• 한국지리정보학회지
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• 제11권4호
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• pp.41-50
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• 2008

육상자원에 대한 치열한 경쟁 속에 많은 나라들이 바다(해양자원)로 눈을 돌리고 있다. 따라서 세계 각국의 배타적경제수역(EEZ)과 대륙붕의 경계를 명확하게 하기위해 첨예하게 대립하고 있다. 1982년 해양법 협약(UNCLOS)이후, 한국과 일본, 한국과 중국의 인접수역이 400해리 미만으로 한국은 일본 중국과 해양경계획정 회담을 해오고 있다. 본 연구는 해양법과 기술지침서 IHO-51을 통해 해상경계의 획정을 위해 가장 중요한 법률과 기술을 검토하고 주변국과의 해양경계 협상에 효과적인 해양경계 GIS DB를 정의하였다. 영해기점과 영해기선의 정의는 해양의 경계를 획정하기위해 가장 중요한 개념으로 국가 간 협의과정과 협상에 임하기 위해서 정책결정자들은 해양법 협약을 바탕으로 자국에 이익을 최대화 할 수 있는 해상 경계를 획정할 준비가 되어 있어야 한다. 협상 전략과 원칙은 해양경계 결정과 관련된 요소들의 신뢰할 수 있는 데이터베이스를 통해 구체적으로 만들어 진다. 따라서 협상에 대한 효율적이고 신속정확한 의사결정은 해상경계 결정을 위한 GIS DB를 근거하여 만들어 질수 있다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권38호
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• pp.13-46
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• 2015

Dokdo issue reaches beyond economic and security interest to Koreans, as it is regarded as symbol of her independence. Albeit the fact that Japan has merely no legitimate title over Dokdo, Japan has been tenaciously insisting their jurisdiction over Dokdo since the independence of Korea. Under such circumstances, public outrage towards Japan is most certainly understandable. Yet, mere outrage itself, lacking in logic and factual grounds, can contribute little if not any, to the desirable solution of the problem. Precedents reveal that dealing maritime issues amid lack of profound understanding in international law has often led to undesirable results, such as the inclusion of Dokdo in the Joint Management Fisheries Zone in 1999 Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement. In a sense, adroit use of international law is a critical element in preserving Korea's sovereign rights against persistent Japanese plans to rob Dokdo once again. The Dokdo issue is inextricably bound to international law; the legal status of Dokdo as island, the equitable solution of maritime boundary delimitation and effective control, existence of dispute. Yet, the public policies and arguments made by pundits are generally in lack of understanding in international law. It is now the time for Korea to commence on long-term cross-academia / department plans to establish Dokdo strategy as part of the nationwide maritime strategy effectively using international law as its stronghold.

• Strategy21
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• 통권37호
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• pp.193-241
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• 2015

China, Japan and Korea are the world's top 10 energy consumers, and so very interested in the development of seabed hydrocarbon resources in order to meet their energy demands. The East China Sea is the tri-junction area where three countries' entitlements on the maritime boundaries are overlapped. There are abundant oil reserves in the East China Sea, and therefore competitions among countries are growing to get control of them. Although these countries have concluded the bilateral agreements to jointly develop resources in the East China Sea, they do not function as well. Because joint development and management of seabed petroleum resources can lead to stable development system, and to lower possibility of legal and political disputes, the needs for joint development agreement among three countries are urgent. Meanwhile, Northeast Asian seas are semi-closed seas, which are geographically closed and vulnerable to marine pollution. Moreover there are a lot of nuclear power plants in coastal area, and seabed petroleum resources are being developed. So it is likely to occur nuclear and oil spill accidents. Fukushima nuclear disaster and Bohai Bay oil spill accident in 2011 are the cases to exhibit the potential of major marine pollution accidents in this area. It is anticipated that the risks become higher because power plants and offshore oil platforms are extending gradually. Therefore, the ways to seek the joint marine environmental protection agreement focused on regulation of nuclear power plant and offshore oil platform have to be considered. In this paper, we try to find the way to make joint development and joint environmental protection agreement in Northeast Asian seas. We concentrate on the measure to drive joint development of seabed petroleum deposits in East China Sea's overlap area, despite of maritime delimitation and territorial disputes, and we try to drive joint marine environmental protection system to respond to marine pollution and accidents due to offshore oil platform and nuclear power plants. Through these consideration, we seek solutions to deal with lack of energy, disputes of maritime territorial and boundary delimitation, and marine pollution in Northeast Asia.

• 해양환경안전학회:학술대회논문집
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• 해양환경안전학회 2017년도 추계학술발표회
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• pp.281-281
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• 2017

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.142-163
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• 2013

Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.

• 한국측량학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국측량학회 2007년도 춘계학술발표회 논문집
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• pp.11-16
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• 2007

Since public awareness on the importance of sea is increasing, a number of states have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. However several problems on marine boundary making are raising due to the ambiguity of law and importance of sea area. The purpose of this study is to find a logical principal through overall consideration on decision of baseline points which is a criteria of maritime boundary delimitation. Accordingly, this paper considers the current status, problems and measures for marine boundary making and then presents an alternative on it.

