• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.127-165
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• 2014

This article regards the phase of political confrontations in Thailand and Burma as a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle between national revolution forces and civil revolution forces. It argues that in Thai case, anti-monarchy constitutional revolution has led to a right-wing national revolution based on state nationalism consolidating capitalist economic system by Sarit's military coup, while in Burmese case, anti-British imperialism movement in colonial era has resulted in a left-wing national revolution grounded on state nationalism associating with socialist economic system by Ne Win's military coup. It is also interesting to note that the two cases experienced state nationalism denying autonomous civil society as a process of nation-building in spite of their contrasting ideologies. In both cases, it became inevitable to have national revolution forces clinging to official nationalism and state nationalism confronting with civil revolution forces seeking popular nationalism and liberal nationalism. In particular, unlike Burmese society, Thai society, without colonial history has never experienced a civil war mobilizing anti-colonial popular nationalism including ethnic revolt. This article considers Dankwart Rustow's argument that national unity as a background condition must precede all the other phases of democratization, but that otherwise its timing is irrelevant. In this context, Thai democratization without national unity which began earlier than Burmese is taking a backward step. For the time being, there would be no solution map to overcome severe political polarization between the right-wing national revolution forces defending official nationalism cum state nationalism and the civil revolution forces trying to go beyond official nationalism towards popular nationalism cum liberal nationalism. In contrast, paradoxically belated Burmese democratization has just taken a big leap in escaping from serious and inconclusive nature of political struggle between the left-wing national revolution forces to defend official nationalism cum state nationalism and civil revolution based on popular nationalism cum liberal nationalism towards a reconciliation phase in order to seek solutions for internal conflicts. The two case studies imply that national unity is not a background condition, but a consequence of the process of political polarization and reconciliation between national revolution forces and civil revolution forces.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.21 no.5
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• pp.499-507
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• 2021

This study compares the educational effect using real equipment, virtual reality, and video to improve the educational and training effect of the army and verifies which method of education is excellent. The Army has made a lot of efforts to realize the actual training environment, however, it is increasingly difficult to provide the actual training environment because of 1) restrictions on securing training sites and urbanization, 2) deepening conflicts with the people, and 3) difficulties in acquiring defense budget. To resolve these issues, the use of virtual reality(VR) has the advantage to experience actual battlefield indirectly and could save budget by training in a virtual battlefield environment. In particular, in the case of dangerous or expensive weapons systems, is further required. Hence this paper studies how effective virtual reality is compared to the actual weapons system. virtual reality(VR) education is less effective than actual equipment education, but it is higher than video education. Based on this research result, it will be used as a basic data for the analysis of educational effects based in virtual reality(VR).

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.22 no.7
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• pp.206-212
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• 2022

Strengthening global geopolitical instability in the world leads to an aggravation of international conflicts; it destabilizes the domestic political situation in countries, violates the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, and also activates economic crime. The full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine and the deployment of military operations in a large territory of a sovereign country have created a number of destabilizing factors in the development of digital technologies and negatively affect the state and trends of digital marketing, which allows establishing interaction with a wide audience and facilitating the search for new customers in various places. The purpose of the research lies in substantiating the theoretical and applied principles for studying the features of digital marketing in the conditions of wartime posture in Ukraine. In the course of the research, general and special methods of economic analysis have been used and applied, namely: analysis and synthesis; analogies and comparisons; generalization and systematization; graphic and tabular methods. Regarding the results of the research of digital marketing in the conditions of wartime posture in Ukraine, it has been established that the intensification of the development of digital marketing is caused by the crisis phenomena of social-economic, social-political and military nature, as well as exacerbated by the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. It has been proven that highly developed countries use innovative digital technologies more effectively in the field of marketing, which indicates the importance of the Multidimensional Index of Digitization (the USA - MID: 0,92-0,92; the UK - MID: 0,80-0,97; Japan - MID: 0,80-0,88; Canada - MID: 0,78-0,81; Germany - MID: 0,78-0,88; France - MID: 0,72-0,76), however, the developing countries record much lower values (Ukraine - MID: 0,22-0,48). Accordingly, the level of cybersecurity in highly developed countries is also significantly higher than in transitive countries, in particular, in the United States (GCI: 0,919-0,999); Great Britain (GCI: 0,783-0,995); Canada (GCI: 0,818-0,978) and in Ukraine (GCI: 0,501-0,661).

