• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.501-524
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• 2002

Article 121 of the UNCLOS stipulates the regime of islands and grants different jurisdictions to islands and rocks. Especially, paragraph 3 gives different definitions and distinguishes the legal status of between islands and rocks. That is, rocks, which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life cannot have their own EEZ, continental shelf or the great-sphere maritime jurisdiction. In this paper various theories and state practicess on islands and rocks are examined with reference to Article 121 of UNCLOS. Also, the status of Dokdo as a rock or an island is examined in accordance with the interpretation of Article 121 of UNCLOS. National legislations, practices, and many scientific opinions are often contradictory and controversial with respect to the interpretation of Article 121 of the UNCLOS. However, it is believed that Article 121 of UNCLOS, particularly paragraph 3 has to be interpreted more strictly. That is because the highly developed modem scientific technology can be meaningless when the criteria of Article 121 of UNCLOS are to be inappropriately applied. Insular figures like ${\ulcorner}rocks{\lrcorner}$ could bring the inequitable effects disadvantageous toward the other party when the maritime delimitation is applied. Claiming and Intentionally extending maritime zone of a coastal states by assigning EEZ for small insular figures like ${\ulcorner}rocks{\lrcorner}$ is over-zealous nationalism which is illegal, and such practices must be recognized as actions bringing great harm to the neighboring nations and demise of the sprit of all mankind.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.177-199
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• 2012

As is generally known, the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku Islands between China/Taiwan and Japan was triggered by a report commissioned by the UN in 1968, which reported the possibility of a substantial amount of petroleum and natural gas buried in the South China Sea. When the administrative authority over the Ryukyu Islands was transferred from the US to Japan in 1972, jurisdiction over the Senkaku Islands was also transferred. A dispute ensued between China (Taiwan) and Japan over the Senkaku Islands except during the period in which formal relations were established between the two states. This paper will take a look particularly at the events that occurred in the 2000's and discuss their recent trends and aspects of the dispute. Though China and Japan agreed to joint resource development in 2008, the agreed zone was a very small area adjacent to the Korea-Japan Joint Continental Shelf Development Zone, and the points of agreement have not been implemented. China has been developing four oil fields including Chunxiao in its waters adjacent to the median line asserted by Japan. However, China also has been excluding the participation of Japan, while Japan has been strongly objecting to the unilateral development of oil fields by China. If indeed the oil fields on China's side are connected past the median line asserted by Japan, then China's unilateral development will infringe upon the potential sovereign rights of Japan, thereby violating international law.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.147-159
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• 2023

Sea level rise due to climate change is an increasing concern for the international community, and especially for coastal States. In case of regression of the coastal line or inundations of maritime features, including islands, the questions of whether coastal States are under an obligation to redraw their baseline and the outer limits of their maritime jurisdiction and of whether the existing maritime boundary treaties should be terminated are raised. This article reviews the arguments raised by the Small Island Developing States, International Law Association, and International Law Commission and suggests a solution within the current legal framework of the Law of the Sea through an interpretation of the existing provisions of the UNCLOS focusing on the legal issues relating to the Law of the Sea.

• Maritime Security
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.83-113
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• 2022

Although China's maritime militia has not been well known despite its long history, it is recently emerging as a serious threat to maritime security, causing neighboring countries' security concerns due to the growing number of maritime disputes with China. In this regard, it is now time to clearly define the true nature of the Chinese maritime militia. A close look at the organization and roles of the Chinese maritime militia reveals that it is an organization that is systematically managed and operated by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army of China. Its role is to serve the purpose of "contributing to the protection and expansion of China's marine interests." In addition, the threat factors of the Chinese maritime militia were analyzed by examining the cases of maritime disputes between the Chinese maritime militia and neighboring countries. First, the Chinese maritime militia has implemented the "Gray Zone Strategy." Second, it is a systematic organization supported by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army. Third, it is a maritime power that cannot be ignored as the world's largest militia organization. Fourth, it has a strategic flexibility that enables the execution of the dual mission of working for a living such as commercial fishing and serving in the maritime militia. The threats of the Chinese maritime militia are not limited to Southeast Asian countries located in the South China Sea. This is also the case in Korea as the country cannot avoid maritime disputes with China such as the Ieodo issue and the boundary delimitation of the West Sea. Accordingly, this study was focused on presenting a predictable scenario and countermeasures based on the analysis through a scenario technique with respect to the two cases that are most likely to occur in Korea-China relations. Finally, beyond identifying the nature of the Chinese maritime militia, this study takes a further step to share considerations as to how the organization may operate and develop in the future and how we can cope with its moves.

