• 한국유통학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국유통학회 2000년도 추계학술대회 발표논문집
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• pp.47-59
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• 2000

Following the increasing importance of logistics function in today's company operation, this work explores the mechanism for cooperation within a supply chain, especially between a firm and an independent logistics supplier. We first characterize the optimal linear logistics contract based upon the recent developments in contract theory, and then investigate the effect of such a contract on the firm's inventory policy. The results indicate that the order quantity becomes smaller and the lead time becomes shorter and under the optimal contract than without the incentive scheme. Accordingly, the service level under the optimal contract becomes higher. These findings are in accordance with the literature on vertical control and JIT (Just in Time) philosophy.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제9권4호
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• pp.621-639
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• 2000

High population and economic growth leads to ever increasing demand for water resources, prompting many regional conflicts for the water. With the observation, this paper examines the allocation problem of flowing water between upstream and downstream regions, We offer a two- region model in which the downstream region pays a portion of product to the upstream region in order to induce the upstream region to share the water. Our model shows that the "side-payment" does not always work, because the ex post income of the downstream region could be lower than the income without the side-payment This happens when the externality the upstream region imposes on the downstream region is small. The paper derives the condition under which the incentive mechanism like side-payment is likely to fail (or work). The model also shows that the higher the degree of externality is, the less amount of side-payment should be. The results of the paper suggest that the incentive scheme can help the regional conflicts be solved if the externality effect generated by the water use of upstream region is big enough, which is in fact the case where the conflict is severe.

• 한국통신학회논문지
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• 제32권11B호
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• pp.700-708
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• 2007

이 논문은 통신서비스의 소매가격과 접속료에 대한 유인적 규제제도를 제안한다. 이러한 유인적 규제제도는 병목설비를 가지고 있는 독점적 사업자로 하여금 자발적으로 사회적으로 최적인 접속과 소매서비스를 제공하게 한다. 중간투입 설비를 가진 상류기업은 이부제 요금을 통해, 전체 통합이윤을 실현할 수 있다는 것은 잘 알려진 사실이다. 이 논문은 첫째, 규제기업의 수지보전(budget balancing)과 관련하여 접속료와 소매요금 등을 규제하는 규제프레임워크를 제시한다. 둘째, 접속(상류)과 소매서비스(하류) 모두에서 이부제 요금제도가 어떻게 적용될 수 있는가를 소개하고, 비용함수에 대해 규제자가 불완전한 정보를 가지고 있는 경우, 유인적 규제제도의 적용가능성과 그 효과를 분석하고 있다. 셋째, 자기선택 제도를 사용하여, 접속과 소매부문에서 어떻게 사회적 최적인 상태가 도달되는지를 보여준다.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• 제22권2호
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• pp.107-114
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• 2022

The main purpose of this study is to substantiate the theoretical and methodological foundations of the organizational and economic mechanism of development of the agro-industrial complex in modern conditions. Organizational and economic mechanism is presented as a complex organizational structure of the system type, which is aimed at performing specific functions, the characteristic feature of which is the constant support of process changes without which the organizational and economic mechanism can not exist. There are four components of the agro-industrial complex, represented by agriculture and the national economy, which ensure its operation, including industry, processing of agricultural products, its storage and transportation, sale and repair and maintenance of agricultural machinery and more. It is proved that the organizational and economic mechanism of development of agro-industrial complex in modern conditions it is expedient to consider: from the point of view of system and process approaches; as a set of economic levers and organizational measures to influence the agro-industrial complex; constituent components of organizational influence on the development of the complex; a set of components, elements that are integrated into the system of economic relations of the subjects of the agro-industrial complex; a set of purposeful stimulators of agro-industrial complex development. The functions of the organizational component of the mechanism of agro-industrial complex include: redistributive, planning, interaction, control, integration and regulatory functions, the functions of the economic component include consumer, investment and innovation, social, incentive, monitoring functions of the mechanism. The symbiosis of the functions of organizational and economic components ensure the effectiveness of the organizational and economic mechanism of the organizational and economic mechanism through its functionalities as a whole.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2000년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.406-408
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• 2000

Recently, Korea's electric industry is in the midst of a period of profound changes in the structure and function, including the introduction of market competition in the generation sector. Therefore, it is difficult to promote long-term capacity planning and new generating capacity construction which have been driven by KEPCO so far, after the introduction of market competition, so new generating capacity construction and security of reserve margin is needed through self·regulation plan of private generation producers by market mechanism. According to the competition in the generation sector, a new paradigm is necessary to the long-term capacity planning driven by the Government. This paper analyzes the plan and the incentive level able to guide the new generation capacity construction considering the uncertainty risk in a period of introduction of competition. In addition, this paper analyzes the plan able to guide the new capacity construction by market function at the stage which market become established and Government's role to solve the anxiety about the capacity supply and demand.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제11권4호
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• pp.810-819
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• 2016

