• Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.7-16
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• 2024

Fishing is considered one of the most dangerous industries alongside mining that needs further efforts to improve safety. In this study, we have investigated safety management of the gillnet fishing industry in South Korea through identifying safety level and classifying common accident types from the statements of accident com-pensation insurance payments for the last 5 years (2016-2020). There were in total 3,895 accidents and 159 fatalities with an average accident frequency of 5.34 × 10^-2 per year per fisher and an average fatality of 2.18 × 10^-3 fishers per year. We have also identified that 62.4% of the accidents occurred during Fishing (FS), and the most common and the most severe accident type is Slips and Trips (ST) and Other (OT) marine accidents such as collision and capsizing, respectively. The hand was most frequently injured. Finally, the risk assessment indicated that most of the accident types of gillnet fishing in South Korea have unacceptable levels of risks, and it is urgent to implement improved safety measures to reduce accidents during gillnet fishing operation. The findings of this study are expected to provide valuable data to create a safer working environment for fishers working on gillnet fishing vessels.

• Journal of the Society of Naval Architects of Korea
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• v.61 no.5
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• pp.324-333
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• 2024

This paper focuses on the cooperation between Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV). It aims to develop efficient guidance and control algorithms for USV based on obstacle identification and path planning from aerial images captured by UAV. Various obstacle scenarios were implemented using the Robot Operating System (ROS) and the Gazebo simulation environment. The aerial images transmitted in real-time from UAV to USV are processed using the computer vision-based deep learning model, You Only Look Once (YOLO), to classify and recognize elements such as the water surface, obstacles, and ships. The recognized data is used to create a two-dimensional grid map. Algorithms such as A^* and Rapidly-exploring Random Tree star (RRT^*) were used for path planning. This process enhances the guidance and control strategies within the UAV-USV collaborative system, especially improving the navigational capabilities of the USV in complex and dynamic environments. This research offers significant insights into obstacle avoidance and path planning in maritime environments and proposes new directions for the integrated operation of UAV and USV.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.446-455
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• 2018

This study examined the effects of different performance sequences of aerobic and strength exercises for 10 weeks on the body composition, physical function, and hormones in males aged in their 20s. A total of 30 subjects (N=30) were assigned randomly to either aerobic and resistance exercise (n=10, A+R), resistance and aerobic exercise (n=10, R+A), or a control group (n=10, CON). The different order of aerobic (HRmax 50-80%, 30 min) and resistance (50-80% 1RM, 30 min) exercises for 10 weeks was consisted of 3 times per week and 80 minutes per session. The body composition, physical function, and hormones were measured before and after the training period. The lean body mass (p=.015) was increased and the fat mass (p=.042) and % body fat (p=.007) in the A+R were decreased. The skeletal muscle mass (p=.001) in the R+A was increased and % body fat was decreased (p=.003). The weight (p=.03) and % body fat (p=.039) in the CON were increased. The aerobic capacity (p=.011) and muscular endurance (p=.001) in the A+R group were improved. The muscular endurance (p=.0016) in the R+A was improved. The epinephrine (p=.048), norepinephrine (p=.013), and cortisol (p=.045) levels in the A+R group were increased. The epinephrine (p=.046) level in the R+A group was increased. The insulin (p=.007) level increased in the CON group. In conclusion, both A+R and R+A groups produced superior results to the CON group but the A+R group was slightly more efficient than the R+A group.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.27 no.7
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• pp.987-994
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• 2021

The Yellow sea, as described in article 123 of UNCLOS, is semi-enclosed sea surrounded by the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and North Korea. In addition, the Yellow Sea is one of the 66 large marine ecosystems as it contains large amounts of marine resources. According to article 194 of UNCLOS, states should be aware of rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment to be engaged with countries directly as regional entity or indirectly. Therefore, the legal blank is urgent in terms of trans-boundary environmental pollutant issues. The UNDP has conducted a project called Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (YSLME) which has reached the 2^nd phase. The project has some notable achievements, namely performing joint activities on analysis of diagnostic trans-boundary issues in collaboration with China and South Korea, developing a strategic action plan based on TDA, and establishing regional strategic action plan. However, on the other hand, the project could not reflect the full participation of North Korea as a state party. As a result, the project has a limitation on effective implementation of RSAP. Therefore, this study focuses on the suggestion of a legally-binding trilateral treaty as a blue print for the next, 3^rd phase of the project. By analyzing the best practice of the Wadden Sea Trilateral Treaty case, the study verifies the validity of legislative measures on establishing and managing a legally-binding trilateral YSLME Commission. By suggesting a three phase treaty, incorporating a joint declaration by establishing the commission, the signing of the treaty, and formulating an umbrella convention and implementation arrangement, the study expects to guarantee the consistency and sustainability of the trilateral treaty regardless of political issues pertaining to North Korea.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.5-26
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• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.93-127
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• 2014

During the four years following the sinking of the Cheonan frigate in 2010, the South Korean public opinion has seen changes in four basic ways. First, public polls with respect to the cause of the sinking show that 70% of the people consider North Korea as the culprit, while 20% maintain that it was not an act carried out by North Korea. Second, the opinions relative to the cause of the incident seem to vary according to age difference, generational difference, and educational difference. From 2011, people in their 20s showed 10% increase in regarding North Korea as the responsible party. People in their 30s and 40s still have a tendency not to believe the result of the investigation carried out by the combined military and civilian group. Third, the most prominent issue that arose aftermath of the Cheonan incident is the fact that political inclination and policy preference are influencing the scientific determination of the cause. In other words, scientific and logical approach is lacking in the process of determining the factual basis for the cause. This process is compromised by the inability of the parties concerned in sorting out what is objective and what is personal opinion. This confused state of affairs makes it difficult to carry on a healthy, productive debate. Fourth, rumors, propaganda, and disinformation generated by pro-North Korea Labor Party groups in the internet and SNS are causing considerable impact in forming the public opinion. Proposed Strategy 1. The administration can ascertain public trust by accurately determining the nature of the provocation based on accurate information in the early stages of the incident. 2. Education in scientific, logical, rational methodologyis needed at home, school, and workplace in order toenhance the people's ability to seek factual truths. 3. In secondary education, the values of freedom, human rights, democracy, and market economy must be reinforced. 4. It is necessary for the educational system to teach the facts of North Korea just as they are. 5. Fundamental strength of free democratic system must be reinforced. The conservative, mainstream powers must recognize the importance of self-sacrifice and societal duties. The progressive political parties must sever themselves from those groups that take instructions from North Korea's Labor Party. The progressives must pursue values that are based on fundamental human rights for all. 6. Korean unification led by South Korea is the genuine means to achieve peace in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The administration must recognize that this unification initiative is the beginning of the common peace and prosperity in the Far East Asia, and must actively pursue international cooperation in this regard.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.