• Strategy21
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• 통권46호
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

유엔 안전보장이사회(UNSC, United Nations Security Council) 주도의 경제제재는 초창기 '포괄적 경제제재(comprehensive sanctions)' 모델에서 '스마트 경제제재(smart sanctions)' 모델로 발전하고 있다. 유엔 안보리는 직접적인 무력개입(military intervention)보다 규범적 비용(normative costs)과 부담이 덜한 경제제재를 통해 대상 국가의 손익계산법(cost-benefit calculation)을 바꿔 행동변화를 이끌어내려고 했으나, '포괄적 경제제재'에 따른 비용 대부분이 일반 대중에게 전가되면서, 인도적 위기(humanitarian crisis) 사태를 초래하고, 대상 국가의 내부 결속력을 강화하는 역설적인 상황을 만들었다. 이에 따라 정책 결정 과정에 직접적으로 관여하는 지도자와 정치 엘리트를 대상으로 자산을 동결(asset freeze)하거나 여행금지(travel ban) 조치 등을 집중적으로 하는 '스마트 제재'가 탄생하였다. 대북한 경제제재 또한 '스마트 경제제재' 모델로 점차 발전하여 그 효과성을 나타내고 있다. 특히 최근의 결의안(resolutions)을 통해 석탄 수출을 전면 금지하고, 원유 수입을 제한함에 따라 지표상 가시적인 성과가 나타나고 있고, 2018년부터 한국, 미국과 평화협상에 나서면서 제재완화를 촉구하는 등, 위와 같은 '스마트' 대북제재가 북한의 행동변화를 이끌어내고 있음을 알 수 있다. 대북제재의 효과성은 북한의 대외무역규모(total trade volume) 변화량을 통해 측정할 수 있는데, '포괄적 경제제재'의 성격에 가까운 초기의 대북제재 결의안 채택 이후에는 북한 대외무역규모가 감소한 경우도 있지만 도리어 증대된 경우도 있었다. 그러나 석탄 수출 금지 및 원유 수입 제한 조치를 담은 2016, 2017년의 결의안 이후에는 북한 대외무역규모가 2016년 약 65억 달러에서 2017년 약 55억 달러로, 2018년에는 약 28억 달러로 대폭 감소한 사실을 발견할 수 있다. 북한의 대외무역은 정권의 자금줄과 같기 때문에 대외무역규모의 감소는 곧 '스마트 제재'의 효과와 같다. 대북경제제재의 효과성에 영향을 미치는 두 번째 조건은 중국의 대북제재 레짐(sanctions regime)에의 참여 여부다. 북한은 경제적으로 중국에 상당히 의존하고 있고, 이는 지표상으로도 명백히 나타나고 있다. 중국은 그 동안 북한의 지정학적인 가치 및 급변 사태 시 북-중 국경에서의 대규모 난민 발생 우려 등에 따라 직간접적으로 북한을 지지해왔지만, 북한 핵능력의 고도화에 따른 동북아시아 지역에서의 핵확산(nuclear proliferation) 우려, 미-중 무역분쟁에 따른 여파 등으로 대북제재 레짐에 성실히 참여할 것을 밝혔다. 실제로 중국의 대북한 석유 수출량이 감소하고, 북-중간 대외무역 총량 또한 2016년부터 지속적으로 감소하며, 대북경제제재에 중국의 참여가 제재 성공의 중요한 변수임을 증명했다. 효과적인 대북제재를 위한 마지막 요건은 북한의 경제제재 회피 노력 방지(prevention of North Korea's economic sanctions evasion efforts)다. 앞서 밝힌 바와 같이 석탄 수출과 원유 수입은 북한 정권의 자금줄이자 핵무력 고도화를 위한 필수 에너지원이다. 중국이 대북제재 레짐에의 참여를 선언한 상태에서 중국으로부터의 원유 수입량이 급감함에 따라 중동지역 등지로부터 바닷길을 통해 원유를 수입해야 하는데, 원유 수입량 제한에 따라 동중국해(East China Sea) 및 공해(high seas)상에서 선박 대 선박간 불법 환적(ship-to-ship illegal transshipment)을 실시하면서 대북제재를 무력화하고 있다. 유엔 대북제재위 산하 전문가 패널(Panel of Experts), 미 국무부(U.S. Department of State), 미 재무부 외부자산통제국(U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) 등은 보고서를 통해 북한의 해상 불법 환적 실태를 상세히 밝히고 있는데, 자동 선박 식별 장치(AIS, Automatic Identification System)의 허위 신호 송출(false signaling), 선박 등록 문서 위조(false certificate of registry)와 같은 방식으로 감시 및 단속을 회피하고 있는 실정이다. '스마트'한 대북제재 설계 및 중국의 참여로 대북제재가 북한의 행동 변화를 이끌어낼 수 있음이 확인되었지만, 국제사회의 눈을 피해 해상에서 만연하고 있는 불법 환적과 같은 행위는 효과적인 대북제재 실행의 마지막 퍼즐이라고 할 수 있다. 앞으로 해상에서의 불법 환적 행위를 막기 위해 다음 세 가지 정책적 함의를 도출해낼 수 있다. 첫 번째는 가장 강력한 조치라고 할 수 있는 해상봉쇄(maritime blockade)에 대한 고려다. 전세계 물동량의 40%가 지나가는 말라카 해협(Malacca Strait)은 북한에게도 중요한 해상 교통로이다. 북한이 계속해서 결의안을 위반하고 공해상에서 불법 환적 행위를 자행할 경우, 말라카 해협에서 북한과 연계된 의심 선박을 검문 검색하고 차단(interdiction)하여 강제적인 방식으로 북한의 제재 회피 노력을 근절할 수 있다. 남중국해(South China Sea)에서 중국과 미국 간, 중국과 주변국 간 갈등이 격화됨에 따라 다국적군의 말라카 해협 봉쇄는 중국에게 달갑지 않겠지만, 유엔 대북제재 결의안에 명시되어 있는 의심 선박에 대한 검문 검색 행위임을 명백히 함과 동시에 다자간의 협조를 바탕으로 하여 규범적 정당성(normative justification)을 높인다면 충분히 실현 가능한 방안이다. 두 번째는 공해상에서의 불법 해상 환적에 대한 감시 강화와 증거 수집이다. 마지막 세번째는 대한민국의 다국적 해상 감시 활동에의 참여다. 북한의 대북제재 이행 여부는 한국의 안보와 직결되는 사안이다. 대북제재의 최종 목표는 북한 비핵화에 있고, 협상 테이블에 북한을 이끌어내는 데 제재가 효과적이라는 것이 드러났기 때문에 핵 위협의 당사자인 대한민국 또한 효과적인 제재 이행 여부 감시에 책임감을 가져야 한다.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권8호
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• 해양안보
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.311-343
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• 2020