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.43 no.3
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• pp.1-22
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• 2012

This study is to survey the Japanese investigations for Korean sea during Meiji period. Meiji government was eager to develop new fishing ground to provide the marine products to their people, to offer the job for their people and to accumulate the starting capital. They found that the Korean sea was abundant in shark, sea cucumber and ear shell. These products were valuable for Chinese foods. From 1870's, Japan Navy investigated Korean sea for military purpose and subsequently for fishery. The first investigation for Korean maritime products was The Circumstances for Catching Fish in Korean Sea by Sekizawa Akikiyo in 1893. He was the most famous specialist in fishery and insisted that Japanese fishermen must go to Korean sea and catch fishes. Meiji government accepted his opinion and pushed the policy sending fishermen to Korean sea. Meiji government enlarged the investigations and backed up the activities of fisherman and the organization for fishery in Korean sea. Especially, the investigations by The Association for Korean Sea Fishery were repeated and detailed(1897~1900). The Association intervened the conflicts between Korean and Japanese fishermen. At the same time, The Association investigated the attitudes of Korean people to Japanese. The Guidelines for Fishery in Korean Sea by Kuzuu Syuzo was also very detail, especially in the kinds of fishes in Korean sea. These investigations were supported by Meiji government or organizations helped by government.

• Journal of Advanced Marine Engineering and Technology
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.171-175
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• 2017

The high-tech large warships are minimal and they are always monitored by opponents, and become primary targets when conflicts occur. The improvement in reducing susceptibility has significant importance because it is difficult for a ship to maintain mission capability and functionality once it is damaged. Ordinary decoys are effective only under the premise that the ship has already been exposed. Traditionally, for naval vessels, techniques related to the radar have been used in military stealth techniques to ensure confidentiality. The corner reflector, on the other hand, can produce rather large radar cross sections. Continued use of deceptive systems such as chaff during operations will help to improve survivability of naval ships. From this viewpoint, corner reflector was considered for making radar countermeasures and deception technology. This paper reviews the current status of corner reflector basis decoys and the technical feasibility of corner reflectors for developing structural decoys.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.81-88
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• 2021

Officers and noncommissioned officers are the leaders of the military. Every year, more than 5,000 first-time officers are commissioned and perform their duties in various parts of the country. There is a conflict between officers and noncommissioned officers over the efficiency of experience. First-time officers are experiencing experience and a loss of authority from older noncommissioned officers and a failure to obey orders. Noncommissioned officers have complaints about first-time officers who want to direct only by class.Conflicts between officers and noncommissioned officers have existed in the past, but some first-time officers were resolved when they gained experience. Recently, the chief executives protested against the Chief of Staff's words and actions. I would like to study the cause of conflict between officers and noncommissioned officers and suggest solutions.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.21 no.7
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• pp.331-340
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• 2021

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a rapidly growing physical network that depends on objects, vehicles, sensors, and smart devices. IoT has recently become an important research topic as it autonomously acquires, integrates, communicates, and shares data directly across each other. The centralized architecture of IoT makes it complex to concurrently access control them and presents a new set of technological limitations when trying to manage them globally. This paper proposes a new decentralized access control architecture to manage IoT devices using blockchain, that proposes a solution to concurrency management problems and enhances resource locking to reduce the transaction conflict and avoids deadlock problems. In addition, the proposed algorithm improves performance using a fully distributed access control system for IoT based on blockchain technology. Finally, a performance comparison is provided between the proposed solution and the existing access management solutions in IoT. Deadlock detection is evaluated with the latency of requesting in order to examine various configurations of our solution for increasing scalability. The main goal of the proposed solution is concurrency problem avoidance in decentralized access control management for IoT devices.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.117-126
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• 2019

Historically, the United Nations supported the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea after liberation and played a decisive role in defending liberal democracy and peace by sending peacekeepers during the Korean War. With the political and military support of the United Nations, the Republic of Korea was able to grow into the world's 10th largest economy today, and now it is time to fulfill its responsibilities and roles to contribute to peace and prosperity in the international community as a middle power. The international peace operations of the United Nations are comprehensive concepts encompassing conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace building, and are implemented in accordance with the Security Council resolutions based on the UN Charter. In order to effectively respond to changes in the international security environment and conflict factors after the post-Cold War, the UN promoted a paradigm shift in international peace operations through the 2000 Brahim Report and the 2015 High-Level Panel Report on UN Peace Activities. Therefore, this study aims to assess the Korean military's international peace operations at a limited level, such as reconstruction assistance and humanitarian assistance, and to present development measures for more active participation as a middle power in the future. To this end, we reviewed the history and specificities of conflict, the conflicting factors after the post-Cold War, and the new paradigm of UN peace operations, focusing on the African region where a number of UN peacekeeping missions are stationed. And it also suggested ways to develop international peace operations that the Korean military should pursue in the future.