• 융합보안논문지
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• 제14권1호
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

한국은 과거처럼 국제관계의 예속자가 아니라 명실상부한 중견국으로서, 북한의 핵과 재래전 도발위협을 극복하고 동북아지역의 평화를 유지하는 '균형자' 역할을 할 수 있도록 군사력을 건설해야 한다. 군사력 건설을 통해 다양한 안보위협에 대한 억제력 발휘가 가능하다. 군사적 억제력 발휘를 위해 첫 번째로 '선제적 억제'(deterrence by preemptive)와 '응징적 억제'(deterrence by punishment)는 현재와 미래의 위협에 대비하여 '감시정찰체계와 지휘통제체계'(C41SR)를 공통전력으로 공격무기체계를 결합한 '공격체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 두 번째로 '거부적 억제'(deterrence by denial)는 공통전력과 방어무기체계를 결합한 '방어체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 마지막으로 자주적으로 첨단전력을 개발하기 위해서는 기존의 방위산업과 연구개발 역량을 통합하여 '인프라 축'을 구축해야 한다. 우리는 미래 한국군의 군사력을 건설함에 있어서 정부의 균형자 역할에 대한 국가적 비젼, 이에 대한 국민적 합의를 토대로 본고에서 제시한 군사력 건설 모형에 따른 일관성 있는 정책적인 노력과 신념이 반드시 필요하다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• 보건행정학회지
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• 제19권3호
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• pp.109-124
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• 2009

Background: This study aimed to examine whether cases of punishing false claimants threat general physicians to check their medical cost claims with care to avoid being suspected, and identify empirically general deterrence effects of the on-site investigation system in the Korean National Health Insurance. Methods: 800 clinics were selected among a total of 15,443 clinics that had no experience of on-site investigation until June 2007 using a stratified proportional systematic sampling method. We conducted logistic multiple regression to examine the association between factors related to provider's perception of on-site investigation and high level of perceived deterrence referring to fear of punishment after adjusting provider's service experiences and general characteristics. Results: The probability of high perceived deterrence was higher 1.7 times (CI: 1.13-2.56), 2.73 times (CI: 1.68-4.45) each among clinics exchanging the information once or more per year or once or more for 2-3 months than among clinics no exchanging the information about on-site investigation. Also, the probability of high perceived deterrence was higher 2.27 times (CI: 1.28-4.45) among clinics that knows more than 3 health care institutions having experienced an on-site investigation than among clinics knowing no case. Conclusion: A clinic knowing more punishment cases by onsite investigation and exchanging more frequently information about on-site investigation is likely to present high perceived deterrence. This result will provide important information to enlarge preventive effects of on-site investigation on fraud and abuse claims.

• 방사선산업학회지
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.411-416
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• 2023

From Cold War, Nuclear weapons have emerged military power into a very dangerous and important way of each national security. Throughout the era, the U.S. had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. But President George Bush initially started the withdrawal of nuclear tactical weapons deployed abroad in 1991. After that, under the protection of the nuclear umbrella, South Korea guarantees that the United States would operate its nuclear weapons to protect South Korea if it would be needed and the economy of South Korea has rapidly developed as more strong countries in the world. However, South Korea has seen and been realized the present state from the recent war between Russia and Ukraine. The protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea is unlikely to be permanently guaranteed. At the same time, South Korea should consider the security environment changes of surrounding nations such as China as military power acceleration and Russia as re-formation ambition. Because of these reasons, South Korea independently wants to protect itself and have the own nuclear weapons as a way to counter security threats. A majority of South Koreans also definitely believe that North Korea will not denuclearize or give up because North Korea has been having nuclear weapons as the final survival strategy of Kim Jong Un's regime. However, South Korea considers and makes new nuclear strategy through the role and effect of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to overcome the paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore, this research is to suggest the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea from new security threats of surrounding nations through dispute between India and Pakistan. The focus of this research is that what is the role and paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to find the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제10권3호
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• pp.31-35
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• 2024

2023년 10월 7일 하마스는 이스라엘 상대로 대규모 기습공격을 감행하며 전쟁이 발발하였다. 이날은 로켓 공급과 더불어 패러라이더, 오토바이 등을 이용하여 다영역으로 이스라엘 영토를 직접 침공하였다. 이스라엘이 하마스의 공격을 허용한 원인이 무엇이고 사전에 전쟁을 억제하지 못했는지를 고찰하는 것은 한반도 안보 상황을 고려시 유의미하다고 하겠다. 억제는 능력과 의지, 의사전달, 신뢰성이 뒷받침되어야 성공할 수 있다. 능력과 의지가 충분하고 그동안 응징적 억제로 의사전달이 충분히 되었지만 이번 전쟁을 억제하지 못한 것은 신뢰성에 문제가 있었다. 우리는 북한의 위협에 대해 억제력을 높이기 위해서는 맞춤형 확장억제력 향상, 한미 양국의 억제 의지 전달, 억제할 능력과 실행력에 대한 신뢰성 제고가 요구된다.