• Proceedings of the Korean Association of Geographic Inforamtion Studies Conference
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• 2003.04a
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• pp.56-61
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• 2003

해양경계 획선은 해양 국가들 사이의 협상 중 매우 중요한 쟁점이었다. 각각의 협상의 문제는 공평의 법적 원칙이 엄격하게' 적용되는 국제적 경계를 결정하는 것이다. 하나의 공식이 각국의 경제적, 지형적 그리고 주위요소와의 전략적 경우에 모두 적용될 수 없기 때문에 어떠한 특별한 방법이 정해지지 않았다. 그러나 균등한 경계를 얻기 위한 몇 가지 지침이 1953년부터 International Law Commission(ILC)에 의해 제안되었다 이 지침들 중에 하나는 등거리 원칙(the principle of equidistant)에 의거한 일반적인 규칙을 사용한다. 이 등거리 원칙은 경계상의 모든 점들은 해안의 한 폭에서 측정된 기준선(baseline)상의 최근접점에서 항상 등거리에 있어야 한다. 이 원칙을 구현하기 위한 여러 가지 기하학적 방법이 적용되어왔다. 본 연구에서는 등거리 원칙을 기본으로 하는 알고리즘 중 광범위하게 사용되고 있는 Two-Point 알고리즘과 Three-Point 알고리즘을 정립한 후, 이 알고리즘 결과를 확인할 수 있는 해양경계 획선 프로그램을 웹으로 구현하였다.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Navigation
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.1-21
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• 1993

The purpose of this paper is to search for reasonable and fair principles applicable to the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone(which is called the EEZ, hereinafter) around the Korean Peninsula th-rought the comprehensive study of maritime boundary, which is one of the most important issues in the law of the Sea. So far, the sea has been exploited for activities such as fishery, transport and military stratedy, and en-vironmental policy and so on. From this time on, however, it becomes important to us as the major trea-sure-house of various resources which will be developed and used for diversified purposes. For these rea-sons, nowadays, more and more countries of the world are competing to secure waters as much as possible within their jurisdiction. And the regime of the EEZ was created as a result of this international trend. At last, it has been institutionalized as the 200-mile EEZ of a legal notion in the Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was adopted at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in Jamaica on December 10, 1982. In adapting to this EEZ institution, Korea is faced with several complicated problems as it is bounded on three sides by the sea and all of its neighboring countries such as the PRC, the DPRK, Japan, Russia etc are less than 400 miles away between opposite countries. Therefore, when trying to delimit the boun-dary for the EEZ, it appears necessary to analyze applicable principles and rules of international law for delimitation mainly through the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and studies the trends of actual State practices and recent international precedents. It is hoped that such knowledge will enable Korea to secure sufficient resources and other sovereign rights without conflicting with the neighboring countries concer-ned. For the achievement of the above mentioned object. I analyzed the necessities of the establishment of the EEZ in Korea, the difficulties and practices of Korea's neighbors, and the changes and forthcoming trends in Korea's relations with its neighbors concerned on the basis of the general explanation of the EEZ regime. In conclusion, it is my opinion that for the establishment of the EEZ delimitation which neighbors around the Korean Peninsula should be applied reasonable and equitable principles considering the rele-vant circumstances which characterize the area definitely as well as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.31-50
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• 2009

The demarcation of Maritime Boundary is directly related to the expansion of jurisdiction and the securing of resources. Resource diplomacies of the three countries Korea, China and Japan represent a major task for the national administrations : to secure resources as well as to stablize and sustain resources for future national economies. At the sea area around Korea as well, countries are fiercely competing to secure resources and to expand jurisdiction. This is evidenced by the fact that various principles and logics which are beneficial to each own country are presented through international precedents, agreement between countries and the theories of the international law scholars. They say that the conclusion of demarcation of maritime boundary for the Yellow Sea would be easy from the point that there is no dispute related to island dominion in the waters of the Korean Peninsula especially the Yellow Sea, but still we need to have a strategic approach to this issue from the point that the factors used for claiming maritime boundaries may expand the waters of a country over much. For example, the continental shelf boundary in consideration of the distribution of sedimentary deposits in the Yellow Sea which is being raised by China began from the hypothesis that the inflow of sedimentary deposits to the Yellow Sea through the rivers of China represents absolute majority, but the results of the latest studies raised questions on the hypothesis. Especially, the studies done by Martin and Yang revealed that the inflow of sedimentary deposits to the Yellow Sea from the Yellow River is approximately less than 1% of total sedimentary deposits in the Yellow Sea, and also the result of analysis on the causes and counter policy measures on the environment of Bohai, China supports the reliability of the results of such studies. From a legal aspect, the sedimentary deposits of rivers which are claimed by China represent extremely weak ground for the claim for the title of the continental shelf. The siltline claimed by China seems to be based on the Article 76-4-(a)(i) of UNCLOS. This is, however, not the definition on the title of the continental shelf but it is only a technical formula to utilize in a case where a country desires to expand the continental shelf to over 200 nautical miles. Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf also confirm this point through the Article 2.1.2 of the Guideline. The only case in which sedimentary deposits of rivers were referred to as concrete demarcation of maritime boundary was in the which was concluded in 1986 between India and Myanmar at the Andaman Sea. In the said case, India acknowledged the boundary up to the isobath of 200m which Myanmar claimed based on the sedimentary deposits of the Irrawaddy River. It has limits as a case for acknowledging the sedimentary deposits, however, because in fact India's acknowledgment was made in exchange for the condition that Myanmar gave up the dominion of two islands which they had been claiming from India up until that time.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.255-276
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• 2014

