• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.94
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• pp.53-87
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• 2011

Leibniz regards a corporeal substance, which is composed of monads, as 'one substance' and tries to prove that it has a true unity. This position seems to be contradictionary to his Monadology. Therefore, many scholars have ignored Leibniz's stand that corporeal substance is 'one substance', or consider this only as a stand from his theory of substance in his early works, which has been discarded afterwards. This Research will show that Leibniz adheres to this position throughout his lifetime; that although Leibniz uses the concepts such as substantial form and substantial bond to explain his stand, but the concept of substancial bond doesn't fit in with his philosophical system; that to explain the unity of the corporeal substance, the concept of substancial form and the theory of preestablished harmony are sufficient; and that nevertheless the stand that the corporeal substance is 'one substance' inconsistent with the position that the monad is 'one substance'; and that if Leibniz abandons that stand, the theory of the corporeal substance is a good foundation of his panorganism.