• Title/Summary/Keyword: maritime terrorism

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A study on Merchant Ship′s Security System for the Correspondence of Maritime Security Threats (해양보안위협 대응을 위한 선박보안시스템에 관한 연구)

  • 이은방
    • Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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    • v.9 no.1
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    • pp.17-23
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    • 2003
  • With the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the ships and their crew' safety and security have become a major issue in the maritime industries, In high-risk terrorism, not only ship owners and port authorities but also crew members on board should take precautions in the conduct of their business. In this paper, the vulnerability and essential elements in overall security of merchant ship are analyzed with a discussion in depth of the concept and principles of maritime security of merchant ship are analyzed with a discussion in depth of the concept and principles of maritime security management. And then, ship's security model and security system to reduce security rish and to minimize damage are proposed.

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A Study on the Legal Liabilities and Countermeasures against Piracy (해적행위에 대한 법적 책임과 대응방안)

  • Choi Suk-Yoon;Lee Yun-Cheol;Hong Sung-Hwa;Park Jeong-Ki
    • Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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    • v.29 no.1 s.97
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    • pp.43-58
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    • 2005
  • Piracy is the enemy of the human race. Pirates commit acts of murder, robbery, plunder or other villainous deeds at sea, cruelly against humanity. The Republic of Korea(ROK), as a big maritime country, is obliged to suppress piracy under international treaties it ratified, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the two 1988 Conventions against maritime terrorism The Korean government is recently taking a positive attitude towards the regional cooperation which is necessary for the suppression of piracy in the waters of Southeast Asia In spite of the effects of international cooperation to prevent piracy, it is recently on an increasing trend every year. Such circumstances may have a bad effect on the sound development of world economy by means of trade at sea as well as treat to the safety of crews and safe operation of ships. This paper aims to suggest the countermeasures against piracy in terms of criminal law, civil law and international law in order to secure safe operation of vessels at sea.

Feasibility Study on High Speed Craft Considering Environment in South Korea (우리나라 운항환경을 고려한 소형 고속정의 타당성 분석)

  • Lee, Soon-Sup;Kang, Dong-Hoon;Shin, Sung-Chul
    • Journal of Ocean Engineering and Technology
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    • v.25 no.2
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    • pp.113-119
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    • 2011
  • The Korea navy has a vital national interest in maritime security. The national strategy for maritime security focuses on preventing terrorism, crime, and hostile acts in the maritime domain. This requires the development of high speed crafts for maritime security in the South Korea domain. This paper reviews the state of the art on the development of high speed craft internationally, including efforts by the U.S. navy, and analyses the riverine environment to operate high speed crafts in South Korea. This paper makes specific proposals for high speed craft such as their main dimensions, speed, endurance, hull structure material, propulsion system, and general arrangement and 3D shape. This paper was used in the generation of basic resources for future ROC (requirement of capability) of high speed crafts using an engineering methodology.

Legislation, Co-ordination Centre and Database System to Respond Security Incidents at Sea

  • Deyi, Gao
    • Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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    • 2004.08a
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    • pp.155-159
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    • 2004
  • The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code has come into force on July 7$^{th}$ 2004. It would therefore be prudent that all parties' concerned put in place, methodically, systematically and as soon as possible, all the necessary infrastructure needed to give effect to all the decisions of the Conference. But the ISPS Code doesn't have the details during implementation. For example, how to legislate, administrate\ulcorner How are the data relating to security incident saved\ulcorner So, the author will lay emphasis to expatiate on three aspects in this thesis on the basis of the fact of anti-terrorism at sea.

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A Sensitivity Risk Analysis for Additional Truck Turnaround Time (ATTT) by Container Inspection Stations Derived from C-TPAT and CSI.

  • Yoon, Dae-Gwun
    • Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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    • v.31 no.2
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    • pp.151-157
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    • 2007
  • After World Trade Center's Terror in 2001 and promulgating Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA, 2002) and Security and Accountability For Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act, 2006) in the United States, most of the attention on security of international transportation including marine carrier and facility has focused increasingly. Inspection stations in foreign seaport terminal including Busan, South Korea, have been installed by Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The inspection station, however, may directly and indirectly affect delay of truck turnaround time in the seaport, especially high and severe level of security. This paper was analysed a risk for the additional average delay of truck turnaround time incurring by the inspection station under the all level of security, C-TPAT and CSI. As a result of this risk analysis, the higher weighted inspection time based on raising security level, the less number of trucks to be inspected, which will derive high delay in the inspection station.

