• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.8
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• pp.484-489
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• 2004

When the energy resource available to a particular plant (be it coal, oil, gas, water, or nuclear fuel) is a limiting factor in the operation of the plant, the entire economic dispatch calculation must be done differently. Each economic dispatch calculation must account for what happened before and what will happen in the future. This paper presents a formulation and a solution method for the optimization problem with a fuel constraint in a competitive electricity market. Take-or- Pay (TOP) contract for an energy resource is the typical constraint as a limiting factor. Two approaches are proposed in this paper for modeling the dispatch calculation in a market mechanism. The approaches differ in the subject who considers and inserts the fuel-constraint into its optimization problem. Market operator and each power producer having a TOP contract are assumed as such subjects. The two approaches are compared from the viewpoint of profits. surplus. and social welfare on the basis of Nash Equilibrium.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.391-393
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• 2000

This paper presents an new algorithm for the economic load dispatch considering the reliability level constraints of composite power system under deregulated electricity market. It is the traditional ELD problem that generation powers have been dispatched In order to minimize total fuel cost subjected to constraints which sum of powers generated must equal the received load and no violating lower and upper limit constraints on generation. Under deregulated electricity market, however, generation powers of a pool have to be reallocated newly in order to satisfy the reliability differentiated level required at a load point because of a reliability differentiated electricity service which is a part of the priority service. In this study, new economic load dispatch algorithm for reallocating the generation powers of a pool in order to satisfy the reliability differentiated level under deregulated competitive electricity market is proposed. The uncertainties of not only generators but also transmission lines are considered fer the reliability evaluation. The characteristics and effectiveness of this methodology are illustrated by the case studies on MRBTS and IEEE-RTS.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.07a
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• pp.127-129
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• 2007

Since the competitive market environment was introduced into the electric power industry, the structure of the industry has been changing from vertically integrated system to functionally unbundled and decentralized system composed of multiple (decision-making) market participants. So the market participants such as Gencos or LSE (load serving entity) need to forecast the market clearing price and thus build their offer or bidding strategies. Not just these market players but also a market operator is required to perform market analysis and ensure simulation capability to manage and monitor the competitive electricity market. For fulfilling the demand for market simulation, many global venders like GE, Henwood, Drayton Analytics, CRA, etc. have developed and provided electricity market simulators. Most of these simulators are based on the optimization formulation which has been used mainly for the least cost resource planning in the centralized power system planning and operation. From this standpoint, it seems somehow inevitable to face many challenges on modeling competitive market based on the method of traditional market simulators. In this paper, we propose a kind of new method, which is MAS based market simulation. The agent based model has already been introduced in EMCAS, one of commercial market simulators, but there may be various ways of modeling agent. This paper, in particular, seeks to introduce an model for MAS based market simulator.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.7
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• pp.311-316
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• 2002

It has been a basic model for the present electric power industry that more than two generators compete, and thereby the market clearing price and the generation schedules are determined through the bid process. In order for this paradigm to be applicable to real electric power systems and markets, it is necessary to reflect many physical and economic constraints related to frequency and transmission in the dispatching schedule. The paper presents an approach to deriving a Nash bargaining solution in a competitive electricity market where multiple generators are playing with the system operator who mitigates the transmission congestion to minimize the total transaction cost. In this study, we take the effect of the line flows and the role of system operator into the Game. Finally, a case study has been demonstrated to verify the proposed cooperative game.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2001.05a
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• pp.535-535
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• 2001

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.10
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• pp.1731-1737
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• 2007

The Korea electricity wholesale market is operated under the cost-based-pool system and the government regulation to the new generation capacities in order to insure the resource adequacy. The goal of government's regulation is the electricity market stability by attracting proper generation investment while keeping the reliability of system. Generation companies must mandatory observe that government plan by now. But if the restructuring is to be complete, generation companies should not bear any obligation to invest unless their profitability is guaranteed. Namely the investors' behavior will be affected by the market prices. In this paper, the system dynamics model for Korea wholesale electricity market to examine whether competitive market can help to stabilize is developed and analyzes the investors behavior. The simulation results show that market controlled by government will be operated stable without resulting in price spike but there is no lower price because of maintaining the reasonable reserve margin. However, if the competition is introduced and the new investment is determined by the investor's decision without government intervention, the benefits from lower wholesale price are expected. Nevertheless, the volatility in the wholesale market increases, which increases the investment risks.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.431-438
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• 2011

To ensure that equipment outages do not directly impact the reliability of the ISO-controlled grid, market participants request permission and receive approval for planned outages from the independent system operator (ISO) in competitive electricity markets. In the face of major generation outages, the ISO will make a critical decision as regards the scheduling of the essential maintenance for myriads of generating units over a fixed planning horizon in accordance with security and adequacy assessments. Mainly, we are concerned with a fundamental framework for ISO's maintenance coordination in order to determine precedence of conflicting outages. Simulated annealing, a powerful, general-purpose optimization methodology suitable for real combinatorial search problems, is used. Generally, the ISO will put forward its best effort to adjust individual generator maintenance schedules according to the time preferences of each power generator (GENCO) by taking advantage of several factors such as installed capacity and relative weightings assigned to the GENCOs. Thus, computer testing on a four-GENCO model is conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method and the applicability of the solution scheme to large-scale maintenance scheduling coordination problems.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.376-378
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• 2000

The current worldwide electricity market introduced competition, which is breaking up the monopoly structure and also enforcing phased structural reform in South Korea. The change of the electricity charge from cost base to price base due to the introduction of the electricity market competition causes consumer to choose a variety of charge schemes and a portion of loads to be affected by this change. Therefore, in order to find a mathematical model of the sensitively-responding-to-price loads and reflect this to the DSM demand management, the price-sensitive load model is needed. Thus, this paper first proposes the composite price-sensitive load model that is expressed as a function of price, presents the methodology to estimate price-sensitive load model at each bus by bus load compositions.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.50 no.8
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• pp.379-387
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• 2001

This paper shows that we can make simple modifications to an existing optimal power flow(OPF) algorithm that minimizes generation costs in order to solve the maximization of social welfare objective of the OPF in a competitive electric power market. We have illustrated the potential for the use of OPF in light of the marked impacts on nodal prices and generation/demand allocation levels among competing suppliers. This paper can provide all market players with the transparent information that ensures sufficient control over producers and consumers in case of economic of secure operation with transmission line outage while maximizing the sum of participants social benefit of participating in the electricity energy market.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.42-46
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• 2003

The economic operation of a utility in a deregulated environment brings about optimization problems different from those in vertically integrated one［1］. While each utility operates its own generation capacity to maximize profit, the market operator (or system operator) manages and allocates all the system resources and facilities to achieve the maximum social welfare. This paper presents a sequential application of non-cooperative and cooperative game theories in analyzing the entire power transaction process.