지구온난화의 영향으로 2035년 이후 북극해가 대부분 개방될 것으로 예측된다. 그리고 북극해 개방 시에는 북유럽까지 항해 거리·비용 감소, 북극권 자원 해상운송, 아시아의 허브항으로서 간접이익 창출 등 많은 국가이익이 기대되고 있다. 이에 따라 미지의 영역이던 북극해에서 국가이익을 확보하고, 국민의 자유로운 활동을 보장하기 위해 정부도 구체적인 정책을 수립하여 추진 중이다. 해군도 북극해 관련 국가정책을 군사적으로 뒷받침하려면, 지금부터 역할과 계획을 구체화해야만 한다. 북극해에서 지원 임무를 수행하기 위해 해군력은 고유 작전특성(기동성, 융통성, 지속성, 현시성, 투사성)을 발휘하여야 하며, 이를 준비하는 과정에서 긍정적·부정적 영향을 미칠 수 있는 내·외부 작전환경(OE)을 먼저 분석할 필요가 있었다. 이는 해군 내부의 강점(S)과 약점(W), 외부의 기회(O)와 위협(T)으로 구분되는데, 각 환경요인들을 연계(S-O, S-T, W-O, W-T)하여, 작전특성을 구현할 수 있는 발전방안을 도출하고자 하였다. 해군은 경험해보지 못한 추운 원해에서 임무를 수행하기 위해 다음의 노력을 기울여야 할 것이다. 첫째, 정부 정책과 발맞추어 해군의 단계적인 추진계획(로드맵)을 작성하고, 둘째, 국내·외 교육훈련 프로그램과 해외 연합훈련에 적극적으로 참여함으로써 전문인력을 양성해야 한다. 셋째, 국내의 우수한 특수선박 조선기술과 4차 산업혁명 신기술을 적용하여 극지 작전용 무장·장비·물자를 확보하는 한편, 광활한 북극해 상 전력공백을 해소하기 위해 연합작전 역량과 군사신뢰도를 증진하면서, 북극권 내 기항지를 마련할 필요가 있다. 끝으로, 북극권 진출 후 군사적·비전통적 위협(전염병, 재난, 인명구조 등)에 대응하며, 다양한 성과를 창출할 수 있도록 사전 준비를 해나가야 할 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.5-52
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• 2017

Debates about introducing nuclear submarines have been a main issue in Korea. The highest officials and the government has started to think seriously about the issue. Yet there were no certain decision to this issue or any agreements with US but it is still necessary to review about introducing nuclear submarines, the technologies and about the business. The reason for such issues are the highest officials of Korea to build nuclear submarine, nK's nuclear development and SLBM launching. ROKN's nuclear submarine's necessity will be to attack(capacity to revenge), defend(anti-SSBN Operation) and to respond against neighboring nation's threat(Russia, Japan, China). Among these nations, US, Russia (Soviet Union), Britain, France had built their submarines in a short term of time due to their industrial foundation regarding with nuclear propulsion submarines. However China and India have started their business without their industrial foundation prepared and took a long time to build their submarines. Current technology level of Korea have reached almost up to US, Russia, Britain and France when they first built their nuclear propulsion submarines since we have almost completed the business for the Changbogo-I,II and almost up to complete building the Changbogo-III which Korea have self designed/developed. Furthermore Korea have reached the level where we can self design large nuclear reactors and the integrated SMART reactor which we can call ourselves a nation with worldwide technologies. If introducing the nuclear submarine to the Korea gets decided, first of all we would have to review the technological problems and also introduce the foreign technologies when needed. The methods for the introduction will be developments after loans from the foreign, productions with technological cooperations, and individual production. The most significant thing will be that changes are continuous and new instances are keep showing up so that it is important to only have a simple reference to a current instances and have a review on every methods with many possibilities. Also developing all of the technologies for the nuclear propulsion submarines may be not possible and give financial damages so there may be a need to partially introduce foreign technologies. For the introduction of nuclear propulsion submarines, there must be a resolution of the international regulations together with the international/domestics resistances and the technological problems to work out for. Also there may be problem for the requirement fees to solve for and other tough problems to solve for. However nuclear submarines are powerful weapon system to risk everything above. This is an international/domestically a serious agenda. Therefore rather than having debates based on false facts, there must be a need to have an investigations and debates regarding the nation's benefits and national security.

• Strategy21
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• 통권32호
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'