• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.71-94
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• 1990

This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.

• Explosives and Blasting
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.3-13
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• 1991

The cautious blasting works had been used with emulsion explosion electric M/S delay caps. Drill depth was from 3m to 6m with Crawler Drill ${\phi}70mm$ on the calcalious sand stone (soft -modelate -semi hard Rock). The total numbers of test blast were 88. Scale distance were induced 15.52-60.32. It was applied to propagation Law in blasting vibration as follows. Propagtion Law in Blasting Vibration $V=K(\frac{D}{W^b})^n$ were V : Peak partical velocity(cm/sec) D : Distance between explosion and recording sites(m) W : Maximum charge per delay-period of eight milliseconds or more (kg) K : Ground transmission constant, empirically determind on the Rocks, Explosive and drilling pattern ets. b : Charge exponents n : Reduced exponents where the quantity $\frac{D}{W^b}$ is known as the scale distance. Above equation is worked by the U.S Bureau of Mines to determine peak particle velocity. The propagation Law can be catagorized in three groups. Cubic root Scaling charge per delay Square root Scaling of charge per delay Site-specific Scaling of charge Per delay Plots of peak particle velocity versus distoance were made on log-log coordinates. The data are grouped by test and P.P.V. The linear grouping of the data permits their representation by an equation of the form ; $V=K(\frac{D}{W^{\frac{1}{3}})^{-n}$ The value of K(41 or 124) and n(1.41 or 1.66) were determined for each set of data by the method of least squores. Statistical tests showed that a common slope, n, could be used for all data of a given components. Charge and reduction exponents carried out by multiple regressional analysis. It's divided into under loom over loom distance because the frequency is verified by the distance from blast site. Empirical equation of cautious blasting vibration is as follows. Over 30m ------- under l00m ${\cdots\cdots\cdots}{\;}41(D/sqrt[2]{W})^{-1.41}{\;}{\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots}{\;}A$ Over 100m ${\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots}{\;}121(D/sqrt[3]{W})^{-1.66}{\;}{\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots}{\;}B$ where ; V is peak particle velocity In cm / sec D is distance in m and W, maximLlm charge weight per day in kg K value on the above equation has to be more specified for further understaring about the effect of explosives, Rock strength. And Drilling pattern on the vibration levels, it is necessary to carry out more tests.