• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.17 no.6
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• pp.129-139
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper was to comparatively investigate the efficient building incentives in Korea and foreign countries and to seek strategies to enhance low energy building integrated design market infrastructure in Korea. The structure of incentive policies were composed of four main component: 1) types of financial aids and beneficiaries, 2) energy performance criteria and verification methods, 3) supports for low energy building integrated design, and 4) funding sources for incentive programs. Every overseas incentive program has adopted a design team incentive along with building owners incentive and the range of target buildings have been extended from new construction to remodeling projects. The main system of the program is the performance standard through which projects were investigated and the level of incentive are decided. Initially, the integrated performance has been investigated through simulation methods, but the construction performance evaluation and energy monitoring methods are emerging. In addition, the direct support and educational support for integrated design has been provided to enhance the foundation of relative markets. Financial funding is also a key component of the program and more aggressive funding strategies have been adopted.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.23-45
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• 2013

This paper aims to identify the problems of incentives and find a solution to them by empirically analyzing the port incentives and the development of cargo volume. The current method of paying performance incentives and cargo-increase incentives makes it is possible for shipping companies to get the maximum incentives just by regulating cargo volumes without increasing them. Since the processing volume of transshipment cargo of the Busan port is over the volume eligible for the maximum incentive determined by the tie-up of shipping companies, the transshipment cargo can decrease. The incentive of the Busan port based on the cargo record and increase does not affect the increase of transshipment cargo, only to suffer a loss, and thus a new incentive system is needed that does not allow shipping companies to regulate cargo volumes. Based on the result of this study, We have to apply the even-handed incentive rule which pays the incentive for the cargo volume of the pertinent year with the unit price per 1 TEU to avoid the chicken game among the ports.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.11
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• pp.1-11
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• 2019

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of different group incentive type on performance under two types of interdependence in a task structure. One hundred twenty college and graduate students were recruited and asked to perform group typing task. Each typing groups organized three members. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: equally-distributed incentive and differentially-distributed under two different task interdependence. In this study, the dependent variable was the number of correctly typed characters. We found the significant interaction effects between group incentive type and task interdependence. Specifically, under interdependent task, the work performance of participants in equally-distributed group incentive condition was higher than the performance in differentially-distributed group incentive condition.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.25-47
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• 2010

CS is one of the major concerns of managers in the world because it is well known to be a key medium construct for firms' superior outcome. One of the major agents for CS management is retailers. Firms try to manage not only employees but also retailers to promote CS behaviors. And so diverse incentives are used to promote their CS behaviors under diverse channel setting such as multi-channel. However in spite of the rising needs there has been scarce studies on the optimal incentive structure for a manufacturer to offer competing retailers at the multi-channel. In this paper, we try to find better way for a manufacturer to promote the competing retailers' CS behaviors. We investigated how to promote the retailers' CS behavior via game-theoretic modeling. Especially, we focus on the possible incentive, CS bonus type reward introduced in the studies of Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt(1994) and Chu and Desai(1995). We build up a multi stage complete information game and derive a subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. Stages of the game are as following. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price(w) and CS bonus($\eta$). (Stage 2) Both retailers in competition set CS effort level($e_i$) and retail price($p_i$) simultaneously. (Stage 3) Consumers make purchasing decisions based on the manufacturer's initial reputation and retailers' CS efforts.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.14 no.9
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• pp.199-214
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• 2016

There is a negotiation between management and labors about paying incentive at the every end of the year. This result causes the conflict between management and labors. The successful operation of incentive system is based on respect and common benefit between workers and managers. The manager-trust is the power of leading reciprocality. This research started from the issues of companies with incentive system at this year. This research analysed the influence of manager-trust by the fairness of incentive system. and how HRM system affects the manager-trust through the strength of the HRM system. It appeared in a survey that shows the fairness of incentive system and manager-trust effect positive matter. As a result of the control effect in the strength of the HRM system, the relationship between distributive justice and manager-trust shows that Distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus have the control effect. Although the Distinctiveness has control effect, consistency and consensus didn't have control effect in the relationship between perceptual justice and manager-trust.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.45 no.3
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• pp.117-129
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• 2021