The dispute between China and Japan regarding $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is believed to be quite similar to the controversy surrounding Dokdo in terms of historical and post-war processes except for the point that the phenomena of occupation is different with regard to Dokdo. China's claim to $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is based on historical title and continuous use while the basis of Japan's claim is summarized as preoccupancy of ownerless land. Even though Japan acknowledges that China discovered $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, Japan claims that the act to establish sovereignty over the island from the standpoint of International Law was not taken by China. However, at that time, effective occupation was not an essential prerequisite for the acquisition of a territory. That is to say, from a legal perspective, the legal right for an area could be established based on the discovery of the land, and so it is thought that Japan is applying the current criteria of International Law in a manner that is inappropriate. When we review the post-war process, the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not directly mention $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. But based on the said treaty, we can note that Japan gave up all rights for the southern area that is north of the boundary line that equates to latitude $29^{\circ}$ and that includes the Ryuku Islands and $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. Of course, the provisions for the territory in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its disposal are not the final factor for the judgment regarding dominium of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. However, it seems clear that Japan's attitude and interpretation regarding the issues of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, the Kuril Islands and Dokdo is problematic.

• The Sea:JOURNAL OF THE KOREAN SOCIETY OF OCEANOGRAPHY
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.495-508
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• 2019

Tidal datums are key and basic information used in fields of navigation, coastal structures' design, maritime boundary delimitation and inundation warning. In Korea, the Approximate Lowest Low Water (ALLW) and the Approximate Highest High Water (AHHW) have been used as levels of tidal datums for depth, coastline and vertical clearances in hydrography and coastal engineering fields. However, recently the major maritime countries including USA, Australia and UK have adopted the Lowest Astronomical Tide (LAT) and the Highest Astronomical Tide (HAT) as the tidal datums. In this study, 1-hr interval 19-year sea level records (1999-2017) observed at 9 tidal observation stations along the west and south coasts of Korea were used to calculate LAT and HAT for each station using 1-minute interval 19-year tidal prediction data yielded through three tidal harmonic methods: 19 year vector average of tidal harmonic constants (Vector Average Method, VA), tidal harmonic analysis on 19 years of continuous data (19-year Method, 19Y) and tidal harmonic analysis on one year of data (1-year Method, 1Y). The calculated LAT and HAT values were quantitatively compared with the ALLW and AHHW values, respectively. The main causes of the difference between them were explored. In this study, we used the UTide, which is capable of conducting 19-year record tidal harmonic analysis and 19 year tidal prediction. Application of the three harmonic methods showed that there were relatively small differences (mostly less than ±1 cm) of the values of LAT and HAT calculated from the VA and 19Y methods, revealing that each method can be mutually and effectively used. In contrast, the standard deviations between LATs and HATs calculated from the 1Y and 19Y methods were 3~7 cm. The LAT (HAT) differences between the 1Y and 19Y methods range from -16.4 to 10.7 cm (-8.2 to 14.3 cm), which are relatively large compared to the LAT and HAT differences between the VA and 19Y methods. The LAT (HAT) values are, on average, 33.6 (46.2) cm lower (higher) than those of ALLW (AHHW) along the west and south coast of Korea. It was found that the S_a and N₂ tides significantly contribute to these differences. In the shallow water constituents dominated area, the M₄ and MS₄ tides also remarkably contribute to them. Differences between the LAT and the ALLW are larger than those between the HAT and the AHHW. The asymmetry occurs because the LAT and HAT are calculated from the amplitudes and phase-lags of 67 harmonic constituents whereas the ALLW and AHHW are based only on the amplitudes of the 4 major harmonic constituents.