• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.139
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• pp.47-80
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• 2016

The main aim of this article is to thoroughly illuminate the personality characteristic of "honesty (Redlichkeit)" that Nietzsche presents as one of the major 'virtues' in the sense of 'excelences of character', calling it "the Youngest Virtue". Clearly distinguished from the 'honesty' that conventional morality regards as the highest virtue, this particular trait or inclination Nietzsche has in mind is an affective disposition with a highly complicated structure, which is closely related to 'truth' and 'knowledge'. In this paper, I first analyze what "honesty" (as a Nietzschean excellence of character) consists of. Afterwards, I seek to answer what the evaluative status of the quality in Nietzsche's theory of 'value' understood as what ought to be possessed or pursued, especially, the question of whether or not the disposition is treated as an 'intrinsic' value. Finally and most importantly, I explore the reasons why Nietzsche confers the aforementioned normative significance upon the excellence at issue.