Uncoordinated charging of large-scale electric vehicles (EVs) will have a negative impact on the secure and economic operation of the power system, especially at the distribution level. Given that the charging load of EVs can be controlled to some extent, research on the optimal charging control of EVs has been extensively carried out. In this paper, two possible smart charging scenarios in China are studied: centralized optimal charging operated by an aggregator and decentralized optimal charging managed by individual users. Under the assumption that the aggregators and individual users only concern the economic benefits, new load peaks will arise under time of use (TOU) pricing which is extensively employed in China. To solve this problem, a simple incentive mechanism is proposed for centralized optimal charging while a rolling-update pricing scheme is devised for decentralized optimal charging. The original optimal charging models are modified to account for the developed schemes. Simulated tests corroborate the efficacy of optimal scheduling for charging EVs in various scenarios.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.347-382
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• 2003

본 연구에서는 한국에서 생태적 산업개발을 추진할 경우에 선택할 수 있는 유형을 제시하고 있다. 즉, (1) 다양한 업종으로 구성된 생태산업단지 또는 생태산업 네트워크, (2) 클러스터와 제로 에미션 개념의 결합에 의한 부산물 교환 시스템, (3) 동종 산업으로 구성된 산업 단지에서의 제로 에미션 추구, (4) 포괄적인 지역개발 프로젝트로서의 EID 등이다. 국내에서 자원순환형 경제개발 정착을 위한 우선적 과제는 산업체들로 하여금 현재의 관행을 벗어나서 다른 기업과의 공생적 관계를 적극 모색하여 부산물교환을 촉진하는 제도적 여건을 조성하는 것, 산업체들이 부산물 활용 네트워크를 조직하는데 필요한 자금지원과 인센티브 도입, 부산물 교환을 위한 시장의 창출에 기여하는 정보네트워크의 구성, 산업체의 환경관련 교육 강화 등이다.

• 정보처리학회논문지C
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• 제19C권2호
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• pp.145-148
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• 2012

비디오 소스를 다수의 부스트림으로 인코딩하는 향상된 코딩 기법을 이용하는 분산 비디오 스트리밍 시스템의 경우 시스템의 용량 증대를 위해서는 피어들이 자발적으로 많은 양의 부스트림을 재전송할 수 있는 장려책이 필요하다. 또한 참여 피어들은 자원 제공자인 동시에 서비스 소비자인 특성을 가지므로 시스템의 전체 용량은 참여 피어들의 부스트림 제공량에 따라 공정하게 할당되어야 하며 시스템의 효율성 측면에서는 참여 피어들의 전체 서비스 인지 품질이 최대화 되도록 할당되어야 한다. 본 논문에서는 이와 같은 문제 해결을 위해 최적화기법을 이용한 부스트림 할당 기법을 제안한다. 제안 기법은 자원 제공자이자 소비자인 피어의 특성을 고려하여 참여 피어의 자발적 자원 제공을 장려함으로써 기존 최적화 기법과 달리 분산 비디오 스트리밍 시스템 자원의 효율적 이용과 공정한 배분을 보장한다는 것을 모의실험을 통해 정량적으로 검증하였다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권8호
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• pp.2854-2874
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• 2015

This paper presents a game theoretic approach to analyze the public goods (PGs) allocation in peer-to-peer (p2p) networks. In order to reduce the free-riders and promote the cooperation among peers, we propose an incentive mechanism with cooperation-based game theory. In this paper, we regarded the contributed resources by cooperators as public goods (PGs). We also build the PGs allocation in P2P networks to be the optimization problem, and the optimal solution of PGs allocation satisfies the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium. Firstly, based on the subscriber mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity, which can achieve Nash equilibrium. However, this strategy cannot meet to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium as the free-riders do not pay with their private goods for consuming the PGs. Secondly, based on the Walker mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity for the same allocation problem, which meets to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium and achieves Pareto efficiency within cooperative game. Simulations show that the proposed walker mechanism can significantly improve the network performance of throughout, and effectively alleviate free-riding problem in P2P networks.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제16권8호
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• pp.2507-2528
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• 2022

Blockchain interoperability, which refers in particular to the ability to access information across blockchain systems, plays the key role for different blockchains to communicate with each other, and further supports the superstructure built on top of the cross-chain mechanism. Nowadays, blockchain interoperability technology is still in its infancy. The existing cross-chain scheme such as BTCRelay requires that the smart contract in a blockchain to download and maintain block headers of the other blockchain, which is costly in maintenance and inefficient to use. In this paper, we propose a supervision mechanism between blockchains, called Surveillant. Specially, the new entities called dual-functional nodes are introduced to commit the real-time information from the blockchain under supervision to the supervising blockchain, which enables users to have efficient cross-chain verification. Furthermore, we introduce Merkle mountain range for blocks aggregation to deal with the large-scale committing data. We propose the design of long orphan branch counter to trace the bifurcations in the blockchain under supervision. The existing incentive mechanism is improved to encourage the behaviors of dual-functional nodes. In Surveillant, the analysis and experimental results demonstrate that users are able to have efficient cross-chain verification with low maintenance overhead.