• 한국환경교육학회지:환경교육
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• 제13권2호
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• pp.38-50
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• 2000

We are evidently Home Economicus, egoistic rational utility maximiger, and all the capitalism economic situation make us adapt to such life, and recognize that it is rational to act like that. This can be demonstrated in Prisoner′s Dilemma(PD) which always select the non-cooperative choice for free rider in rational selection process of public goods. This paper notice the "what is problem\ulcorner"The problem is not in free rider itself but in free rider egoism. The practical behavior of free rider egoism can be explained by way of Prisoner′s Dilemma. In PD situation, the prisoner makes a rational choice, non-cooperative alternative, but he doesn′arrive at preto-optimality. It is dilemma. Why can′t he arrive \ulcorner Because he is isolated from other prisoner. So we call it prisoner′s dilemma. The PD situation can be compared with our real economic life, which, we think, have kept by rational choice of the public goods. We actually have made our life as an individual one although we organized communities of capitalism. Of course, we know each others as members of same society, but each individual being can′t secure the belief, which has composed basis of community. So, it is very similar and common between PD situation and our real economic life in the production of public goods. We conclude that this non-cooperative process of PD situation can be utilized as instrument of EE. So this non-cooperative process can show us the effectiveness of EE as follows. \circled1 Game situation life PD can be used as good instrument for explaining the rational selection dilemma(error) to Homo-Economicus, the rational agent, with the optimal and rational language. \circled2 We can show that the selection result is dilemma, not arrive pareto - optimality. \circled3 The dilemma can be resolved with accomplishing the good communal life based on the belief, not on the isolation.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• 제11권1호
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• pp.25-48
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• 2005

Firms often collaborate on building an infrastructure, which benefits all the firms in the industry, although in unequal magnitudes. Then a difficult and tricky issue is concerned with 'free riding.' Should there be only 'common, i.e., industry-wide' benefits in such collaboration, the literature indicated that the free rider problem is unavoidable, In this paper, however, we suggest that while collaborating, the firm also learns firm-specific knowledge, experience, and know-how, which can be directly utilized for its own internal improvement. That is, the collaboration between firms provides them with not only 'industry-wide,' but also 'firm-specific' benefits, Our analysis shows that if there indeed exist two types of benefits simultaneously, depending on the balance between the two, the free rider problem can be mitigated or even eliminated.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.31-46
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• 1978

Consider a time interval during which the demand for trips is fixed (e.g. the rush hour period). The traveller has a choice between various public modes, whose travel times and fares are fixed, and the automobile mode, for which travel time and cost depend on the volume of traffic flow on those roads, which are subject to congestion. We consider the equilibrium in terms of a representative travellerm, who choses for any trip the mode and route with the least combined money and time cost. When several (parallel) model or routes are chosen, then the combined cost of money and time must be equal among these. Our problem is first, to find the optimal flows of cars and of public mode carriers on the various links of their networks and second the optimal fares for trips by the variousmodes. The object is to minimize the total operating costs of the carriers and car plus the total time costs to travellers. The optimal fares are related to, but not identical with the dual variables of the underlying Nonlinear Program. They are equal to these dual variables only in the case, when congestion tolls on trips or on the use of specific roads are collected from automobile users. When such tolls are not collected, they must be passed on as subsidies to travellers using competing modes. The optimal fares of public modes are then reduced by the amounts of these subsidies. Note that subsidies are not a flat payment to public carriers, but are calculated on the basis of tickets sold. Fares and subsidies depend in general on tile period considered. They will be higher during periods of higher demand. When the assumption of fixed trip demand is relaxed, this tare system is no longer best, but only second best since too much traffic will, in general, be generated. The Free Rider Theorem states the following : Suppose road tolls can be charged, so that a best pricing system for public modes is posssible. Then there may exist free rides on some routes and modes, but never on a complete round trip.

• 한국산학기술학회논문지
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• 제12권6호
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• pp.2543-2547
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• 2011

본 연구에서는 조별과제 시 발생할 수 있는 무임승차자, 학생들 간의 갈등, 학생들 간의 적대감 형성 문제를 해결하기 위하여 직무배정을 통한 조별과제 수행방법을 제안한다. 특히, 직무배정을 통한 과제 수행이 조별과제에 대한 동료평가 시 발생하는 역효과를 개선할 수 있는지 고찰한다. 본 연구에서는 공학교육의 설계 교과목에서 학습자를 한 조당 일곱 명으로 구성하고, 조원 별로 각각 상이한 직무를 부여하여 한 학기 간 과제를 진행하였다. 결과적으로 변화된 조별과제 수행방법이 무임승차자, 학생들 간의 갈등, 학생들 간의 적대감 형성 문제에 미치는 영향을 학생들의 평가를 통해 고찰한다. 본 연구에서 제시한 직무배정을 통한 조별과제 수행 방법은 무임승차자 문제의 해결에 효과가 있었으며, 특히 동료평가 방법을 적용한 경우와 대비하여 학생들 간의 갈등 발생을 줄이고, 적대감 형성을 예방하는 효과가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 본 논문에서 제시한 조별과제 수행방법을 교육과정의 조별과제 수행 시 적용하면 과제 수행 과정의 효율성을 높일 수 있을 것이다.

• 한국지구과학회지
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• 제25권5호
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• pp.327-335
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• 2004

본 연구는 초등학교 과학과 문제중심학습에서 협동기술 훈련의 효과를 밝히기 위하여 통제집단, 문제중심학습 집단, 협동기술 훈련을 한 문제중심학습 집단의 학습능력 수준에 따라 과학 성취도와 자아존중감을 조사하였다. 본 연구의 결과, 학습능력이 높은 학습자는 협동기술 훈련에 무관하게 문제중심학습이 전통적 수업보다 효과적인 것으로 나타났다. 학습능력이 중간인 학습자와 낮은 학습자는 협동기술 훈련을 한 경우, 전통적 수업 집단보다 과학 성취도가 높게 나타났다. 이로써 협동기술 훈련이 학습능력이 중간 이하인 학습자에게서 발생하는 무임승객효과를 줄이고 소집단활동의 협력적인 상호작용에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 밝혀졌다. 자아존중감은 문제중심학습 집단이 통제 집단에 비해 유의미하게 높게 나타났고 학습능력에 따른 상호작용 효과는 없었다.

• 한국항공운항학회지
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.