court used the Banner System to manage Manchurian ginseng. The banner soldiers stationed in Manchuria checked unauthorized civilian entrances in this frontier and protected its ginseng producing mountains from the Han Chinese people. All the process of ginseng gathering was managed by the institutions under the direct control of the imperial court, such as the Imperial Household Department, the Butha Ula Office, and the Three Upper Banner in Shengjing. Banner soldiers were dispatched to the given mountains, collect the given amount of ginseng, and send them to the imperial court in Beijing. The state monopoly of ginseng was maintained throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under the principle that Manchuria and its natural resources should be guarded from civilian encroachment. At the same time, Manchurian ginseng was considered as an important source of state revenue. The imperial court and financial bureau wanted to collect ginseng as much as they needed. By the late seventeenth century as the ginseng management by the banner soldiers failed in securing the ginseng tax, the Qing court began to invite civil merchants to ginseng business. During the eighteenth century the Qing ginseng policy became more dependent on civil merchants, both their money and management. In 1853 the Qing finally ended the ginseng monopoly, but it was before the early eighteenth century that wealthy merchants hired ginseng gatherers and paid ginseng tax to the state. The Qing monopoly of ginseng was in fact maintained by the active participation of civil merchants in the ginseng business.
China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.
Considering the expenditure size of public institutions centering on public enterprises, about 28% of Korea's GDP in 2007, public institutions have significant influence on the Korean economy. However, still in the new government, there are voices of criticism about the need of constant reform on public enterprises due to their irresponsible management impeding national competitiveness. Especially, political controversy over appointment of executives such as CEOs of public enterprises has caused the distrust of the people. As one of various reform measures for public enterprises, this study analyzes the effect of internal governance structure of public enterprises on their managerial performance, since, regardless of privatization of public enterprises, improving the governance structure of public enterprises is a matter of great importance. There are only a few prior researches focusing on the governance structure and managerial performance of public enterprises compared to those of private enterprises. Most of prior researches studied the relationship between parachuting employment of CEO and managerial performance, and concluded that parachuting produces negative effect on managerial performance. However, different from the results of such researches, recent studies suggest that there is no relationship between employment type of CEOs and managerial performance in public enterprises. This study is distinguished from prior researches in view of following. First, prior researches focused on the relationship between employment type of public enterprises' CEOs and managerial performance. However, in addition to this, this study analyzes the relationship of internal auditors and managerial performance. Second, unlike prior researches studying the relationship between employment type of public corporations' CEOs and managerial performance with an emphasis on parachuting employment, this study researches impact of employment type as well as expertise of CEOs and internal auditors on managerial performance. Third, prior researchers mainly used non-financial indicators from various samples. However, this study eliminated subjectivity of researchers by analyzing public enterprises designated by the government and their financial statements, which were externally audited and inspected. In this study, regression analysis is applied in analyzing the relationship of independence and expertise of public enterprises' CEOs and internal auditors and managerial performance in the same year. Financial information from 2003 to 2007 of 24 public enterprises, which are designated by the government, and their personnel information from the board of directors are used as samples. Independence of CEOs is identified by dividing CEOs into persons from the same public enterprise and persons from other organization, and independence of internal auditors is determined by classifying them into two groups, people from academic field, economic world, and civic groups, and people from political community, government ministries, and military. Also, expertise of CEOs and internal auditors is divided into business expertise and financial expertise. As control variables, this study applied foundation year, asset size, government subsidies as a proportion to corporate earnings, and dummy variables by year. Analysis showed that there is significantly positive relationship between independence and financial expertise of internal auditors and managerial performance. In addition, although business expertise and financial expertise of CEOs were not statistically significant, they have positive relationship with managerial performance. However, unlike a general idea, independence of CEOs is not statistically significant, but it is negatively related to managerial performance. Contrary to general concerns, it seems that the impact of independence of public enterprises' CEOs on managerial performance has slightly decreased. Instead, it explains that expertise of public enterprises' CEOs and internal auditors plays more important role in managerial performance rather than their independence. Meanwhile, there are limitations in this study as follows. First, in contrast to private enterprises, public enterprises simultaneously pursue publicness and entrepreneurship. However, this study focuses on entrepreneurship, excluding considerations on publicness of public enterprises. Second, public enterprises in this study are limited to those in the central government. Accordingly, it should be carefully considered when the result of this study is applied to public enterprises in local governments. Finally, this study excludes factors related to transparency and democracy issues which are raised in appointment process of executives of public enterprises, as it may cause the issue of subjectivity of researchers.
