• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.69-100
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• 2006

We examine the effect of controlling shareholders ownership structure and related-party transactions(hereafter 'RPT') of publicly traded companies on their firm values during the post-IMF period. In the multivariate regression analysis using control variables such as firm size, capital structure, investment, dividend, profitability and industry dummy that might affect firm values, we find that there exists a significant negative relation between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values proxied by Tobin's Q, and also find that there is a significant negative relation between RPT and the firm values. Those evidences seem to support the controlling shareholders' expropriation hypothesis. Additionally, we investigate the relation between ownership structure and rim value through the piecewise regression analysis. We find a significant 'inverse' U-shape pattern between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values. This result is quite different from the existing literatures that have usually reported an U-shape pattern. In conclusion, the findings in this study do not support the notion that the ownership concentration to the controlling shareholders does negatively affect the firm values monotonically.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.851-861
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• 2021

The main objective of this study is to examine the government ownership effect on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR). Government ownership is assumed to affect the CSR either directly or indirectly. That is by moderating the association between corporate governance and CSR. Publicly listed companies on the UAE capital markets (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) from 2010-2013 constituted the study sample. Panel data regression analyses and random effect model is used to examine the effects of board size, board independence, and audit committee characteristics on CSR. Government ownership is used as a moderator variable. The result showed that the existence of government ownership has a moderator effect on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the CSR. Precisely, the research revealed that the audit committee characteristics become more effective in improving the firm's CSR when the government owns shares in the organization. The main contribution of this study is to examine how firm ownership structure influences good corporate governance and CSR in the UAE. The study contributes to the CSR literature by merging between the existence of governmental ownership and the power to enforce the implementation of corporate governance in an emerging country.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.4 no.3
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• pp.35-43
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• 2017

This paper explores the impact of corporate control, measured by ownership structure, on top-executives' compensation in Japan. According to agency theory, the pay-performance link is expected to be affected by the firm's ownership structure. Using a sample of 4,411 firm-year observations (401 firms for the 11-years period from 2001 to 2011) for Japanese non-financial firms publicly traded on the first section and second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), this study demonstrates that institutional ownership (both financial and corporate) is negatively related to the level of executives' compensation. Such finding is in line with efficient monitoring hypothesis which claims that the presence of institutional shareholders provides direct monitoring over managers, limits managerial self-dealing and curves the increase in top-executives pay. On the other hand, the results also show that managerial ownership is positively related to their compensation which supports managerial power theory hypothesis, i.e. management-controlled firms are more likely to extract more compensation from the business than other firms. Overall, this study confirms that corporate control has significant impact on cash compensation paid to Japanese top-executives after controlling the conventional pay-performance relationship.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.7
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• pp.323-331
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• 2021

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and level cash holdings in an emerging country, namely, Saudi Arabia, by constructing a corporate governance mechanism (foreign ownership, family ownership, institutional and managerial ownership). This paper uses data from 100 listed firms at Saudi Stock Exchange (TADAWUL) from 2011 to 2019. The firm's decision to hold cash has come to the fore in the last two or three years as a result of the recent global financial crisis, and the impact that this has had on the firms' ability to raise funds from external sources. Using the random-effect generalized least square (GLS) regression model, the findings reveal that foreign and family ownership negatively influences cash holdings, while managerial ownership has a positive association with cash holdings. Further, institutional ownership did not have a direct effect on cash holdings in Saudi Arabia. Our results suggest that ownership structure include foreign ownership, family and managerial ownership is an essential vehicle to promote the performance of cash holding of all the 100 public-listed non-financial firms in Saudi Arabia. We recommend that sound policies should be targeted toward foreign ownership, family, and managerial ownership since they are essential to improve cash holding in Saudi Arabian firms.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.9
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• pp.159-168
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• 2020