This study intends to verify the effectiveness of incentive schemes at Busan Port' aimed at promoting transshipment cargo. The current incentive schemes of Busan port intended to increase the T/S cargo volume have been disputed constantly. It is imperative, therefore, to restructure the system in accordance with the planned strategy. In this study, in order to ensure objectivity of the incentive schemes, all the parties (carriers, terminal operators and Port Authority) with a direct interest are answered and analyzed using the AHP methodology. Effectiveness is the top priority in the analysis of beneficiary validity of incentive schemes, when incentives are provided to Global overseas carriers compared with Global national carriers, IntraAsia carriers and Terminal operators. In the analysis of incentive schemes, direct cash support corresponding to the quantity of the T/S cargo had the highest effectiveness compared with exemption of port dues, cost compensation, port infrastructure support and subsidy for the service opening. The study results, therefore, reference the Port Authority when restructuring the schemes. This study has been conducted only focusing on the Busan port; however, the findings may have significant implications for overseas Port Authorities intending to implement incentive systems to promote cargo volumes similar to those at Busan port.

• Journal of Korean Academy of Nursing
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• v.36 no.1
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• pp.55-63
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• 2006

Purpose: This study was to examine the effects of deep breathing exercises with Incentive Spirometer on the pulmonary ventilatory function of pnemothorax patients undergoing a thoracotomy. Mothod: This experiment used anonequivalent control group non-synchronized design which compared pre-experimental measures with post-experimental ones. The subjects of this study were 34 inpatients who were scheduled for a thoracotomy and classified into the experimental group (17 patients) or control group (17 patients) by using an Incentive Spirometer or not. The collected data was analyzed by a SPSS Win I PC (percentage, mean, standard deviation, chi-square test, t-test, repeated measured two-way ANOVA). Result: The Pulmonary Ventilatory Function of the experimental and control group were significantly increased on the first day, third day, and fifth day after the thoracotomy, but the group interaction period was not significant. Conclusion: This study showed that the deep breathing exercises with an Incentive Spirometer and deep breathing exercise without an Incentive Spirometer were both effective for recovering the pulmonary ventilatory function after a thoracotomy.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.342-349
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• 2002

This paper presents the determination of incentive level of Direct Load Control (DLC) program based on California Test. In the most of the Demand-Side Management (DSM) program, the variables art given by constant value during the DSM program's life time. But, in the case of DLC, variables are depen-dent on the executing number and time of the DLC per year. Therefore, we formulate a newly designed Cal-ifornia Test technique to overcome these problems and to apply effectively to the determination of incentive level of the DLC program. We perform case studies for various scenarios using a proposed formulation and review incentive level of the current DLC program. And we propose a plan to activate the DLC program in the competitive electricity market.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.59-85
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• 2014

This paper analyses an impact of wage scheme and transparency of performance evaluation on the productivity. The main findings in this paper are as follows: First, the effect of wage scheme based on seniority system on the productivity is worse off than the performance pay. Second, there is a positive relationship between an incentive and the productivity, but, in the case of firms which individually informs the results of performance evaluation to their workers, it shows the hump-shaped relationship. Third, though the wage scheme is based on the performance, if the evaluation system is not transparent, the impact of incentive on the productivity is disappeared. Consequently, this paper implies that the appropriate incentive and the transparent performance evaluation system are required so as to improve the productivity.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.121-161
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• 2011

We study incentive structures of public developers and land owners in the process of public expropriations using a sequential game model. In the model, we show that there is an incentive for the public developer to give more compensation than just compensation that are defined by law. Also the model shows that there is an incentive for the land owners to revolt strategically against the public expropriation. Then an ideal authority delegation model is introduced to resolve the problems, where an independent appraiser determines the compensation for the expropriation. In the real world, improving the independence of appraisal process is critical to make the system closer to the ideal authority delegation model. So this paper concludes by making a few policy suggestions to improve the current appraisal system.