• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.63-92
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• 2019

What motivates split-ticket voting in mixed electoral systems, where voters choose one party in district races and another party on the party list ballot? While much of the literature assumes strategic intent, three aspects commonly are overlooked: the competitiveness of district races, the presence of a district candidate from one's preferred party, and whether voters know the electoral threshold for party list seats. Furthermore, few studies disaggregate types of split-ticket voting (e.g. not voting for one's preferred party in a district vs. party list). Taiwan provides an intriguing case study for analysis, not only as a relatively new adopter of a mixed system, but also the presence of additional conditions that would encourage at least the consideration of a split ticket. Using survey data from the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) after the Taiwan's 2016 Legislative Yuan election, this analysis finds that knowing the threshold, the winner's margin, and the placement of a district candidate from one's preferred party all influence split-ticket voting among those with a partisan preference. However, closer inspection identifies a distinction between defecting from the district versus the party list. Evidence shows that district competitiveness and candidate placement influences defection from the district candidate, while the electoral threshold influences defection from the party list. The results add to our understanding of strategic and non-strategic incentives in mixed systems.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.43 no.2
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• pp.171-187
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• 2008

Islands are vulnerable to outer influences due to their small size and isolation. Tourism often becomes an important development focus because of their unique culture and nature. Jeju-do, as well as other islands, has experienced such development mostly led by central government, and the regional change was understood as the outcome of global influences without much concern with the local response or strategy. Thus, vulnerability has been the key theme in island development studies. This paper examines the current state of island development as an outcome of locals' alternating strategy in which the islanders accept the central government's plan, but express their demands to modify them. It is reflected in the electoral preference for ruling or oppositional parties, local movements against central government's development plans, and the spatial organization of tourism sites from a few growth centers to more dispersed, balanced development. These suggest that the current state of island development is not derived from unidirectional global forces, even if islands are peripheral. Rather, it is the outcome of an alternating strategy of Jeju locals accepting the central government development plans while managing them for local benefits.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.62 no.3
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• pp.141-162
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• 2010

This paper tries to provide empirical support for a formal model of social policy development which has been presented in a former paper of this study. In the direct democracy, median voter's social policy preference is critical because he is Condorcet winner in a pair-wise pure majority voting. But, in the more general setting, we should think of various political institutions as a collective choice device. For this reason, I draw a formal model which formulates three contrasting types of political institutions which are distinguished by the developments of political democracy and the differences of electoral rules. Comparative patterns of key variables which measure political institutions, social policy developments, and social policy preference provide support for my arguments. My empirical results suggest that three political institutions are associated with very different policy outcomes. Compared to other institutions, committee system entails more targeted subsidy, less universal benefit. On the contrary, proportional elections produce more universal benefit, less targeted subsidy.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.61 no.4
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• pp.35-59
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• 2009

This paper presents a formal model of social policy development. The model shows that the development of social policy depends both on the social policy preferences of voters and on the political institution which mediates the preferences of voters. In the direct democracy, median voter's social policy preference is critical because he is Condorcet winner in a pairwise vote. But in the representative democracy, political parties design social policy to win the support of a majority of voters. Hence, the political institution like electoral rule may affect social policy outcome. The model presented in this paper contrasts 3 alternative constitutional features and investigates how they affect social policy outcome. In result, this papers emphasizes that policy preferences of voters and political institution may be key variables to explain social policy development and divergence among welfare regimes.