• 의정연구
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• 제25권3호
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• pp.69-96
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• 2019

본 논문은 현재 북한의 비핵화가 점점 불확실해지고 있고, 미국의 안보 공약에 대한 불신을 제거할 수 없는 상황이라는 전제하에 한국이 보유하고 있는 비핵전력으로 북한의 핵공격을 억제 또는 방어할 수 있는 노력의 방향을 제시하기 위한 목적으로 작성되었다. 이를 위하여 제2장에서는 비핵전력으로 핵위협에 대응하는 방법을 열거 및 설명하였고, 제3장에서는 이에 근거하여 한국의 실태를 분석하였으며, 제4장에서는 한국이 노력해야 할 방향을 제시하였다. 분석을 통하여 본 논문은 북한의 핵위협이 심각한 정도에 비해서 한국의 대비태세는 미흡하고, 특히 2018년 시작된 북한의 비핵화를 둘러싼 협상으로 인하여 기존에 추진해오던 '3축 체계'의 추진이 지체되고 있다고 평가하였다. 결국 미국의 확장억제가 제대로 이행되지 않을 경우 한국의 억제 및 방어에 심각한 문제가 발생할 수밖에 없는 상황이다. 이제 한국은 핵전략의 최소억제 개념에 근거하여 북한이 핵공격을 가할 경우 참수작전을 시행하겠다는 의지를 과시하고 그 능력을 구비하는 것에 최우선적인 비중을 둘 필요가 있다. 선제타격의 경우에도 타격시점을 더욱 앞당길 수밖에 없고, 탄도미사일방어의 경우 담당기구를 격상시키고 주한미군의 그것과 결합시켜 나가야 할 것이다. 핵폭발 시를 대비한 대피소 구축 등에도 노력할 필요가 있다.

• 한국컴퓨터정보학회논문지
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• 제24권6호
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• pp.81-88
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• 2019

Based on the theory of planned behavior and the theory of legal deterrence, this study takes consumers' willingness to pay for digital music as the research object, investigates the consumers who have digital music consumption channels and behaviors, and discusses the willingness of consumers to pay for digital music and its influencing factors. The study attempts to achieve the following research purposes: First, explore the influencing factors of willingness to pay for digital music using domestic and foreign literature research and related content analysis. Second, we want to examine the effect of Attitude, Collective Specifications, Quality Sensitivity and Music affinity on willingness to pay. Third, Legal deterrence and resource availability tries to verify whether there is a moderating effect between Attitude, Collective Specifications, Quality Sensitivity and Music affinity and willingness to pay. The research data was collected in 2019 between April 6th to May 8th. Questionnaires were randomly distributed in fixed places, mainly in Hubei Province, China. A total of 393 questionnaires were selected for data analysis. Based on the previous theoretical review and empirical analysis, the study draws the following conclusions: Firstly, attitude, collective specifications, quality sensitivity and music affinity have an impact on the willingness to pay. Second, Legal deterrence has a regulatory effect on the relationship among quality sensitivity, musical affinity and the willingness to pay. Last the resource availability has a significant impact on the willingness to pay. It also has a regulatory effect on the relationship among quality sensitivity, music affinity and the willingness to pay.

• 디지털융복합연구
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• 제13권2호
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• pp.13-22
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• 2015

본 연구는 대전, 세종, 충 남북 지역에 거주하는 배우자 없는 남성 286명을 조사대상자로 하여 그들의 표현적 성 대처행동이 성매매 태도에 미치는 영향을 조사하였고, 이 과정에서 범죄억제에 대한 인식 요인의 조절효과를 검증하였다. 본 연구의 자료분석을 위하여 PASW Statistics 18.0을 이용하였다. 주요 연구결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 조사대상자의 성매매에 대한 태도는 보통수준 이상으로 관대하게 인식하는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 성매매 태도는 조사대상자의 거주 지역, 교육수준, 건강상태, 근로활동 여부, 사회 참여 여부에 따라 집단별로 유의미한 차이가 나타났다. 셋째, 성매매 태도에 영향을 미치는 요인은 교육수준, 건강상태, 근로활동 여부, 사회 참여 여부, 표현적 성 대처행동, 범죄억제에서의 공식적 비공식적 억제 등으로 나타났다. 넷째, 범죄억제에서의 공식적 억제는 성 대처행동과 성매매 태도와의 관계에서 조절효과를 갖는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 연구결과에 기초하여 무배우자 남성의 성매매를 억제할 수 있는 통합적이고 실질적인 방안을 제시하였다.

• 한국국방경영분석학회지
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• 제31권1호
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• pp.1-13
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• 2005

Due to the rapid developments in information and computer technology, the warfare paradigm is being transformed into information-centric and knowledge-based warfare. This atmosphere may have significant impact on the ROK armed forces' Force Improvement Plans (FIP) which is documented in 'Defense White Paper 2004'. We focus here on the relationship of information-centric force and deterrence of invasion. Particularly, we are interested in understanding the level of information superiority that might be required to deter the invasion. In order to solve this problem, we employed two-sided, zero-sum strategic game to simulate the outcome with six hypothetical cases devised by varying the level of information superiority.