According to the National Currency (國幣) article in GyeongGukDaeJeon (經國大典), the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn (朝鮮通幣之印) was a seal that was imprinted on both ends of a piece of hemp fabric (布). It was used for the circulation of hemp fabric as a fabric currency (布幣). The issued fabric currency was used as a currency for trade or as pecuniary means to have one's crime exempted or replace one's labor duty. The ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn would be imprinted on a piece of hemp fabric (布) to collect one-twentieth of tax. The ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn (朝鮮通幣之印) was one of the historical currencies and seal materials used during the early Chosun dynasty. Its imprint was a means of collecting taxes; hence, it was one of the taxation research materials. Despite its value, however, there has been no active research undertaken on it. Thus, the investigator conducted comprehensive research on it based on related content found in JeonRokTongGo (典錄通考), Dae'JeonHu-Sok'Rok (大典後續錄), JeongHeonSwaeRok (貞軒?錄) and other geography books (地理志) as well as the materials mentioned by researchers in previous studies. The investigator demonstrated that the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn was established based on the concept of circulating Choson fabric notes (朝鮮布貨) with a seal on ChongOseungp'o (正五升布) in entreaty documents submitted in 1401 and that the fabric currency (布幣) with the imprint of the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn was used as a currency for trade, pecuniary or taxation means of having one's crime exempted, or replacing one's labor, and as a tool of revenue from ships. The use of ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn continued even after a ban on fabric currencies (布幣) in March 1516 due to a policy on the "use of Joehwa (paper notes)" in 1515. It was still used as an official seal on local official documents in 1598. During the reign of King Yeongjo (英祖), it was used to make a military service (軍布) hemp fabric. Some records of 1779 indicate that it was used as a means of taxation for international trade. It is estimated that approximately 330 ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn were in circulation based on records in JeongHeonSwaeRok (貞軒?錄). Although there was the imprint of ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn in An Inquiry on Choson Currency (朝鮮貨幣考) published in 1940, there had been no fabric currencies (布幣) with its imprint on them or genuine cases of the seal. It was recently found among the artifacts of Wongaksa Temple. The seal imprint was also found on historical manuscripts produced at the Jikjisa Temple in 1775. The investigator compared the seal imprints found on the historical manuscripts of the Jikjisa Temple, attached to TapJwaJongJeonGji (塔左從政志), and published in An Inquiry on Choson Currency with the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn housed at the Wongaksa Temple. It was found that these seal imprints were the same shape as the one at Wongaksa Temple. In addition, their overall form was the same as the one depicted in Daerokji (大麓誌) and LiJaeNanGo (?齋亂藁). These findings demonstrate that the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn at Wongaksa Temple was a seal made in the 15th century and is, therefore, an important artifact in the study of Choson's currency history, taxation, and seals. There is a need for future research examining its various aspects.
The purpose of this paper is to review the representative Buddhist policies enforced during the reign of Gwanghaegun (光海君), the 15th king of the Joseon Dynasty, and the aspects of the Buddhist community affected by them. Through this, the influence and dynamism of Buddhism during the reign of Gwanghaegun will be revealed. Some of the findings will run contrary to what is popularly known about Joseon Buddhism and the policy of Sungyueokbul (崇儒抑佛), 'Revering Confucianism and Supressing Buddhism.' During the Joseon Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism was taken as an ideological background, and consequently, Buddhism was ostracized by the ruling class who advocated the exclusion of heretical views. This also characterized King Gwanghaegun's reign during the Mid-Joseon Dynasty. In reality though, the ruling class held mixed opinions about Buddhism, and this influenced the Buddhist community in the Gwanghaegun Period. The military might of Japan demonstrated during the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592, led the ruling class to recognize Buddhism, and as a result, the status of Buddhism rose to a certain extent. Based on its elevated status and the aftermath of the Japanese Invasion of Korea, the Buddhist community engaged in social welfare activities inspired by the notion of requiting favors, and the Buddhist community gained recognition for providing relief services. As a result, the number of monks increased, and the economic situation improved as land ownership was granted to temples and monks. This is the means by which the Japanese Invasion of Korea influenced the Buddhist policies of the Gwanghaegun Period and changed the religious topography of Buddhism. During the reign of King Gwanghaegun, the ruling class regarded Buddhism as heretical, but offered posthumous titles to monks who engaged in meritorious services during the Japanese invasions of 1592~1598. Favorable and/or preferential treatment was also granted to some Buddhist monks. In addition, monks began to perform labor projects that demanded organizational and physical strength, such as those which related to national defense and architecture. However, throughout the Gwanghaegun Period, the monks were paid a certain amount of compensation for their labor, and the monks' responsibility for labor increased. This can be understood as a partial reconciliation with Buddhism or an acceptance of Buddhism rather than the suppression of Buddhism often presented by historians. As for policies which affected Buddhism, the Buddhist community showed signs of cooperation with the ruling class, the creation and reconstruction of temples, and the production of Buddhist art. Through close ties with the ruling class, Buddhism during the Gwanghaegun Period saw the Buddhist community actively responded policies that impacted Buddhism, and this allowed their religious orders to be maintained. In this way, it was also confirmed that the monk, Buhyu Seonsu (浮休 善修) and his disciple Byeogam Gakseong (碧巖 覺性), took up leadership roles in their Buddhist community. The Buddhist-aimed policies of Gwanghaegun were implemented against the backdrop of the Buddhist community, wherein the ruling class held mixed opinions regarding Buddhism. As such, both improvements and set backs for Buddhism could be observed during that time period. The ruling class actively utilized the organizational power of Buddhism for national defense and civil engineering after the Japanese invasions of 1592~1598. Out of gratitude, they implemented appropriate compensation for the Buddhists involved. The Buddhist community also responded to policies that affected them through exchanges with the ruling class. They succeeded in securing funds and support to repair and produce Buddhist temples and artworks. A thoughtful inspection of the policies towards and responses to Buddhism during the Gwanghaegun Period, shows that Buddhism actually enjoyed considerable organizational power and influence. This flies in the face of the general description of Joseon Buddhism as "Sungyueokbul (revering Confucianism and supressing Buddhism)."
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.