• Title/Summary/Keyword: maritime domination

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An Analysis of the Characteristics of China's Naval Strategy to Become a Maritime Power: Focusing on analyzing the "goals, methods, and means" of strategy (해양강국 달성을 위한 중국 해군전략의 성격 분석: 전략의 "목표·방법·수단"을 이용한 분석을 중심으로)

  • Kim, nam-su
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.2 no.1
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    • pp.1-42
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    • 2021
  • Controversy continues over the offensive nature of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify the characteristics of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power by using the three elements of strategy and predict China's military actions in the future. For this purpose, research was conducted by considering the three elements of strategy and the distinct characteristics of naval strategy, and it was found that China's naval strategy was overall aggressive, but there was an imbalance in the pursuit of aggression between each strategic element. Offensive nature was prominent in terms of the methods, but there were limitations in the goals and means, such as the need to cooperate with neighboring countries to become a maritime power and the lack of military technology and operational continuity. The prospects for China's future military actions derived from the imbalance between these strategic elements are as follows. ① The risk of all-out military conflict with the US is low for now. ② China may use its naval power to force or cause limited military clashes against neighboring countries within the first island chain. ③ Accidental military conflicts with the US and neighboring countries may occur over naval confrontation over territorial disputes.

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A Study on the Historical Origin of Private Security Industry in Korea (우리나라 보안산업의 역사적 기원에 관한 연구)

  • Lee, Chang-Moo
    • Korean Security Journal
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    • no.22
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    • pp.91-111
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    • 2010
  • Around the middle of the ninth century the strict bone-rank system of Silla frustrated many people who had political ambition but lacked nobility. They had to seek other ways, including maritime trade. Such an undertaking reflected and also increased their economic and military power. Trade prospered with T'ang China and with Japan as well. The threat of piracy to Silla's thriving maritime trade caused to create a succession of garrisons at important coastal points. Chonghae Jin (Chonghae garrison) was regarded as the most important of these. It was established in 828 by Chang Pogo. Chonghae Jin was on Wando, an island just east of the southwestern tip of Korea and a key place at this time in the trade between China, Korea, and Japan. From this vantage point Chang Pogo became a merchant-prince with extensive holdings and commercial interests in China and with trade contacts with Japan. Although piracy was rampant in East Asia at that time, either the Chinese or Silla government was not able to control it due to inner political strife and lack of policing resources. Infuriated by the piracy and the government's inability to control it, Chang Pogo came back to Silla to fight against the pirates and to protect maritime trade. He persuaded the king of Silla and was permitted to control the private armed forces to sweep away the pirates. In 829 he was appointed Commissioner of Chonghae-Jin with the mission of curbing piracy in that region. Chang's forces were created to protect people from pirates, but also developed into traders among Silla Korea, T'ang China, and Japan in the 9th century. This was geographically possible because the Chonghae Garrison was situated at the midpoint of Korea, China, and Japan, and also because Chang's naval forces actually dominated the East Asia Sea while patrolling sea-lanes. Based on these advantages, Chang Pogo made a great fortune, which might be collected from a charge for protecting people from pirates and the trades with China and Japan. Chang's forces could be termed the first private security company in the Korean history, at least in terms of historical documents. Based on historical documents, the numbers of private soldiers might be estimated to exceed tens of thousands at least, since Chang's forces alone were recorded to be more than ten thousand. Because local powers and aristocratic elites were said to have thousands of armed forces respectively, the extent of private forces was assumed to be vast, although they were available only to the privileged class. In short, the domination of Chang's forces was attributable to the decline of central government and its losing control over local powers. In addition it was not possible without advanced technologies in shipbuilding and navigation.

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