A Study on Jurisdiction under the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions (국제항공테러협약의 관할권 연구)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.59-89
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    • 2009
  • The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

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India's Maritime-Security Strategy: Pretext, Context and Subtext (인도의 해상 안보 전략: 구실, 맥락 및 숨은 의미)

  • Khurana, Gurpreet S
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.4 no.1
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    • pp.1-56
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    • 2022
  • Why has India become a key actor in the maritime-configured Indo-Pacific region? There are some external factors, but for India, its geo-strategic frontier encompassing its geopolitical and maritime interests is expanding rapidly beyond its territorial space across both the Indian and Pacific oceans amidst an increasingly arduous geopolitical and security environment. India must, therefore, acquire the ability to influence events within this strategic arena using all facets of national power, including maritime-military power. Lately, therefore, New Delhi has invested much intellectual capital to review its maritime-security strategy. India's new strategy is premised on the concept of holistic security involving the 'softer' aspects of maritime-security, and a rekindling of maritime consciousness in India, a nation that has traditionally been beset by 'sea-blindness'. The strategy adopts a region-wide, inclusive, and a more proactive approach than hitherto, as is evident in its title 'Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy'. While it deals with the growing concern of new non-traditional threats in the Indian littoral and the need for military deterrence and preparedness, it also addresses the imperatives for India to seek a favorable and rules-based benign environment in its immediate and extended maritime periphery, including through multi-vectored strategic partnerships dictated by its enduring principle of strategic autonomy. For a more profound and comprehensive understanding of India's maritime-security strategy, this paper examines the key unstated and implicit factors that underpin the strategy. These include India's historical and cultural evolution as a nation; its strategic geography; its geopolitical and security perceptions; and the political directions to its security forces. The paper deals specifically with India's response to maritime threats ranging from natural disasters, crime and state-sponsored terrorism to those posed by Pakistan and China, as well as the Indian Navy's envisaged security role East of the Malacca Straits. It also analyzes the aspects of organizational restructuring and force planning of India's maritime-security forces.

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A Study on Improvement Plan of Training System for the Specialization of Port Security Guard (항만보안 인력의 전문화를 위한 교육시스템 개선방안)

  • Lee, Jung Hun;Lee, Min Hyung;Kim, Sung Woo
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.14 no.6_1
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    • pp.13-21
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    • 2014
  • It is needless to say that the port security is very important owing to the geographic setting of Korea and the possibility of the provocation by North Korea. In addition, The security management is necessary for the port and the domain of maritime to block the inflow from overseas because of the increase of international crime as terrorism. The training system for port security guard should be constructed to secure the specialization of the manpower for the efficient port security management. But the training system of port security manpower is not unified and the training is not carried out, therefore it is necessary to improve the training system of port security manpower. In this study, the improvement plan of training system is suggested as follows. First, the unification of the legislation of port security should achieved to establish the guidance of training for port security guard. Second, the specialized training per activities should be done. And lastly, the qualification system should be introduced for the specialization of port security manpower.

Legal Issues in Application of the ISPS Code under Marine Cargo Insurance (해상적하보험에서 국제선박 및 항만시설 보안규칙의 적용상 법률적 쟁점)

  • Lee, Won-Jeong;Yoo, Byung-Ryong
    • Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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    • v.16 no.3
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    • pp.307-316
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    • 2014
  • In view of the increased threat arising terrorism, the International Maritime Organization(IMO) adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) which attached to the SOLAS Convention. The ISPS Code requires a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities. For example, a shipowner must obtain the International Ship Security Certificate(ISSC). If the carrying vessel has not ISSC, the ship may be detained by the contracting governments. The Joint Cargo Committee(JCC) in London adopted the Cargo ISPS Endorsement, in which the assured who knowingly ships the cargoes on a non-ISPS Code compliant vessel will have no cover. However, where there is no the Cargo ISPS Endorsement in a Marine Cargo Insurance Policy and the cargo is carried by a non-ISPS Code certified vessel, the legal problem is whether or not it would constitute a breach of an implied warranty of seaworthiness and/or an implied warranty of legality. The purpose of this article is to analyze the potential legal issue on the relations between non-ISPS Code compliant vessel and two implied warranties under Marine Insurance Act(1906) in U.K.

International Legal Measures of Protection of Critical Infrastructure Facilities in Banking Sphere

  • Oleg, Batiuk;Oleg, Novikov;Oleksandr, Komisarov;Natalia, Benkovska;Nina, Anishchuk
    • International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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    • v.22 no.10
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    • pp.145-154
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    • 2022
  • Based on the obtained results of the study, the most problematic issues and legal conflicts are identified, which are related to the ratio of norms of domestic and foreign legislation, taking into account the requirements of the Constitution of Ukraine and the provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On international agreements". Along with this, it is stated in this scientific article that there are a number of provisions and examples of positive practice on the specified topic abroad and in international legal acts today, which should be used by Ukraine both in improving legislation on the issues of banking activity and in increasing the level of criminal legal protection of relevant critical infrastructure facilities, especially those that are substantively related to prevention and counteraction of activity, with regard to the legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained funds, financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which is quite relevant for our state, given the military conflict that is taking place on its territory in the Donbass. Again, in the same context, the need for more active cooperation between Ukraine and the FATF (international body developing a policy to combat money laundering) has been proven.