• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.223-258
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• 2013

1967 Outer Space Treaty(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; OST) is a treaty that forms the basis of international space law. OST is based on the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space announced by UNGA resolution. As of May 2013, 102 countries are states parties to OST, while another 27 have signed the treaty but have not completed ratification. OST explicitly claimed that the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies are the province of all mankind. Art. II of OST states that "outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means", thereby establishing res extra commercium in outer space like high seas. However 1979 Moon Agreement stipulates that "the moon and its natural resources are the Common Heritage of Mankind(CHM)." Because of the number of the parties to the Moon Agreement(13 parties) it does not affect OST. OST also established its specific treaties as a complementary means such as 1968 Rescue Agreement, 1972 Liability Convention, 1975 Registration Convention. OST bars states party to the treaty from placing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit of Earth, installing them on the Moon or any other celestial body, or to otherwise station them in outer space. It exclusively limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, or establishing military bases, installations, and fortifications. However OST does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit. China and Russia submitted Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT) on the Conference on Disarmament in 2008. USA disregarded PPWT on the ground that there are no arms race in outer space. OST does not have some articles in relation to current problems such as space debris, mechanisms of the settlement of dispute arising from state activities in outer space in specific way. COPUOS established "UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" based on "IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" and ILA proposed "International Instrument on the Protection of the Environment from Damage Caused by Space Debris" for space debris problems and Permanent Court of Arbitration(PCA) established "Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities" and ILA proposed "1998 Taipei Draft Convention on the Settlement of Space Law Dispute" for the settlement of dispute problems. Although OST has shortcomings in some articles, it is very meaningful in international law in considering the establishment of basic principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. OST established the principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space as customary law and jus cogens in international law as follows; the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind; outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States; outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. The principles of global public interest in outer space imposes international obligations erga omnes applicable to all States. This principles find significant support in legal norms dealing with following points: space activities as the "province of all mankind"; obligation to cooperate; astronauts as envoys of mankind; avoidance of harmful contamination; space activities by States, private entities and intergovernmental organisations; absolute liability for damage cauesd by certain space objects; prohibition of weapons in space and militarization of the celestial bodies; duty of openness and transparency; universal application of the international space regime.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.