• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.95-113
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• 2007

To minimize IT operational risks and the opportunity cost for lost business hours. it is necessary to have preparedness in advance and mitigation activities for minimization of a loss due to the business discontinuity. There are few cases that banks have a policy on systematic management, system recovery and protection activities against system failure. and most developers and system administrators response based on their experience and the instinct. This article focuses on the mitigation model development for minimizing the incidents of disk unit in IT operational risks. The model will be represented by a network model which is composed of the three items as following: (1) the risk factors(causes, attributes and indicators) of IT operational risk. (2) a periodic time interval through an analysis of historical data. (3) an index or an operational regulations related to the examination of causes of an operational risk. This article will be helpful when enterprise needs to hierarchically analyze risk factors from various fields of IT(information security, information telecommunication, web application servers and so on) and develop a mitigation model. and it will also contribute to the reduction of operational risks on information systems.

• 한국지능시스템학회논문지
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• 제26권3호
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• pp.218-225
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• 2016

첨단과학기술의 집합체로서 비약적으로 발전한 항공기 성능과 나날이 고도화되어 가고 있는 군 작전 환경을 고려해 볼 때 이상적인 조종적성을 가지고 있는 인원을 선발하는 문제는 매우 중요하다. 또한 무위로 돌아갈 수밖에 없는 중도 탈락자의 손실비용과 항공사고의 대부분이 인적요인에 의해 발생하고 있다는 사실은 조종적성검사를 통한 인원선발이 왜 중요한지에 대한 좀 더 현실적인 이유가 될 것이다. 이에 본 연구에서는 한국 공군이 2004년 개선하여 조종사 선발에 사용하고 있는 조종적성검사 항목의 타당성을 다양한 분류모형을 통하여 분석하고 선택된 변수에 대한 의미와 향후 발전방향에 대하여 논의하였다. 그리고 광의의 적성검사 항목에 속하는 개인특성변수를 투입하여 분류모형을 구성함으로써 예측력을 높이는 연구를 수행하였다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권32호
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.