• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.46
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• pp.290-318
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• 2001

In 1981, Chile has fundamentally reformed the public pension system from the pay-as-you-go system (PAYGs) to the full funding defined contribution system managed by the private funding companies. The Chilean privatization reform influenced not only the neighbor South American countries but also the advanced countries. The United Kingdom contracted out the state earning related pension system. Australia and Sweden recently introduced the private investment accounts system. And now the hot debates on the privatization of the social security pension is going on in the United States of America. This wind of privatizing the public pension system is being backed up by the New Liberalism, the nowadays' strongest ideology. Besides, the theoretical and idealogical debate between the World Bank and the ILO/ISSA was happened in the middle of 1990s. The World Bank, the supporter of the international financial capital, insisted the introducing of the full funding individual accounts system and the abolition of the existing PAYGs. The ILO/ISSA apposed the World Bank's policies and advocated the moderate reform of the PAYGs. In this paper, I reviewed the Chilean reform, the World Bank's report and the opposing argument of the ILO/ISSA against it, and analysed the core issues of the two sides. Also, I tried to present the suggestions to the Korean public pension systems. Through the discussing the debate, we made certain of the importance of the basic issues in the social security system like equity vs. adequacy, inter-generational redistribution vs. intra-generational redistribution and welfare vs. economy, once again.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.51
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• pp.5-28
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• 2002

The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues and the characteristics of the recent social security pension debate in the United States. For the purpose the transforming process from the funded system to the pay-as-you-go system in the 1930s, three alternatives of social security reform proposed by the Social Security Administration in 1996, and the other various alternatives proposed by the politicians, the business leaders and the scholars were analysed. While the alternatives were compared, the critical issues could be identified. The core issues were as follows. First, the individual accounts should be newly made or not? Second, who is the main administrator, government or private investment companies? Third, what is important, the inter-generational and the vertical income redistribution effect or the individual equity in social security pension system? Besides, the different positions of the social forces were also examined. The supporters of privatizing the social security pension, supporters of IA and PSA, prefer the value of equity, the effect of promoting savings, the private management of the social security funds, and the investment of the funds to the private capital markets. The supporters of pay-as-you-go system, supporters of MB, prefer the inter-generational and the vertical income redistribution effect of social security pension, and were convinced that fundamental changes of the systems are not necessary, and the insolvency problem could be overcome through a few reform, for example, increasing the rate and decreasing the benefits.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.38 no.4
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• pp.1-29
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• 2015

The Individual Retirement Pension (IRP) enables workers to continuously receive a retirement pension even when workers change their jobs in different companies and so it performs a bridge fund as the complimentary living expenses until they receive government public pension. Although the Korean government has forced workers to maintain an IRP account until their retirement age and to close their accounts only when they want to do so, it is not clear to measure its really effectiveness and, in fact, most of IRP accounts have been terminated immediately after the changes of their jobs. In this respect, IRP has not performed the bridge role for the future retirement pension income. We provide an economic decision-making model of both government and workers, where the retirement benefits related with the IRP are explicitly considered. Our model is required to select specific severance pay systems to maximize the income security and stability for their future old ages. It is concluded that the need of workers on the severance pay system is automatically revealed into the switch to IRP when workers are out from their current jobs, which is equivalent to the effect of gradually unifying the dual system of the retirement payment. In additoin, our empirical data indicates the relatively higher probability of termination on IRP for the older male workers having the more retirement deposit.