• Title/Summary/Keyword: leakage of stored secrets

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Security Proof for a Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Establishment Protocol

  • Shin, Seong-Han;Kazukuni Kobara;Hideki Imai
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.14 no.4
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    • pp.75-90
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    • 2004
  • At Asiacrypt 2003, Shin et al., have proposed a new class for Authenticated Key Establishment (AKE) protocol named Leakage-Resilient AKE ${(LR-AKE)}^{[1]}$. The authenticity of LR-AKE is based on a user's password and his/her stored secrets in both client side and server side. In their LR-AKE protocol, no TRM(Tamper Resistant Modules) is required and leakage of the stored secrets from $.$my side does not reveal my critical information on the password. This property is useful when the following situation is considered :(1) Stored secrets may leak out ;(2) A user communicates with a lot of servers ;(3) A user remembers only one password. The other AKE protocols, such as SSL/TLS and SSH (based or PKI), Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) and Threshold-PAKE (T-PAKE), do not satisfy that property under the above-mentioned situation since their stored secrets (or, verification data on password) in either the client or the servers contain enough information to succeed in retrieving the relatively short password with off-line exhaustive search. As of now, the LR-AKE protocol is the currently horn solution. In this paper, we prove its security of the LR-AKE protocol in the standard model. Our security analysis shows that the LR-AKE Protocol is provably secure under the assumptions that DDH (Decisional Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard and MACs are selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks (which is a weaker notion than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).

Introduction to Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols and Their Applications

  • Imai, Hideki;Shin, Seong-Han;Kobara, Kazukuni
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.18 no.6B
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    • pp.207-217
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    • 2008
  • Secure channels, indispensable to many applications, can be established by using an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol where the involving parties authenticate one another and then share authenticated session keys over insecure networks. In this paper, we introduce a new type of AKE protocols that are especially designed to minimize the damages caused by leakages of stored secrets. Such protocols are called Leakage-Resilient AKE (LR-AKE) protocols, whose motivation, design principles, several constructions, security analysis and applications are explained in detail.