• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.225-242
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• 2005

Consciousness dualists argue that materialism is false because of the conceivability of zombie which has no consciousness. The argument from conceivability applies to consciousness asymmetrically with $Water=H_2O$ whose identity was already established. However I think that argument is unsound because asymmetric application Is implausible. First, the metaphysical sap between water and $H_2O$ must be filled not by conceptual analysis, but by empirical methods: the neuroscientific developments will fill the metaphysical gap of consciousness. Second, consciousness dualists said it is illusion when we seem to conceive of $H_2O$ without water, but it is not illusion when we conceive the tumble with no consciousness. I argue it is also illusion in the case of latter. So two cases must be concerned equally.

• International journal of advanced smart convergence
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.71-76
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• 2022

The continuous development of virtual reality technology in the last five years has brought about a big change in the future film industry. Interactive VR movies using virtual reality technology in movies showed the result of increasing the immersion of the audience due to the characteristics of interaction. This will provide a unique opportunity for a new experience of immersion in various forms of cinema in the near future. In this paper, the interaction of narrative VR movies was studied as an example of the movie , which won the [The Best VR Experience Award] at the Venice International Film Festival, In future development, improve the scene transition, Dizziness, Ways of interaction and other questions, let the audience increase the sense of participation, immersion and curiosity when watching movies, and make watching movies a more interesting thing in life.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.94
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• pp.163-192
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• 2011

A posteriori physicalists criticize non-physicalist arguments based on the framework of two-dimensional semantics. Most of them argue for physicalism based on the analogy between scientific identity statements and psychophysical identity statements. This paper argues for another version of aposteriori physicalism, so called physicalism employing 'phenomenal concept strategy' or 'exceptionalist strategy', which appeals to merely the nature of phenomenal concept without recourse to a semantic framework. Loar's phenomenal concept strategy employs the aspect of our recognitional ability of objects in criticizing non-physicalism, leading to the argument that phenomenal concepts are 'exceptional' in applying conceivability-possibility link. I critically examine Stoljar's, Chalmers', Raffman's criticisms against Loar's exceptionalists strategy. Loar's phenomenal concept strategy reflects well our psychological aspects surrounding the acquisition and the possession of 'phenomenal concept'. In several respects, Loar's exceptionalist version of a posteriori physicalism is the best explanation for accounting for both the explanatory gap and the a posteriority of psychophysical identity.