This is a quantitative research, underpinned by the philosophy of natural science and deduction approach that examines the impact of the various aspects of corporate governance mechanism on the choice of capital structure of Vietnamese listed firms. We focus on the effect of factors such as the board size, the board independence, and especially different ownership structures, which include the managerial ownership, the state ownership, the concentrated ownership, and the foreign ownership. They are the main scopes of corporate governance and are supposed to be relevant to determine the corporate financing choice. To explain the causal relationship between factors, we construct the regression model and then test it by using different statistical method approaches, including the pooled OLS, the fixed effects model, and the random effects model. Data are collected from 336 firms with shares listed in the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange in Vietnam, totaling 1583 observations. Overall, the results reveal that the board size, state ownership, and concentrated ownership have positive impact on the firm's capital structure, whereas foreign ownership appears to have negative influence on the capital structure. The research does not find evidence of a the correlation between board independence, managerial ownership and corporate capital struture.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.627-637
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• 2021

This research extends the literature on the effect of board characteristics and ownership structure on audit fees; these factors affect the firm's agency costs and how the auditor assesses various risks, hence the audit efforts and fees. The paper introduces political connections as a determinant of audit fees for the first time in Jordan, where the political connection is prevalent and affects decision making on the Jordanian boards. The sample consists of 109 manufacturing and service firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) over the years 2012-2019. Data is obtained from the ASE and the company's annual reports. Board characteristics are measured by board size, independence, leadership duality, meetings frequency, political connections, and audit committee. Ownership structure was measured by concentration, foreign ownership, and Institutional ownership. The study hypotheses were tested by using Generalized Least Squares regression. The Findings showed that larger boards, politically connected firms, and firms with leadership duality are more likely to pay higher fees. Besides, Firms with greater foreign ownership pay less fees, whereas the rest of the variables are insignificant. Results suggest that political connections play a major role in determining audit fees; this provides a recommendation to policymakers in Jordan to reconsider regulations regarding political connections.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.105-113
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• 2005

I investigate whether the efficient ratios used as the proxies of the agency costs maintained by Ang et al.(2000) is significant. Utilizing a sample of 77 manufacturing companies listed on the KOSDAQ from the TS2000 of the KSDA, The results are as follows. Agency costs are found to be decreasing with the ownership share of controlling shareholders and accounting performance becomes higher. But firm value measured by Tobin's Q ratio becomes lower according as the ownership of the controlling shareholders increases. If agency costs decrease in proportion to controlling shareholder's share, firm value should be higher according to the agency theory by Jensen and Meckling(I976). But the results of the empirical test of this study are inconsistent with Jensen and Meckling's(1976). Therefore the following study on the more useful proxies stand for agency costs should be needed.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.45-73
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• 2007

The empirical results are summarized as follows : First, In relation to effects of ownership structure on firm value, there is the non-linear relationship between major(and foreign) shareholder's holdings and firm value. So the results(the compromise hypothesis) by prior researches(Morck et al. 1988 and so forth) is supported. However Institutional shareholder's holdings do not show the significant results. Second, In relation to effects of outside directors on firm value, equally the results of prior researches(Vafeas 2000, Choi et al. 2004), the higher the ratio of outside directors in the board, the higher firm value. Also there is the non-linear relationship between outside directors ratio and firm value. Furthermore, the higher the possibility of outside directors election in the board, the higher the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. As the economic importance of KOSDAQ is more increase, the researches of KOSDAQ should be more realized.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.363-370
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• 2022

The study aims to probe the impact of foreign ownership on Vietnamese listed firms' capital structure. This study employs panel data of 288 non-financial firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange (HOSE) and Ha Noi stock exchange (HNX) in 2015-2019. In this research, we applied a Bayesian linear regression method to provide probabilistic explanations of the model uncertainty and effect of foreign ownership on the capital structure of non-financial listed enterprises in Vietnam. The findings of experimental analysis by Bayesian linear regression method through Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique combined with Gibbs sampler suggest that foreign ownership has substantial adverse effects on the firms' capital structure. Our findings also indicate that a firm's size, age, and growth opportunities all have a strong positive and significant effect on its debt ratio. We found that the firms' profitability, tangible assets, and liquidity negatively and strongly affect firms' capital structure. Meanwhile, there is a low negative impact of dividends and inflation on the debt ratio. This research has ramifications for business managers since it improves a company's financial resources by developing a strong capital structure and considering foreign investment as a source of funding.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.