• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.39C no.4
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• pp.400-406
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• 2014

In this paper, we propose an approach to minimizing total power consumption by deploying multiple clean-up robots simultaneously in a given area. For this, we propose to use the cooperative game theoretic approaches (i.e., Nash bargaining solution (NBS)) such that the robots can optimally and fairly negotiate the area division based on available resources and characteristics of the area, thereby leading to the minimum total power consumption. We define a utility function that includes power consumptions for characteristics of areas and the robots can agree on a utility pair based on the NBS. Simulation results show that the proposed approach can reduce the total average power consumption by 15-30% compared to a random area division approach.

• Journal of Gifted/Talented Education
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.59-80
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• 2017

In this study, we investigate social preference of gifted students by analyzing their behaviors in social dilemma situations. We conducted an experimental study using ultimatum games and public goods games with 132 academically gifted middle school students who attended the Ewha-Seodaemun Center for gifted education from 2012 to 2016. We also experimented the same games with 87 regular students for comparative analysis. The result of ultimatum game experiment shows that there is no statistical difference in the proposed share of both groups. Their proposed share ranges from 37% to 38% as expected in other similar studies. However, the rejection rate of the respondents to the proposals with small share are significantly higher among gifted students than among their regular counterparts. This result implies that the gifted students show stronger negative reciprocity, meaning that they tend to punish selfish behaviors even when it takes some costs. In finitely repeated public goods game experiments, the results show that both groups' contribution rates decrease toward the end of the experiments. However, the gifted students show strategic cooperation by attempting to increase the other members' contribution rate within an experimental group. This implies that gifted students tend to care more about how to increase their own expected rewards by reciprocating other students' behaviors.

• Review of Culture and Economy
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.63-80
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• 2014

This study evaluates the importance of negotiation agendas and the possibility of reaching the Korea-China FTA agreement. It assesses the current situation of trade barriers in the audiovisual service sector of China and then examines a survey of practitioners and experts to screen important regulations. The results are as follows: First, considering the national economic situation in Korea and the environment of the Chinese trade barrier, an important agenda is to enable the direct service of online games and to reach a co-production agreement in the audiovisual service sector. Second, an agenda regarding the co-production agreement of an audio-visual service sector has high potential to be realized, followed by agendas regarding online game and music services. In the broadcasting and film service sectors, with their high cultural identity, a mutual cooperative approach is needed. Korea bringing up the agenda regarding online service may allow it to gain a net benefit for the next FATs. To realize a mutual cooperative approach, it is necessary to form a frame of mutual interests and cooperation through a co-production agreement of audio-visual service. If both countries agree to acknowledge co-produced content as each country's contents, both would benefit.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.75-83
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• 2015

In mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), nodes are mobile in nature. Collaboration between mobile nodes is more significant in MANETs, which have as their greatest challenges vulnerabilities to various security attacks and an inability to operate securely while preserving its resources and performing secure routing among nodes. Therefore, it is essential to develop an effective secure routing protocol to protect the nodes from anonymous behaviors. Currently, game theory is a tool that analyzes, formulates and solves selfishness issues. It is seldom applied to detect malicious behavior in networks. It deals, instead, with the strategic and rational behavior of each node. In our study,we used the dynamic Bayesian signaling game to analyze the strategy profile for regular and malicious nodes. This game also revealed the best actions of individual strategies for each node. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) provides a prominent solution for signaling games to solve incomplete information by combining strategies and payoff of players that constitute equilibrium. Using PBE strategies of nodes are private information of regular and malicious nodes. Regular nodes should be cooperative during routing and update their payoff, while malicious nodes take sophisticated risks by evaluating their risk of being identified to decide when to decline. This approach minimizes the utility of malicious nodes and it motivates better cooperation between nodes by using the reputation system. Regular nodes monitor continuously to evaluate their neighbors using belief updating systems of the Bayes rule.

• Korean Journal of Child Studies
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.193-208
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• 2004

This study purported to empirically examine joy expression and its cognitive and social contexts in children's play. The following question was asked: 1) What kind(s) of emotional expression(s) can be considered as a defining feature of play? 2) What cognitive/social play contexts are associated with joy expression. 30 children aged 3, 4, and 5 years were observed in terms of the length of each emotional expression at play/nonplay, and at cognitive/social play categories. The findings of this study showed that regardless of children's age and gender only joy expression could be considered as a defining feature of play, and that R&T play and chase games, or associative and cooperative social play were strongly related to joy expression. The findings were discussed in reference with existing assertions and perspectives, emphasizing the importance of joy expression in defining children's play despite of the predominance of interest expression in play. The findings were also discussed in reference with metacommunication functions and social construction of joy, considering cognitive/social contexts of joy. Implications for play researchers and practitioners were described in terms of developing playful learning strategies for childhood. Limitations of this study, and suggestions for further research were also provided.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.79-90
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• 2019

