• Proceedings of the Korean DIstribution Association Conference
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• 2000.10a
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• pp.47-59
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• 2000

Following the increasing importance of logistics function in today's company operation, this work explores the mechanism for cooperation within a supply chain, especially between a firm and an independent logistics supplier. We first characterize the optimal linear logistics contract based upon the recent developments in contract theory, and then investigate the effect of such a contract on the firm's inventory policy. The results indicate that the order quantity becomes smaller and the lead time becomes shorter and under the optimal contract than without the incentive scheme. Accordingly, the service level under the optimal contract becomes higher. These findings are in accordance with the literature on vertical control and JIT (Just in Time) philosophy.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.621-639
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• 2000

High population and economic growth leads to ever increasing demand for water resources, prompting many regional conflicts for the water. With the observation, this paper examines the allocation problem of flowing water between upstream and downstream regions, We offer a two- region model in which the downstream region pays a portion of product to the upstream region in order to induce the upstream region to share the water. Our model shows that the "side-payment" does not always work, because the ex post income of the downstream region could be lower than the income without the side-payment This happens when the externality the upstream region imposes on the downstream region is small. The paper derives the condition under which the incentive mechanism like side-payment is likely to fail (or work). The model also shows that the higher the degree of externality is, the less amount of side-payment should be. The results of the paper suggest that the incentive scheme can help the regional conflicts be solved if the externality effect generated by the water use of upstream region is big enough, which is in fact the case where the conflict is severe.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.32 no.11B
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• pp.700-708
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• 2007

This paper considers an incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry with respect to the sale of retail and access services. This regulation scheme induces the monopoly carrier who owns bottleneck facilities to adopt socially optimal outcomes when providing access and retail services. It is well known that upstream carriers can realize an integrated level of profit, without integration, by means of a two-part tariff. First, this paper introduces a framework for regulating an access and retail price combined with budget balancing. Second, this paper introduces two-part tariff (price discrimination) scheme for both access (upstream) and retail (downstream) services and discusses the resulting implications for incentive regulation when the regulator has incomplete information about cost functions. By imposing a self-selection mechanism, the regulator can induce firms to adopt socially optimal prices in both access and retail markets.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.107-114
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• 2022

The main purpose of this study is to substantiate the theoretical and methodological foundations of the organizational and economic mechanism of development of the agro-industrial complex in modern conditions. Organizational and economic mechanism is presented as a complex organizational structure of the system type, which is aimed at performing specific functions, the characteristic feature of which is the constant support of process changes without which the organizational and economic mechanism can not exist. There are four components of the agro-industrial complex, represented by agriculture and the national economy, which ensure its operation, including industry, processing of agricultural products, its storage and transportation, sale and repair and maintenance of agricultural machinery and more. It is proved that the organizational and economic mechanism of development of agro-industrial complex in modern conditions it is expedient to consider: from the point of view of system and process approaches; as a set of economic levers and organizational measures to influence the agro-industrial complex; constituent components of organizational influence on the development of the complex; a set of components, elements that are integrated into the system of economic relations of the subjects of the agro-industrial complex; a set of purposeful stimulators of agro-industrial complex development. The functions of the organizational component of the mechanism of agro-industrial complex include: redistributive, planning, interaction, control, integration and regulatory functions, the functions of the economic component include consumer, investment and innovation, social, incentive, monitoring functions of the mechanism. The symbiosis of the functions of organizational and economic components ensure the effectiveness of the organizational and economic mechanism of the organizational and economic mechanism through its functionalities as a whole.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.406-408
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• 2000

Recently, Korea's electric industry is in the midst of a period of profound changes in the structure and function, including the introduction of market competition in the generation sector. Therefore, it is difficult to promote long-term capacity planning and new generating capacity construction which have been driven by KEPCO so far, after the introduction of market competition, so new generating capacity construction and security of reserve margin is needed through self·regulation plan of private generation producers by market mechanism. According to the competition in the generation sector, a new paradigm is necessary to the long-term capacity planning driven by the Government. This paper analyzes the plan and the incentive level able to guide the new generation capacity construction considering the uncertainty risk in a period of introduction of competition. In addition, this paper analyzes the plan able to guide the new capacity construction by market function at the stage which market become established and Government's role to solve the anxiety about the capacity supply and demand.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.810-819
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• 2016

