• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.205-214
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• 2019

In Korea, the first-price sealed bid auction and the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction(buchal-je in Korean) have been used alternatively as procurement auctions. In this paper, we characterize the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction in the context of mechanism design. We consider the general ?-bidder case in which each bidder has private information. Under the assumptions of uniformly distributed valuations and linear strategies, we derive the equilibrium of the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction. Furthermore, we analyze the efficiency and the expected revenue of this auction mechanism in comparison with the first-price sealed bid auction. Finally, we conclude with the critical remarks on the practical intention of the government which uses this auction.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.89-102
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• 1994

This paper is to survey the major results of the game-theoretic models and recent research directions of the literature on auctions and competitive biddings. This paper classifies the auctions and competitive biddings into the following four major types:(i) English auction, (ii) Dutch auction, (iii) the first-price sealed-bid auction, (iv) the second-price sealed-bid auction. In order to survey the major ideas related to auctions and competitive biddings, we use two representative theoretical models developed under the game-theoretic framework : (i) the independent private value model are summarized as follows ; (1) The Dutch auction and the first-price auction are strategically equivalent, and so are the English auction and the second-price auction. (2) At the symmetric equilibria, the expected selling price is the same for all four types of auction. Meanwhile, the major results of the general model are as follows ; (1) When bidders are uncertain about their value extimate, the English and second-price auctions are not equivalent, but the dutch and the first-price auctions are still strategically equivalent. (2) The English auction generates the higher expected prices than the second-price auction. Also, when bidders are risk-neutral, the second-price auction generated higher average prices than the Dutch and the first-price auctions.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.135-166
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• 2008

This paper reports the empirical results of comparing the willingness to pay(WTP) for health risk reductions and the willingness to accept(WTA) for risk increases using experimental market methods in the first time in Korea. Health risks were defined as probabilities of premature death from exposure to one of As, Pb, and THM in tap water. A total of six experimental markets with 15 participants in each experiments were held using 20 repetitive Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auctions. To compare the effects of market experiences, trading a marketed good, candy bar, was introduced before the trading the non-marketed good, drinking water risks. Moreover, an objective risk information was provided after the first 10 trials to incorporate learning processes. Regardless of marketed or non-marketed goods, the mean of WTA exceeded the mean of WTP at the first auction trial. As experimental trials proceeded, the disparity between WTA and WTP for marketed goods disappeared. However results for non-marketed goods were rather mixed to the extent that WTA for health risks from As (relatively high risk leves) were significantly larger than WTP, while there were no significant difference between WTA and WTP for health risks fro Pb and THM (relatively low risk levels). On the other hand, participants seemed to respond in a 'rational' manner to the objective risk information provided, with positive learning effects of market-like experience(especially in the WTA experiments).