As an increasing number of cloud service providers begin to provide cloud computing services, they form a competitive market to compete for users. Due to different resource configurations and service workloads, users may observe different response times for their service requests and experience different levels of service quality. To compete for cloud users, it is crucial for each cloud service provider to determine an optimal price that best corresponds to their service qualities while also guaranteeing maximum profit. To achieve this goal, the underlying rationale and characteristics in this competitive market must be clarified. In this paper, we analyze price competition in the multimedia cloud service market with two service providers. We characterize the nature of non-cooperative games in a duopoly multimedia cloud service market with the goal of capturing how each cloud service provider determines its optimal price to compete with the other and maximize its own profit. To do this, we introduce a queueing model to characterize the service process in a multimedia cloud data center. Based on performance measures of the proposed queueing model, we suggest a price competition problem in a duopoly multimedia cloud service market. By solving this problem, we can obtain the optimal equilibrium prices.

• Korean Journal of Child Education & Care
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.179-189
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• 2018

Objective: This study composed a melody program through handbells, and applied it to the mixed-age edu-care children. Methods: This study implemented a handbell melody program suitable for children's interest and development characteristics, based on Nuri Curriculum, to 15 mixed-aged edu-care children aged 3 to 4 at C Kindergarten located in Seoul for 12 weeks (once a week) from October 2015. Results: The program consisted of the origin of handbell, promises to keep in playing the handbell, partial literary introduction, and musical note activities using teaching aids or games in an integrated way with other areas. Through the program, dynamic class could be carried out with mutual leading participation of a teacher and children. Consequently, children aged 3 to 4 could easily encounter playing the handbell, being interested in playing, and showed cooperative spirit and society-friendly behaviors. The mixed age edu-care teacher felt pleasure and achievement of challenge by performing the class herself, which had depended upon extracurricular activities. Conclusion/Implications: A further study as action research for edu-care teachers, focused on change of edu-care teachers themselves, is proposed.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.29-53
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• 2012

As so many marketers get to use diverse sales promotion methods, manufacturer and retailer in a channel often use them too. In this context, diverse issues on sales promotion management arise. One of them is the issue of unplanned buying. Consumers' unplanned buying is clearly better off for the retailer but not for manufacturer. This asymmetric influence of unplanned buying should be dealt with prudently because of its possibility of provocation of channel conflict. However, there have been scarce studies on the sales promotion management strategy considering the unplanned buying and its asymmetric effect on retailer and manufacturer. In this paper, we try to find a better way for a manufacturer in a channel to promote performance through the retailer's sales promotion efforts when there is potential of unplanned buying effect. We investigate via game-theoretic modeling what is the optimal cost sharing level between the manufacturer and retailer when there is unplanned buying effect. We investigated following issues about the topic as follows: (1) What structure of cost sharing mechanism should the manufacturer and retailer in a channel choose when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? (2) How much payoff could the manufacturer and retailer in a channel get when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? We focus on the impact of unplanned buying effect on the optimal cost sharing mechanism for sales promotions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a same channel. So we consider two players in the game, a manufacturer and a retailer who are interacting in a same distribution channel. The model is of complete information game type. In the model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. Variables in the model are as following table. Manufacturer's objective function in the basic game is as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. And retailer's is as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+p_u(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. The model is of four stages in two periods. Stages of the game are as follows. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the first period($w_1$) and cost sharing level of channel sales promotion(${\Psi}$). (Stage 2) Retailer sets retail price of the focal brand($p_1$), the unplanned buying item($p_u$), and sales promotion level(L). (Stage 3) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the second period($w_2$). (Stage 4) Retailer sets retail price of the second period($p_2$). Since the model is a kind of dynamic games, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive some theoretical and managerial implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the backward induction method. In using backward induction approach, we solve the problems backward from stage 4 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each variable in the basic game is as following table. We conducted more analysis of additional game about diverse cost level of manufacturer. Manufacturer's objective function in the additional game is same with that of the basic game as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. But retailer's objective function is different from that of the basic game as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+(p_u-c)(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. Equilibrium of each variable in this additional game is as following table. Major findings of the current study are as follows: (1) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer and retailer had better increase the cost for sales promotion. (2) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer had better decrease the cost sharing portion of total cost for sales promotion. (3) Manufacturer's profit is increasing function of the unplanned buying effect. (4) All results of (1),(2),(3) are alleviated by the increase of retailer's procurement cost to acquire unplanned buying items. The authors discuss the implications of those results for the marketers in manufacturers or retailers. The current study firstly suggests some managerial implications for the manufacturer how to share the sales promotion cost with the retailer in a channel to the high or low level of the consumers' unplanned buying potential.