• Strategy21
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• 통권36호
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• pp.33-58
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• 2015

In 1996, China, Japan and the ROK all became the party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Since then, the UNCLOS has been a fundamental basis for the resolution and management of maritime disputes amongst them. However, there still remain acrimonious disputes in the region. Resources nationalism and the revival of geopolitics aggravates the disputes particularly on sovereignty over disputed islands, maritime delimitation and the legal nature of military activities in other States' Exclusive Economic Zones. Under the circumstances, why have the demands for the conclusion of a regional agreement been raised in this region? A desirable regional agreement regarding ocean affairs should be compatible with the rights and obligations under the UNCLOS, a universal norm regarding ocean affairs. This paper will propose a desirable regional agreement by adopting an incremental approach.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제30권1호
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• pp.119-128
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• 2008

Japan's new Basic Ocean Law took effect in 20 July 2007. This law contains that 1) calls for the consolidation of eight government offices that previously worked separately on maritime issues; 2) establishes a basic plan for maritime matters, and; 3) creates a comprehensive maritime policy headquarters, run by the Prime Minister. The result is a structure for the integrated promotion of maritime policy. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport has been appointed to the newly established position of maritime minister. Japan has been in conflict with Korea and China over EEZ and territory, which has caused the country to turn to ocean. If Japan puts more emphasis on sea, it will be on a collision course with neighboring countries such as Korea, China, Russia, and Taiwan. Japan has been at odds with these countries; with Korea over Dokdo islets, with China over the Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea, where gas fields lie, with Taiwan over fishery rights in the East China Sea, with Russia over the Kuril Islands. Korea's position about the establishment of Japan's new Basic Ocean Law is followed: 1) expression of Korea's position in maritime resourcces of east china sea, 2) understand of strategy for maritime resources development and maritime delimitation in China and Japan, 3) a caution for extention of EEZ and maritime activities, 4)effective and comprehensive policy establishment, and strength in R&D, 5) construction of active and responsive system for maritime issues in neighbor country.

• 수산경영론집
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• 제31권2호
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• pp.67-91
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• 2000

Fisheries Agreements among Korea, China, and Japan, for the effective management of fisheries resources and protection of fisheries disputes, have been processed in a manner to conclude interim arrangements those are effective prior to the final demarcation of the maritime delimitation which often requires much time to settle among the relevant states, Based on this understanding, Korea, China, and Japan, had proceeded their mutual fisheries agreement ; and, two fisheries agreements, between Korea-Japan and China-Japan, have already entered into force on 22 January 1999 and on 1 June 2000, respectively. Lastly fisheries negotiation between Korea and China has been concluded in order to make it effective on 30 June 2001. As Korean fisheries have already experienced the impacts after the entry into force of Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement, it is inevitable that the likewise will also be true for the Korea-china Fisheries Agreement. The results of fisheries negotiation should minimize the loss by ensuring Korean flagged vessels' fishing rights to the maximum level in the counterpart's waters, and to maximize our counterpart's loss by restricting its vessels' fishing rights to the minimum level in our waters. However, such goals are almost unreachable in an intergovernmental negotiation. On this ground, regardless of the results, the negotiation is highly criticized from all the interested realms of the society. First, this study reviews the negotiation process ana subject matters of the fisheries agreement, and then evaluates the disputed items issued by academic, political, and industry areas in an international law and fisheries perspective. After the entry into farce of fisheries agreement, various activities should be accommodated as future tasks, such as the adjustments of the domestic fisheries structure, the reorganization of the resource management based fisheries structure, the construction of EEz large surveillance system, and the construction of the multilateral fisheries cooperation system Through an earlier implementation of those tasks, the Korean fisheries will be better prepared in minimizing the predicted impacts once the Korea-China Fisheries Agreement becomes effective.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제32권4호
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• pp.427-437
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• 2010

The Korean Government is trying to construct an ocean research station in Dokdo's water. The station would be the third ocean research station following the Ieodo station and the Gageocho station. Although the new station would served as a scientific research base for peaceful and academic purposes, the construction of the station will almost certainly lead to a diplomatic dispute between Japan and Korea in the near future due to the disputed ownership of the island. In light of the diplomatic protests against the construction of the Ieodo station by the Chinese Government, various domestic and international legal issues which could be raised regarding the construction of the Dokdo station need to be reviewed. Therefore, this article reviews the international legal status of the station and the rights and duties pertaining to its construction, investigates the domestic legal grounds relating to the construction and operation of the marine scientific installation, evaluates the international legal impacts of the construction on the expansion of maritime jurisdiction, the effective control on Dokdo and the negotiations on maritime boundary delimitation, and finally draws conclusions on the future activities of the Korean Government for the construction and operation of the Dokdo Ocean Research Station.