• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.1-17
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• 2020

The study aims to identify economic interdependencies between regions and define functional economic areas of Korea by analyzing inter-firm transaction networks. Previous research has relied on pre-given administrative boundaries or cultural homogeneity and used data such as commuting, population movement, and cargo flows which could not fully explain economic activities. To overcome the limitations, this study applies a community detection method to inter-firm transaction networks derived from the CRETOP+ database of Korean corporate data. The novel dataset and the network analysis enables us to identify Korea's functional economic areas based on actual inter-firm linkages. The result shows that there are six to seven economic blocs in the networks as of 2018. In particular, one huge economic bloc is formed integrating the Seoul metropolitan area, Chungcheong, and Gangwon provinces. Meanwhile, North Jeolla and South Jeolla provinces form two economic blocs separately rather than being tied up in one bloc due to the low frequency of transactions between each other. The two big economic blocs of Daegu-Gyeongbuk and Busan-Gyeongnam exist, and interestingly, Ulsan, Gyeongju, and Pohang form a separate middle-sized bloc across the administrative boundaries. The results reveal that the future balanced national development policies should be implemented based on functional economic areas derived from empirical data.

• Review of Culture and Economy
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.105-128
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of distributors on the movie exhibition by distributor types. For the analysis, the concept 'screen elasticity of box office' is adopted. Using the weekly screening data of 94 hit movies released in Korea in 2014 and 2015, the panel analysis estimates the 'screen elasticity of box office' with the Hausman-Taylor estimator. The results show that the screen elasticity of box office is smaller for vertically integrated distributors(CJ E&M and Lotte Entertainment) and Hollywood distributors than the local distributors(Showbox and NEW) that do not own integrated cinemas. This means that exhibitors allocate a larger number of screens to vertically integrated distributors and Hollywood distributors. As the two distributor groups had higher market share during the period, the results imply that the screen elasticity is related to the market performance of distributors. Smaller screen elasticity of the vertically integrated distributors might be related not to the ownership to theaters but to higher market share of the distributors.