Purpose : This study aims to identify the influence of individual, parental, workplace, and policy variables on the intention of marriage of unmarried workers. The results of the study can be used as a basis to come up with policy and practical measures to increase these workers' intention of marriage. Methods : Data was collected from 480 participants through a questionnaire. The measuring tools in this study were tested for reliability and validity. In addition, technical statistics, ANOVA, correlation analysis, and hierarchical regression analysis were performed by SPSS 18.0. Results : First, unmarried workers' willingness to marry was higher above the average. Second, significant differences in the unmarried workers' intention of marriage were revealed based on gender, age, level of education, total assets, and debt status. Significant associations were also found with parents' economic levels and the possibility of parental support for housing and marriage expenses. The differences in response based on employment patterns, job satisfaction, and family-friendly organizational culture were also significant. The correlation between policy variables and marriage intentions also showed the necessity of a funded housing policy and a marriage preparation policy. Third, based on the hierarchical regression analysis using personal, parental, and workplace variables to identify the factors affecting unmarried workers' willingness to marry, it is clear that gender, age, and the likelihood of parental support for housing and marriage expenses have a significant impact. A family-friendly organizational culture and funded housing policy were also significant contributors. Conclusion : The study found that the funded housing policy was the most important factor affecting unmarried office workers' willingness to marry. Additionally, the possibility of parental support for housing and marriage expenses and a family-friendly organizational culture at work were found to have an important impact on the improvement of unmarried workers' willingness to marry.
Objectives: The purpose of this study is to analyze each country's infectious disease response capacities and, based on this, find areas for improvement in Korea's infectious disease management response. Methods: First, the capacity to respond to the COVID-19 infectious disease was analyzed by country using the SPAR scores of 96 countries around the world released by WHO in 2022. Second, we analyzed each country's specific COVID-19 quarantine performance using Our World in Data and the Global Health Security Index (GHSI). Results: First, the quarantine intensity index on January 24, 2021 was the highest in the Southeast Asia branch at 67.6, which had strong quarantine measures, and the lowest at 44.5 in the Africa branch. As of December 31, 2022, the quarantine intensity index in Europe was significantly lowered to 11.6. Second, the factor that influenced the SPAR indicator on the total number of patients per million population was national laboratory (C4), p=.027, and the factor that influenced the total number of deaths per million population was infection prevention and control (C9), p=.005., Risk Communication and Community Participation (C10) p=.040. The influential factor on GDP per capita was infection prevention and control (C9) p=.009, and the influential factor on GHSI was infection prevention and control (C9) p=.002. Conclusion: The research findings indicate that it was difficult to find a correlation between the SPAR, which is each country's self-assessment of their infectious disease capacities, and the number of COVID-19 cases or the intensity of pandemic responses. However, mortality rates, as well as factors such as the Global Health Security Index (GHSI) and national income, appear to be somewhat influenced. For future improvements in infectious disease management and response in our country, it is necessary to develop pandemic strategies that can reduce socio-economic costs based on more scientific and reliable data like JEE or GHSI, especially in preparation for potential unknown emerging infectious diseases. Based on this, proactive decision-making led by a control tower of experts and effective health communication are also required to respond to public health crises at a national level.
Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.
Some contracting States of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (commonly known as the Chicago Convention) issue FAOC(Foreign AOC and/or Operations Specifications) and conduct various safety audits for the foreign operators. These FAOC and safety audits on the foreign operators are being expanded to other parts of the world. While this trend is the strengthening measure of aviation safety resulting in the reduction of aircraft accident, it is the source of concern from the legal as well as economic perspectives. FAOC of the USA doubly burdens the other contracting States to the Chicago Convention because it is the requirement other than that prescribed by the Chicago Convention of which provisions are faithfully observed by almost all the contracting States. The Chicago Convention in its Article 33 stipulates that each contracting State recognize the validity of the certificates of airworthiness and licenses issued by other contracting States as long as they meet the minimum standards of the ICAO. Consequently, it is submitted that the unilateral action of the USA, China, Mongolia, Australia, and the Philippines issuing the FOAC to the aircraft of other States is against the Convention. It is worry some that this breach of international law is likely to be followed by the European Union which is believed to be in preparation for its own unilateral application. The ICAO established by the Chicago Convention to be in charge of safe and orderly development of the international civil aviation has been in hard work to both upgrade and emphasize the safe operation of aircraft. As the result of these endeavors, it prepared a new Annex 19 to the Chicago Convention with the title of "Safety Management" and with the applicable date 14 November 2013. It is this Annex and other ICAO documents relevant to the safety that the contracting States to the Chicago Convention have to observe. Otherwise, it is the economical burden due to probable delay in issuing the FOAC and bureaucracies combined with many different paperworks and regulations depending on where the aircraft is flown. It is exactly to avoid this type of confusion and waste that the Chicago Convention aimed at when it was adopted in 1944. The State of the operator shall establish a system for both the certification and the continued surveillance of the operator in accordance with ICAO SARPs to ensure that the required standards of operations are maintained. Certainly the operator shall meet and maintain the requirements established by the States in which it operate. The authority of a State stops where the authority of another State intervenes or where the former has yielded its power by an international agreement for the sake of international cooperation. Hence, it is not within the realm of the State to issue FAOC towards foreign operators for the reason that these foreign operators are flying in and out of the State. Furthermore, there are other safety audits such as ICAO USOAP, IATA IOSA, FAA IASA, and EU SAFA that assure the safe operation of the aircraft, but within the limit of their power and in compliance with the ICAO SARPs. If the safety level of any operator is not satisfactory, the operator could be banned to operate in the contracting States with watchful eyes until the ICAO SARPs are met. This time-honoured practice has been applied without any serious problems. Besides, we have the new Annex 19 to strengthen and upgrade with easy reference for contracting States. We don't have no reason to introduce additional burden to the States by unilateral actions of some States. These actions have to be corrected. On the other hand, when it comes to the carriage of the Personal or Pilot Log Book, the Korean regulation requiring it is in contrast with other relevant provisions of USA, USOAP, IOSA, and SAFA. The Chicago Convention requires in its Articles 29 and 34 only the carriage of the Journey Log Book and some other certificates, but do not mention the Personal Log Book at all. Paragraph 5.1.1.1 of Annex 1 to the Chicago Convention even makes it clear that the carriage in the aircraft of the Personal Log Book is not required on international flights. The unique Korean regulation in this regards giving the unnecessary burden to the national flag air carriers has to be lifted at once.