Uncoordinated charging of large-scale electric vehicles (EVs) will have a negative impact on the secure and economic operation of the power system, especially at the distribution level. Given that the charging load of EVs can be controlled to some extent, research on the optimal charging control of EVs has been extensively carried out. In this paper, two possible smart charging scenarios in China are studied: centralized optimal charging operated by an aggregator and decentralized optimal charging managed by individual users. Under the assumption that the aggregators and individual users only concern the economic benefits, new load peaks will arise under time of use (TOU) pricing which is extensively employed in China. To solve this problem, a simple incentive mechanism is proposed for centralized optimal charging while a rolling-update pricing scheme is devised for decentralized optimal charging. The original optimal charging models are modified to account for the developed schemes. Simulated tests corroborate the efficacy of optimal scheduling for charging EVs in various scenarios.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.347-382
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• 2003

The paper presents available options that Korea can adopt in an effort to promote eco-industrial development in a near future. What is missing and the reasons why Korea is behind the other countries in the area are: 1) Lack of holistic view and the integrated approach toward economy and environment in policy implementation, 2) Lack of understanding, among entrepreneurs, of the concept of productivity per input resource, and the fact that not only labor and capital productivity but also the total productivity enhancement is vital for industry's competitive edge; There has been no driving force in the market to develop economies of system integration to turn industrial wastes to valuable input resources, 3) Unsupportive regulatory system regarding the trade of by products, and 4) Lack of financing and incentive mechanism. 5) Lack of information forum. Regulatory reform should be taken for the direction that in effect increase the price of disposal and motivate firms to seek symbiotic relationship with other firms, and facilitate trade by-product between firms. Financing and incentive mechanism should be introduced in order for the industry to find easy access to the opportunities for organizing the network to transform wastes in negative value to the value added resources. Also information network should be established to provide a market for by-product exchange and public education to improve industry's environmental performance.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.19C no.2
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• pp.145-148
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• 2012

In a distributed streaming system using an advanced coding scheme that encodes a video into multiple substreams, the capacity of the system depends on the amount of contribution of participating peers. Thus, an incentive mechanism for peers to contribute voluntarily is needed to increase system capacity. In addition, since peers are not only a provider but also a consumer in the system (i.e. prosumer), the overall capacity of the system must be allocated fairly among the peers while it must be allocated in a way that can maximize the net quality of experience of peers to increase system efficiency. In this paper, we propose a substream allocation method to solve the problems taking an optimization approach. Unlike the other optimization approaches, the proposed method is verified quantitatively in a simulation study that it can use the capacity of video streaming system efficiently while allocating fair amount of substreams among peers because it considers explicitly the prosumer characteristics of peers.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.8
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• pp.2854-2874
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• 2015

This paper presents a game theoretic approach to analyze the public goods (PGs) allocation in peer-to-peer (p2p) networks. In order to reduce the free-riders and promote the cooperation among peers, we propose an incentive mechanism with cooperation-based game theory. In this paper, we regarded the contributed resources by cooperators as public goods (PGs). We also build the PGs allocation in P2P networks to be the optimization problem, and the optimal solution of PGs allocation satisfies the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium. Firstly, based on the subscriber mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity, which can achieve Nash equilibrium. However, this strategy cannot meet to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium as the free-riders do not pay with their private goods for consuming the PGs. Secondly, based on the Walker mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity for the same allocation problem, which meets to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium and achieves Pareto efficiency within cooperative game. Simulations show that the proposed walker mechanism can significantly improve the network performance of throughout, and effectively alleviate free-riding problem in P2P networks.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.16 no.8
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• pp.2507-2528
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• 2022

Blockchain interoperability, which refers in particular to the ability to access information across blockchain systems, plays the key role for different blockchains to communicate with each other, and further supports the superstructure built on top of the cross-chain mechanism. Nowadays, blockchain interoperability technology is still in its infancy. The existing cross-chain scheme such as BTCRelay requires that the smart contract in a blockchain to download and maintain block headers of the other blockchain, which is costly in maintenance and inefficient to use. In this paper, we propose a supervision mechanism between blockchains, called Surveillant. Specially, the new entities called dual-functional nodes are introduced to commit the real-time information from the blockchain under supervision to the supervising blockchain, which enables users to have efficient cross-chain verification. Furthermore, we introduce Merkle mountain range for blocks aggregation to deal with the large-scale committing data. We propose the design of long orphan branch counter to trace the bifurcations in the blockchain under supervision. The existing incentive mechanism is improved to encourage the behaviors of dual-functional nodes. In Surveillant, the analysis and experimental results demonstrate that users are able to have efficient cross-chain verification with low maintenance overhead.